Essays on Industrial Organization and Health Care Economics by Brown, Zachary Y.
Essays on Industrial Organization and Health Care
Economics
Zachary Y. Brown
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy







Essays on Industrial Organization and Health Care Economics
Zachary Y. Brown
A central tenet of industrial organization is that market concentration leads to higher
prices. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that the market for health care is
unique due to its complexity, and it is often difficult for consumers to make fully informed
decisions. Might information frictions exacerbate market power in concentrated markets
and lead to higher prices? While a growing literature seeks to address this question in a
number of contexts, this dissertation focuses on the lack of price transparency in health
care. I argue that the inability of consumers to compare prices is a major factor leading to
high prices when health care is provided by the private market.
In Chapter 1, I use a dataset covering all private medical claims in a state to exam-
ine the introduction of a state-run website providing detailed information about out-of-
pocket prices for a subset of medical procedures. Exploiting plausibly exogenous varia-
tion across procedures available on the website as well as the timing of the introduction,
I use a difference-in-difference approach and find significant savings for both consumers
and insurers. Part of the effect is due to consumers switching to lower cost providers.
However, there is a small but significant supply-side effects in the long-run, i.e. there
are lower negotiated prices. These lower prices benefit all insured individuals including
those that do not use the website. Supply-side effects reduce price dispersion and are
especially relevant when medical providers operate in concentrated markets.
A relatively small fraction of consumers actually used the price transparency website
when it was available. Therefore, it is important to understand why more consumers
aren’t using the price transparency tool and what would happen if more consumers were
informed about prices. Answering this question requires a structural model, which is the
focus of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2, I study demand for health care services when at least some consumers
lack full information about prices. By exploiting the variation from the introduction of
the website, I am able to separately identify consumer price sensitivity and the degree of
uncertainty about prices. I also explicitly model the decision to use the price transparency
website when it is available. This structural approach yields two main advantages over
the reduced-form approach. First, the model can be used to examine what would happen
if more consumers were incentivized to use the price transparency website. Second, the
model provides insight into the welfare effects of price information.
Finally, the reduced-form evidence that there is a supply-side effect of the website
when even a small fraction of consumers are informed motivates a more in depth analysis
of the supply-side. Chapter 3 combines the demand model of Chapter 2 with a model of
bargaining between medical providers and insurers to examine how price transparency
affects equilibrium prices. Model estimates and difference-in-differences estimates both
imply that the website reduces health care spending by 3 to 4 percent. I then use the
model to examine the effects of price transparency more generally. In counterfactual sim-
ulations, I find that price transparency would generate a substantial reduction in equilib-
rium prices if a larger fraction of consumers in the market were informed. Combining the
price transparency website with high cost sharing would give individuals more incentive
to use the price transparency tool, reducing health care spending by 18 percent.
My research is intended to inform the policy debate surrounding the value of health
care price transparency tools. In sum, I argue that while the value of price transparency
tools is modest when only a small fraction of consumers are incentivized to use the tools,
the savings become quite substantial when enough consumers are informed about prices.
Contents
List of Tables v
List of Figures vii
Acknowledgements viii
1 Effects of Health Care Price Transparency: A Reduced-Form Approach 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Institutional Details and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Effect on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.2 Effect on Transaction Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.4 Heterogenous Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.5 Demand-Side Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.6 Supply-Side Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.7 Price Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Effect on Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
i
1.6 Insurance Choice and Insurance Plan Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 An Empirical Model of Price Transparency and Demand for Health Care Ser-
vices 40
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.1.2 Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Data and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.1 New Hampshire Medical Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.2 HealthCost Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Demand for Providers and Website Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.1 Model Setup and Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.2 Choice of Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.3 Website Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.4 Joint Estimation of Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4.1 Estimates from Multinomial Logit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4.2 Provider Choice and Website Usage Estimates from Baseline Model . 79
2.4.3 Estimates under Alternative Demand Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.5 Demand-Side Out-of-Sample Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3 An Empirical Model of Price Transparency and Bargaining 87
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.1.1 Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2 Bargaining between Providers and Insurers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.1 Bargaining Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
ii
3.2.2 First Order Condition of the Bargaining Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.2.3 Estimation and Identification of Bargaining Model . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 Estimates from Supply Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Effect of the Price Transparency Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4.1 Comparison with Difference-in-Differences Estimates . . . . . . . . . 102
3.4.2 Effect Conditional on using the Price Transparency Website . . . . . 104
3.5 Out-of-Sample Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5.1 Effect of Increased Price Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5.2 Effect of Price Transparency Combined with High Cost Sharing . . . 109
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Bibliography 114
Appendix 125
Appendix A: Additional Details on Data Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Appendix B: Effect on Price Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Appendix C: Treatment Heterogeneity by Price Quantile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Appendix D: Additional Figures for Reduced-Form Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Appendix E: Additional Tables for Reduced-Form Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Appendix F: Derivation of Website Usage Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Appendix G: Details on Bayesian Interpretation of the Demand Model and Esti-
mation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Appendix H: Details on Bargaining First Order Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Appendix I: Details on Procedure for Simulating Equilibrium Prices . . . . . . . . 142
Appendix J: Structural Model Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Appendix K: Structural Model Appendix Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
iii
List of Tables
1.1 The Potential Cost Savings if Consumers Switched to Low Price Providers . 8
1.2 The Availability of Outpatient Radiology Procedure Price Information on
Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Summary of Privately Insured Individuals with Radiology Claims . . . . . . 13
1.4 Summary of Outpatient Radiology Visit Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price Baseline Difference-
in-Difference Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Out-of-Pocket Price By
Insurer Organization Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Out-of-Pocket Price By
Patient Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.8 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Search Behavior and Provider
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.9 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Supply-Side . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.10 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Supply-Side Principal Proce-
dure Price By Herfindahl Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.11 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Price Dispersion . . . . . . . . . 32
1.12 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Quantity . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Summary of Privately Insured Individuals with Medical Imaging Claims . . 50
iv
2.2 Summary of Medical Imaging Visits by Insurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Monthly Percent of Consumers with Price Information By Procedure Listed
on Price Transparency Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4 MCMC Estimates for Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1 Bargaining Model Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Marginal Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.3 Intent-to-Treat Effect of Price Transparency Website Comparison with Re-
duced Form Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4 Effect for Individuals Predicted to have Used the Transparency Website . . 105
3.5 Counterfactual Negotiated Provider Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.6 Counterfactual Cost, Welfare, and Expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.7 Counterfactual Net Welfare Impact for Consumers, Providers, and Insurers 111
A1 Radiology Procedures with Price Information Available on HealthCost Web-
site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
A2 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price Robustness Estimates134
A3 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price Falsification Test . . 135
A4 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Price Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A5 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Out-of-Pocket Price by Insurer
Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A6 The Price Transparency Website and Insurance Composition by Insurance
Type and Insurance Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A7 List of Medical Imaging Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
A8 Potential Savings from Switching Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A9 Estimates from Multinomial Logit Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A10 Counterfactual Provider Markups and Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
v
List of Figures
1.1 Website Searches for Health Care Prices By Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price By Time from Web-
site Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Supply-Side By Time from
Website Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Density of Consumers and Location of Medical Imaging Providers . . . . . 49
2.2 Price Variation within Individuals’ Choice Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Price Transparency Website Usage for Medical Imaging Procedures By Month 57
2.4 Consumer Surplus when Expected Price Differs from Actual Price . . . . . . 69
2.5 Example of Beliefs for Uninformed Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.6 Demand-Side Effect of Price Transparency on Spending By Fraction on In-
dividuals with Price Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1 Effect of Price Transparency on Medical Imaging Spending By Fraction on
Individuals with Price Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A1 Distribution of Herfindahl index Across Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A2 Composition of Insurer Firm and Insurance Type by Month . . . . . . . . . 131
A3 The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price by Price Quantile . . 131
A4 Cost Sharing and Deductible Status By Month of Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A5 Prices Variation within Individuals’ Choice Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
vi
A6 Distribution of Estimated Website Usage Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
A7 Distribution of Counterfactual Negotiated Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
vii
Acknowledgements
There are large number of people who contributed to this dissertation and I owe a
huge debt of gratitude to all of them. First and foremost, I am very grateful to my ad-
visor Kate Ho for motivating me to work on the industrial organization of healthcare,
as well as providing invaluable guidance and advice. I benefited greatly from being her
student, research assistant, teaching assistant, and advisee. I also benefited greatly from
in depth discussions and feedback from Mike Riordan, Chris Conlon, Tobias Salz, Adam
Kapor, Doug Almond, Bernard Salanié, Bentley Macleod, Fanyin Zheng, Matt Backus,
and Tal Gross. I am positive that this dissertation would not exist without these indi-
viduals. I also greatly benefited from the broader Columbia community. In particular,
I relish my discussions with Ilton Sores, Paul Piveteau, Evan Riehl, Ildikó Magyari, Joe
Hogan, Jessica Van Parys, and Nicolás de Roux, among others. I especially appreciate
Chris Hansman being there when I wanted to bounce ideas around, and for shooting
down bad ones. I also am thankful for the support of Shane Bordeau and Amy Devine.
Outside of Columbia, I thank Mary Fields, Tyler Brannen, Maureen Mustard, and the
New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services for providing data and in-
sight into the New Hampshire HealthCost website. I also benefited from over a decade
of economics discussions with Melanie Wasserman. This dissertation was also supported
by the National Science Foundation.
I am also thankful for the experience I had at the Council of Economic Advisers in 2014.
viii
Conversations with Jordan Matsudaira, Matt Fiedler, Betsey Stevenson, Gabe Scheffler,
Kevin Rinz, John Coglianese, and Martha Gimbel motivated my research and furthered
my understanding of economic policy.
I am grateful to numerous seminar participants that provided feedback on parts of
this dissertation. At Columbia, I benefited from participants in the Industrial Orga-
nization Seminar, Industrial Organization Colloquium, Applied Microeconomics Collo-
quium, and Econometrics Colloquium. I also greatly benefited from seminar participants
at University of Washington, University of Michigan, University of Wisconsin, Pomona
College, Wharton, University of Massachusetts Amherst, INSEAD, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, and NBER.
I want to thank my family for constant support regardless of the circumstances. I could
not have done this without your advice, guidance, and patience. And finally, there is one
person that made me eternally grateful that I was able to come to Columbia. Mica, I am
continually in awe of your kindness and intellectual creativity. I value our conversations
about economics almost as much as I value our conversations on other topics. Given that
we work as a team, perhaps all errors and omissions should not be our own.
ix
Chapter 1





While the price of health care procedures varies widely across medical providers, these
prices are often difficult for patients to observe. Consequently, individuals often choose
providers without full information about prices.1 A large theoretical literature, beginning
with Stigler (1961) and Diamond (1971), argues that information frictions can impede
competition and lead to higher prices. In recent years, technological innovations have
made it easier for consumers to compare prices in a number of markets, with important
implications for the equilibria in these markets (Clay, Krishnan and Wolff 2001; Morton,
Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso 2001; Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Goldmanis et al. 2010).
In this paper I ask how information about health care prices affects the market for
health care services in equilibrium, focusing on both the demand- and supply-side re-
sponse. While we expect consumers to benefit by choosing low-cost providers, price
transparency may also allow insurers to negotiate lower prices with health care providers.
This is because increased demand elasticity with respect to prices may generate lower de-
mand for high cost providers, giving them an incentive to lower price. These supply-side
effects could benefit all consumers, including those that do not use the information. Ef-
fects on negotiated health care prices are especially important given that high health care
expenditure in the United States is often attributed to high prices.2
I exploit the introduction of a publicly-provided website that allows individuals to ac-
cess information about their out-of-pocket price for certain medical procedures. While
previously studied price transparency efforts have primarily been conducted by specific
employers, the website provided information that could be used by all privately-insured
individuals in the state. This potentially generated significant supply-side effects in addi-
tion to demand-side effects. I employ a difference-in-difference methodology that takes
1Surveys show that consumers rarely compare prices for medical services. See “How Much Will it Cost?
How Americans Use Prices in Health Care,” Public Agenda (2015).
2For instance, see Anderson et al. (2003), Koechlin, Lorenzoni and Schreyer (2010), and Cooper et al.
(2015).
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advantage of two sources of variation, namely the timing of the website introduction and
variation among procedures available on the website. I focus on the universe of outpa-
tient radiology visits, which account for over 14 million claims, since information about
prices was only available for a subset of radiology procedures. Thus, radiology proce-
dures not on the website can be used as a control group. I argue that whether a radiology
procedure was on the website is unlikely to be correlated with demand and cost fac-
tors that change over time. This allows me to provide the first evidence on the long-run
equilibrium effect of information about out-of-pocket prices. By observing detailed in-
formation on copay, coinsurance, deductible, and insurer payments, I also provide new
evidence about how insurers and patients split the savings that result from price trans-
parency.
First, I examine transaction prices, which include both demand- and supply-side ef-
fects. Over the five year period after the website started, there is a 6.9 percent reduction in
out-of-pocket prices for radiology visits on the website relative to radiology procedures
not on the website. This effect increases over time and by the fifth year, out-of-pocket
prices are 14.6 percent lower relative to the control group. Individuals with the most to
gain from using the website—those under their deductible—see more than double the
savings over the period. These results are highly significant and robust to the inclusion
of procedure category specific time trends, individual fixed effects, and detailed insurer
and individual controls.
Next, I examine the mechanisms driving the reduction in transaction prices. On the
demand-side, individuals with access to the website are more likely to choose a different
provider than their last radiology visit relative to individuals who cannot use the website.
In particular, individuals were more likely to choose a provider in the lowest decile of the
price distribution in their county relative to when the website is not available. These
lower-cost options tend to be non-hospital providers such as imaging centers or clinics.
Although demand-side effects are present throughout the period, I find evidence that
3
supply-side effects are important in the long-run. I analyze the supply-side effects using
a difference-in-difference specification that controls for demand-side effects. Specifically,
I include provider-procedure-insurer fixed effects that control for transaction price dif-
ferences due to switching across providers. Since providers and insurers only negotiate
a new price schedule at most once a year, the supply-side effect may take time to mate-
rialize. The estimates imply that providers reduce their prices in the long-run, defined
as more than two years after the introduction of the website. Visit prices decline by 2.2
percent and principal procedure prices decline by 4.7 percent.3 The effect is greater for
providers operating in concentrated markets that are likely to have the highest margins
in the absence of the website.
Access to price information may also affect whether individuals decide to receive care,
affecting quantity of visits. If individuals know they can choose a low-cost provider,
they may be more likely to get a radiology procedure. Conversely, if prices are higher
than they expected, price information may decrease quantity. I examine these utilization
effects using the same sources of variation. For the majority of procedures, the results
imply no effect on the quantity of care. These results are quite precise, and robust to vari-
ous specifications. The exception is mammograms, which generally are elective screening
procedures at the discretion of patients. The quantity of mammograms increases after the
introduction of the website relative to radiology procedures not on the website, however
it is important to note that I can not rule out confounding factors such as changes in physi-
cian recommendations over time. The website may have also affected insurance choice,
although there is little evidence that changes in the composition of insurance enrollment
explain the effect of the website. In addition, an event study implies little overall effect
on insurance choice.
A theoretical literature has found that price dispersion can result from information fric-
tions in the market. Even markets with homogenous products can exhibit price disper-
3As explaining in Section 1.3, visit price includes all supplemental line items that are part of a radiology
visit while principal procedure price refers to the cost of the individual radiology procedure.
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sion in equilibrium. This is true with heterogenous consumers (Salop and Stiglitz 1977)
as well as homogenous consumers (Burdett and Judd 1983). In order to test the theoret-
ical prediction that price dispersion in the market for health care services is due in part
to information frictions, I use a similar difference-in-difference methodology to directly
examine a measure of price dispersion. The estimates imply that access to the website
reduces price dispersion, as measured by the interquartile range of negotiated principal
procedure prices, by $47 on average relative to the price dispersion of the control proce-
dures.
Prior research has examined the demand-side response to health care price transparency
efforts by individual employers and has found relatively small effects in the short run
(Lieber 2015; Whaley 2015a; Desai et al. 2016). In particular, Desai et al. (2016) finds no
reduction in spending in the year after an employer offers a price transparency tool. Con-
sistent with the this literature, I find modest effects in the initial years. However, I ex-
amine the long-run effects and find larger effects on price. Using website traffic data, I
show evidence it may take time for individuals to learn about the website. In addition,
as I argue below, the previous literature has focused on price transparency efforts that
are available to a small subset of consumers. In contrast, the New Hampshire website
was publicly available to all consumers in the state, therefore supply-side effects may be
important in the long-run.
The evidence on the supply-side effects of market-wide price transparency is quite lim-
ited. While the previous literature has focused on price transparency tools for individual
employers, I examine the introduction of a first-of-its-kind website that was available to
all insured individuals in a state.4 Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2011) discuss the potential
implications of New Hampshire’s price transparency website and note that supply-side
4Whaley (2015b) focuses on a website providing information to specific employers and finds a reduction
in the price of laboratory tests using an event-study methodology. In addition, Christensen, Floyd and
Maffett (2015) examine the effect of information about list prices (rather than out-of-pocket prices) and find
little evidence of effects on negotiated prices.
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effects may be important, but the effects may take time to materialize.5 Using individual-
level data on outpatient radiology visits by all insured individuals in New Hampshire,
this paper provides the first evidence quantifying the overall equilibrium effects of price
transparency for both individuals and insurers in a state. Understanding the equilibrium
effects are particularly relevant given that many states are currently considering price
transparency legislation.6
This paper is also related to work examining how prices are determined through insurer-
provider bargaining. Previous work has focused on network formation, mergers, and
insurer competition (Ho 2009; Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town 2015; Ho and Lee 2017).
Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) develop a model in which hospital demand is a
function of out-of-pocket prices, which then determines negotiated prices in equilibrium.
I contribute to this literature by providing evidence that information about prices can also
affect health care prices in equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1.2 provides additional background
on the website and health care pricing and Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4
describes the main empirical strategy and discusses the demand-side and supply-side
effects on prices. Section 1.5 examines the quantity margin while Section 1.6 examines the
insurance margin. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS AND BACKGROUND
About two-thirds of working-age individuals in the United States have privately pro-
vided health insurance, either through their employer or directly purchased.7 Recent
research has documented a large degree of price dispersion in health care, especially in
5The authors hypothesize that price transparency could either lower or raise prices, but note that “it is
too early to tell what the outcome of experiments with increased transparency will be.”
6At least 27 states proposed price transparency laws in 2015, although many of these proposals would
not mandate disclosure of out-of-pocket prices. Price transparency legislation has also been proposed at
the Federal level. See Nicholson (2015).
7See Smith, Medalia et al. (2014)
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the private sector (Philipson et al. 2010; Newhouse et al. 2013).8 Differences in observable
and unobservable characteristics can only explain a modest portion of the variation in
prices (Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams 2014). Even relatively homogenous medical
services vary in price. For instance, Cooper et al. (2015) find that MRI prices vary by a
factor of 12 across the country.
There is a large degree of price dispersion even within a geographically constrained
area. For example, the total price of a back MRI in New Hampshire for individuals cov-
ered by Anthem, the largest insurer in the state, varies widely, with an upper and lower
quartile of $1,085 to $2,472 respectively. Consequently, the out-of-pocket price paid by
individuals ranges as well, especially for those under their deductible (the out-of-pocket
interquartile range is $143). More generally, Table 1.1 shows the potential savings if all
consumers switched to a low cost provider, defined as a provider in the first quartile of the
price distribution in the state.9 Across a range of procedure categories, savings would be
between 44 and 73 percent. Even if individuals switched to the provider with the median
price they would save 16 to 58 percent on average.
One explanation for why these price differences persist even for relatively homoge-
nous products is that patients lack information about health care prices. Health care prices
are determined through bargaining between insurers and providers, and insurers often
agree not to publicly disclose the negotiated contracts. This is consistent with research on
other markets in which sellers have an incentive for price obfuscation (Ellison and Ellison
2005, 2009). Perhaps for this reason, surveys show that the majority of individuals do not
compare prices before receiving medical care.10
In order to allow health care consumers to find low cost options, the state of New
8Note that a large literature also focuses on variation in Medicare spending (e.g. Fisher et al. 2003; Fisher,
Bynum and Skinner 2009)
9I calculate the first quartile of the price distribution conditional on individuals’ insurance and proce-
dure. I consider the case in which all individuals paying about this price switch to the provider charging
the first quartile price.
10According to a nationally representative survey, 79 percent of individuals stated that they could not
compare prices (or did not even try) before receiving medical care (Public Agenda 2015).
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Table 1.1: The Potential Cost Savings if Consumers Switched to Low Price Providers
Consumers Switch to Consumers Switch to
Mean Total 1st Quartile Provider Median Provider
Procedure Class Visit Price Mean % Savings Mean % Savings
Computed Tomography (CT) 1, 367 562 58.9% 848 38.0%
Mammogram 260 146 44.0% 183 29.8%
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 1, 504 843 44.0% 1, 094 27.3%
Nuclear Imaging 1, 525 815 46.6% 1, 108 27.4%
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 3, 304 1, 976 40.2% 2, 765 16.3%
Ultrasound 464 205 56.0% 275 40.7%
X-Ray 497 135 72.9% 209 58.0%
Notes: The above figures show the average price in 2006 if every consumer paid at most the 25th/50th percentile of visit price in
New Hampshire for each procedure (as defined by CPT/HCPCS) given the consumer’s insurance company and insurance type.
All prices in 2010 dollars.
Hampshire began requiring health insurers operating in the state to submit medical claims
to a centralized database in 2005. These data were then used to calculate the median bun-
dled out-of-pocket prices for various medical procedures. In March 2007, New Hamp-
shire launched their HealthCost website.11 Individuals enter the procedure, their insur-
ance information (including remaining deductible), their zip code, and search radius and
obtain information about each provider’s expected out-of-pocket price, insurer price, and
total price. Results are sorted by out-of-pocket price making it easy to select the least
expensive provider from the point of view of the patient. In addition to information for
insured individuals, the website also has a separate feature providing information for
uninsured individuals.12 More recently, the website has also added information about
provider quality and a guide to health insurance.13 Although other states have since
started price transparency websites of their own, including California, Maryland, Florida,
Oregon, and New Jersey, New Hampshire’s price transparency efforts are the most com-
prehensive.14
11Originally nhhealthcost.org, however the website can now be found at nhhealthcost.nh.gov.
12I do not observe uninsured individuals, and therefore I do not examine the effect of this information.
13This occurred in early 2016, after my period of analysis.
14New Hampshire was the only state to receive an “A” grade from Catalyst for Payment Reform’s 2015
Report Card on State Price Transparency Laws.
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All Website Procedures Website Radiology Procedures
Notes: Includes all searches using “Health Costs for Insured Patients” wizard on either nhhealthcost.nh.gov
or nhhealthcost.org. Website traffic data is not available for the period after 2010 due to a change in the
website host.
At the time it was introduced, the website had price information for about 35 pro-
cedures. In interviews, the administrators of the website noted that a broad subset of
common procedures were chosen with the intention of adding addition procedures over
time. The website focuses on outpatient procedures since patients often schedule these
appointments ahead of time and may have more scope for choosing among providers.
The HealthCost website has received significant attention in the state, with over 40 ar-
ticles in the local public press. In addition, the New Hampshire Insurance Department
promoted the website by encouraging primary care doctors to tell patient about the web-
site. Insurers were also encouraged to inform their enrollees of the website.
A sizable population made use of the website. I construct a measure of website usage
using monthly website traffic logs provided by the New Hampshire Insurance Depart-
ment. Figure 1.1 shows the number of price searches on the website since 2005. When
the website began, there were roughly 1,000 searches per month for the price of radiology
procedures, which grew over time. Searches for the price of radiology procedures make
up about half of all searches using the website.
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In addition to immediate demand-side effects from the website, there is anecdotal ev-
idence of supply-side effects. Analysts have noted that “the balance of plan-provider
negotiating power began shifting significantly in New Hampshire, a result in large part
of public transparency efforts.”15 For instance, Exeter Hospital and Anthem, the largest
insurer in New Hampshire, had a public dispute over contract terms in 2010. Anthem
argued that prices at Exeter Hospital were too high, pointing to the website as evidence,
and was eventually able to negotiate rate cuts.16
Why might provider prices respond to price information? First, consider the case in
which providers have market power and are able to unilaterally set price. If consumers
become more price sensitive due to better information about prices, the profit maximizing
price will decline. In the market for private health care, prices are usually determined
through bilateral negotiations between providers and insurers rather than set unilaterally.
In this case, the same mechanism also applies. However, equilibrium negotiated prices
may also depend on insurer incentives (Ho 2009; Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town 2015;
Ho and Lee 2017). To the extent that the website affects either provider or insurer gains
from trade, negotiated prices may be affected in equilibrium.17
1.3 DATA
The main dataset covers the universe of private insurance enrollment and medical
claims in the state of New Hampshire from 2005 to 2011. These data were collected as
part of the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health Care Information System, which as-
sembled data from all commercial insurers with enrollees that were state residents or
who receive services under a policy issued in the state. These are the same data used to
construct prices for the website.
15See Tu and Gourevitch (2014).
16For more information, see “Exeter Hospital Says Costs Being Used as Negotiating Tactic,” Seacoaston-
line.com, Nov. 14, 2010.
17I explore these mechanisms in more detail in a related paper.
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Table 1.2: The Availability of Outpatient Radiology Procedure
Price Information on Website
Num. Unique Procedures
Procedure Category On Website Not on Website
Computed Tomography (CT) 15 47
Mammogram 12 0
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 16 72
Nuclear Imaging 13 121




Notes: Unique outpatient procedures are indentified using CPT/HCPCS codes. Procedure
codes with updated descriptions are considered separate procedures.
Each outpatient claim has a CPT/HCPCS code which can be used to identify pro-
cedures.18 These codes are very specific (e.g. code 72120 is “x-ray examination, spine,
lumbosacral; bending views only, 2 or 3 views”). I limit the sample to the universe of
outpatient radiology claims, which includes 528 procedures related to X-rays, computer-
ized tomography (CT) scans, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, mammograms,
ultrasound, positron emission tomography (PET) scans, and other nuclear imaging pro-
cedures. These procedures all use imaging to diagnose, and sometimes treat, internal
conditions. The number of procedures in each category are listed in Table 1.2.
Note that inpatient radiology procedures, such as those that are part of major surgeries,
are excluded from the analysis. Since individuals have little ability to choose a provider
when radiology procedures are part of an inpatient episode, the website only includes
information about outpatient radiology procedures.19
In addition to the principal radiology procedure, there are often supplemental proce-
dures such as contrast agents that are billed along with the main procedure. The quantity
18Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes are a set of codes developed and maintained by the Amer-
ican Medical Association. Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes are an extension
of CPT codes that include additional procedures such as non-physician services.
19The website does include prices for a few inpatient procedures that are not related to radiology (e.g.
newborn delivery).
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and price of these supplemental procedures may also vary across providers. When com-
paring the cost across medical providers, the relevant price is determined by the entire
bundle of procedures. For this reason, the website has information about the cost of an
entire visit. For the same reason, my analysis focuses on the price of the visit. However, if
a provider wishes to change the price of an individual procedure they will likely change
the individual procedure price rather than the price of supplemental procedures since the
supplemental procedures are often the same across procedures. I call this price the prin-
cipal procedure price. The construction of the visit price and principal procedure price
are described in more detail in Appendix Section 3.6.
There are 1.1 million individuals under age 65 with at least one radiology claim be-
tween 2005 and 2011. Using individuals’ zip code, I merge on additional demographic
information, including income and education, using the 2007-2011 American Commu-
nity Survey. I also construct each individual’s Charlson Comorbidity Index using Inter-
national Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes in the claims dataset (Charlson et al. 1987;
Stagg 2006). The Charlson Comorbidity Index is an integer score that summarizes co-
morbid conditions that predict mortality. In addition, I construct the number of medical
claims each individual had in the previous year, which I use as a proxy for individuals’
experience with the health care system. Individual demographics are summarized in the
first panel of Table 1.3.
Each medical claim is also associated with a anonymized provider identifier that can
be linked to additional information such as provider zip code and whether the provider
is a hospital or non-hospital facility. This information is used to construct provider con-
centration in each county.
One limitation of the data is that there is no information about patient referrals. Pri-
mary care physicians may refer patients to a specific radiology provider, however indi-
viduals can still choose a different provider as long as it is in the insurer network. The
website may have affected individuals’ choice of provider or it may have affected physi-
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Table 1.3: Summary of Privately Insured Individuals with
Radiology Claims
Mean SD Min Max
Male 0.39 0.49 0 1
Age 38.4 16.9 0.0 64.0
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.4 0.7 0 2
Zip income (1000s) 68.7 21.3 4.9 242.2
Zip more than BA Degree 34.0 13.9 0.0 100.0
Claims in previous year 35.0 50.2 0.0 5118.0
Insurance Type:
PPO 0.32 0.47 0 1
POS 0.13 0.34 0 1
HMO 0.38 0.49 0 1
EPO 0.07 0.25 0 1
Indemnity 0.03 0.17 0 1
Insurance Company:
Anthem 0.46 0.50 0 1
Cigna 0.24 0.42 0 1
Harvard Pilgrim 0.12 0.33 0 1
Other 0.12 0.32 0 1
Plan Characteristics:
Plan has Deductible 0.43 0.49 0 1
Plan has Copay 0.80 0.40 0 1
Plan has Coinsurance 0.22 0.41 0 1
Individuals 1,078,892
Notes: Includes all unique privately insured individuals in the state of New Hamp-
shire over the period 2005 to 2011 with at least one outpatient radiology visit.
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cians’ referrals. Since I do not observe referrals, I do not differentiate between these mech-
anisms.
The vast majority of individuals in the sample are covered by a managed care organi-
zation, either a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plan, Preferred Provider Orga-
nization (PPO) plan, Point-of-Service (POS) plan, or an Exclusive Provider Organization
(EPO) plan. The defining feature of managed care plans is that insurers negotiate lower
prices with a selected network of providers. The plan types differ according to the stan-
dards used when individuals select providers within the network. Only 3 percent of indi-
viduals have an indemnity (fee-for-service) plan. Plan type is summarized in the second
panel of Table 1.3. There are three main insurers operating in New Hampshire: Anthem,
Cigna, and Harvard Pilgrim. Less than a quarter of individuals are enrolled in another
plan (see third panel of Table 1.3).20
The plans offered in New Hampshire over the period differ in their cost-sharing char-
acteristics. In particular, 43 percent of individuals pay a deductible at some point over the
period (see last panel of Table 1.3). In general, individuals are responsible for all health
care costs under the deductible amount in a given year. Although I do not observe the de-
ductible amount associated with each plan, I do observe the deductible paid on each visit.
Using observed deductible payments, I construct an indicator for whether each individ-
ual is under or over her deductible in a given year in order to test whether individuals
benefit more from the website when they are subject to a deductible.21
Over the period, there are 14.6 million claims that constitute 3.6 million radiology visits
(i.e. there are about 3 supplemental procedures on average per radiology visit). For each
health claim, I observe the copayment, coinsurance, and deductible paid by the individ-
ual, which together makes up the out-of-pocket price. In addition, I observe the insurer
20For more detail on the construction of demographic covariates, see Appendix Section 3.6.
21Individuals who know they will fulfill their deductible over the course of the year should not be price
sensitive. However, to the extent that individuals have uncertainty about their future health care use or their
remaining deductible, individuals will be price sensitive even if they are close to hitting their deductible.
For this reason, I consider all individuals who have not passed their deductible.
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Table 1.4: Summary of Outpatient Radiology Visit Price
Visits on Website Visits not on Website
Pre-Website Post-Website Pre-Website Post-Website
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Patient Cost:
Copayment 10.5 34.6 12.9 32.5 12.5 45.7 14.6 34.7
Coinsurance 9.2 67.1 15.3 93.3 13.2 81.7 23.1 119.8
Deductible 35.7 155.8 62.0 248.4 49.1 189.0 85.9 293.9
Total out-of-pocket cost 57.2 192.2 90.5 278.1 77.3 232.4 123.9 330.4
Insurance Cost:
Paid amount 524.5 1, 132.5 643.8 1, 406.4 691.8 1, 532.2 901.1 1, 871.1
Total:
Allowed amount 581.7 1, 184.5 734.3 1, 469.6 769.1 1, 583.1 1, 025.0 1, 931.7
Charge amount 992.7 2, 302.8 1, 252.2 2, 724.8 1, 339.5 2, 897.5 1, 742.6 3, 366.6
Observations (Visits) 865,399 2,019,627 191,576 515,490
Total Claims 3,235,485 8,626,074 673,696 2,076,856
Notes: Includes all outpatient radiology visits for privately insured individuals in the state of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to
2011. All prices in 2010 dollars.
paid amount. Together, the out-of-pocket price and insurer paid amount constitute the
total price received by the provider, often called the allowed amount.22 This price is of-
ten lower than the list price (i.e. charge amount, which is also reported), since insurers
negotiate lower rates for their enrollees.
The average price paid by individuals and insurers is presented in Table 1.4. Insurers
pay the majority of the cost for radiology procedures. Although out-of-pocket prices are
low on average, there is high variance and some individuals are fully exposed to the total
price.
The summary statistics presented in Table 1.4 preview the results. Although the price
of all procedures is increasing over time, the simple difference-in-difference estimate us-
ing the average total price implies that the price of procedures on the website declined
by $104 relative to the price of procedures not on the website. However, it is important
to control for changes in the composition of procedures and changes across time affecting
22Capitation payments for radiology procedures were negligible during the period.
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the control group.
1.4 EFFECT ON PRICES
I begin by examining the overall effect on transaction prices, both out-of-pocket prices
and insurer price. I examine the heterogenous effects and show that results are robust to
a number of specifications. Using a similar identification strategy, I show that this effect
is due to both demand-side and supply-side factors.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the causal effect of price transparency on prices, I exploit two
sources of plausible exogenous variation: the timing of the website introduction and the
availability of radiology procedures on the website. In particular, I construct OnWebm,
which indicates whether procedure m is ever available on the website. I also construct
Postt, which indicates if the website is available at month t. This takes the value of 1 if
the date of admission is March 2007 or later. The baseline difference-in-difference specifi-
cation is given by:
log(1+ pimjkt) = β(OnWebm × Postt) + αXit + λm + λk + λt + εimjkt (1.1)
The outcome of interest is pimjkt, the price of a visit for individual i with insurance k ob-
taining procedure m from provider j at time t. I consider both the patient’s out-of-pocket
cost as well as the cost to the insurer. The baseline specification controls for individual
covariates Xit, which includes age, gender, charlson comorbidity index, income, educa-
tion, rural classification, and member plan characteristics (deductible, coinsurance, and
copay). I also include procedure fixed effects, λm, and insurer fixed effects, λk, that con-
trol for time-invariant factors that may be correlated with prices and the availability of the
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website.23 I also include month fixed effects, λt, which control for time varying factors
that may be correlated with prices and website availability. Finally, εimjkt is a vector of
idiosyncratic random errors. Prices are highly correlated within each month since indi-
viduals tend to be subject to a deductible in the beginning of the year, but not at the end
of the year. To account for correlation within a month, standard errors are clustered at the
month level. The unit of analysis is an individual radiology visit.
The coefficient of interest, β, is interpreted as the change in prices due to the website
in log-points. The main identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the website, the
procedures on the website and the procedures not on the website would follow common
trends. I use a number of methods to examine the validity of this assumption, including
a falsification test and directly controlling for procedure category linear trends.
It is important to note that this assumption assumes that website only provides use-
ful information for procedure that are actually featured on the website. In other words,
individuals do not use website prices to learn about the prices of procedures not on the
website. I argue this would be difficult given that the rank ordering of providers is dif-
ferent even for related procedures. To the extent that individuals do use the website even
when they are obtaining procedures not listed, the results will be biased towards zero.
In order to isolate the supply-side effect of price transparency I use a similar identi-
fication strategy, but control for the demand-side effects. In particular, I include fixed
effects that control for the variation in price of each procedure across providers and in-
surers. This approach is similar to that of Christensen, Floyd and Maffett (2015). The
specification is now
log(1+ pimjkt) = β(OnWebm × Postt) + αXit + λjmk + λt + εimjkt (1.2)
where the vector λjmk includes an indicator for each combination of provider, proce-
23For the insurer fixed effects, I define an insurance plan as a unique combination of insurance firm and
insurance type (e.g. Anthem HMO).
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dure, and insurer. If individuals switch to lower-cost providers after the introduction of
the website, it is captured by these fixed effects. Note that these fixed effects also absorb
changes in prices due to the entry of providers over the period. The remaining varia-
tion in price (with insurer-provider-procedure indicators) identifies β, which can now be
interpreted as the reduction in transaction prices due to lower negotiated prices.24
I examine how the supply-side effect varies by the degree of local competition between
providers. In particular, I use the Herfindahl index in each county for each procedure cat-
egory, which is defined as HHIcl = ∑j s2jcl where s
2
jcl is the market share of provider j in
county c among all procedures in procedure category l. The period prior to the introduc-
tion of the website is used to calculate HHIcl in order to address concerns that the market
structure may have been endogenously affected by the website.
Finally, I examine price dispersion directly as measured by the interquartile rage of
prices. I exploit the same sources of variation and estimate
IQRmt = β(OnWebm × Postt) + αXt + λm + λt + εmt (1.3)
For this specification, individual visits are aggregated to the month level. In particular,
to examine the dispersion in transaction prices, IQRmt is defined as the difference be-
tween the third and first quartile of transaction prices for each procedure in each month.
To examine the dispersion in provider prices (or negotiated prices), IQRmt is defined as
the difference between the third and first quartile of prices for each procedure in each
month after aggregating to the provider level. Under the same assumptions as previous
specifications, β can be interpreted as the dollar change in the interquartile range of prices
due to the website.
24It is also possible that providers reduce the list price. This may affect some privately-insured individu-
als, particularly those going out of network. I do not distinguish between these explanations.
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1.4.2 Effect on Transaction Prices
Figure 1.2 presents the main results for total prices by period with the full set of con-
trols and fixed effects.25 In the periods before the website, there is no significant price
difference between procedures that were eventually on the website and those that were
not. This provides evidence that the procedures on the website had similar trends in the
pre-period as the procedures that were not on the website, supporting the common trends
assumption. Once the website launched, the price paid decreased for procedures on the
website relative to procedures not on the website. The effect becomes significant in the
third year. This effect grows over time, eventually leading to an almost 5 percent reduc-
tion in prices five years after the introduction of the website. I argue that this is partially
due to the fact that supply-side effects take time to materialize, as prices are renegotiated
infrequently. In addition, the website was being used more often in the later period (see
Figure 2.3). An alternative interpretation of Figure 1.2 is that the website led to a trend
break, decreasing the growth in health care expenditure rather than the level. I explore
this interpretation in more detail in Appendix Section 3.6.
The reduction in prices could be due to either lower out-of-pocket prices for consumers
or lower insurer reimbursement amount. The first panel of Table 1.5 presents the aver-
age effect on out-of-pocket prices over the five-year period. The estimates imply a 6.9
percent reduction in out-of-pocket prices due to the website (from a mean of $86.45) for
all individuals in the sample. This result is highly significant. Next I examine how the
effect varies by deductible status. Individuals that are not past their deductible are po-
tentially exposed to the full cost of the procedure, and thus have the most to gain from
choosing a low-cost provider.26 Consistent with this fact, I find that individuals subject to
25The specification used for Figure 1.2 is log(1 + yimjkt) = β(OnWebm ×HalfYeart) + αXit + λm + λk +
εimjkt. The interaction with the period before the introduction of the website is omitted.
26Depending on the specifics of the plan design, some procedures may not count towards an individual’s
deductible. In addition, some individuals classified as under their deductible hit their deductible on the
current visit. For these reasons, the out-of-pocket cost is often less than the full price when an individual is
not past the deductible.
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Figure 1.2: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price
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Notes: Chart shows point estimates for each year using the difference-in-difference baseline specification.
Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval using standard errors clustered at the month-year level.
a deductible see a much larger reduction in price, 14.4 percent (from a mean of $239.70).27
Individuals who are not subject to a deductible may still have an incentive to find a
low-cost provider. In particular, there are potential gains from switching to a low-cost
provider if they are subject to a coinsurance payment.28 In addition, individuals who
do not use the website and find a low-cost provider may still benefit if providers reduce
their prices. This is the supply-side effect that I explore in detail in following sections.
The results imply that individuals that are not subject to a deductible, both those in a
plan without a deductible and those past their deductible, see a significant reduction in
prices of about 4 percent (see column 2 and 4 in Table 1.5).
Although individuals are not likely to internalize the cost to the insurer when choosing
a provider using the website, there may be an indirect benefit to the insurer. In particular,
there is a mechanical correlation between the individual’s out-of-pocket price and the
insurer price when the individual is subject to a coinsurance payment. To test whether
27I conduct a Wald test and determine the difference between the effect for individual subject to a de-
ductible and those not subject to a deductible is significant.
28Coinsurance payments are a set percentage of the total price, often between 5 and 25 percent, that are
paid by the individual.
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Table 1.5: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price
Baseline Difference-in-Difference Estimates
All No Deductible Deductible
Not Past Past
Dep Var: Log(1+Patient Out-of-Pocket Cost)
OnWebm × Postt −0.071∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
Age −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Mean level 86.45 15.96 239.70 40.89
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.269 0.293 0.149
Observations 3,403,645 1,811,585 1,007,188 584,872
Dep Var: Log(1+Insurer Paid Amount)
OnWebm × Postt −0.039∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.009 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.008)
Age −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.009∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.041∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Mean level 653.06 628.26 588.71 840.68
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.369 0.205 0.377
Observations 3,403,645 1,811,585 1,007,188 584,872
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Charlson Comorbidity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The unit of observation is a patient visit, which may contain multiple medical claims. The
sample consists of all commercial claims related to outpatient radiology procedures in the state
of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the
month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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insurers also benefit from the website, I use the same specification but with the insurer
paid amount as the dependent variable. The second panel of Table 1.5 presents the results.
The insurers save 3.8 percent on average over the period (from a mean of $653.06). This is
statistically significant. Much of this savings is due to individuals without a deductible,
consistent with the fact that most of the savings when there is a deductible accrue to the
individual.
Although the percentage change in prices is larger for out-of-pocket cost than insurer
cost, the insurers actually benefit more from the website in absolute terms. This is because
the insurer covers the majority of the cost—88 percent of the total price on average.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Appendix Table A2 shows that out-of-pocket price and insurer paid amount results are
robust to a number of specifications. The results are not driven by changes in observable
characteristics of individuals or changes in insurance plans over the period.29 In column
4, I include a vector of procedure category specific linear time trends which control for
time varying characteristics of procedures that may be correlated with website availability
and prices and have a linear trend over the period. The results remain significant with
the inclusion of procedure category month trends.
Another concern is unobservable individual characteristics. In particular, individuals
that obtain private health insurance after the introduction of the website could be different
on unobservable dimensions. In Appendix Table A2 Column 5, I control for individual
fixed effects. Identification now comes from the same individuals that received radiology
procedures before and after the introduction of the website. The results are robust to this
specification.
A related concern is that the website changed the complexity of procedures due to an
increase (or decrease) in the probability that an individual has a procedure when informa-
29I discuss insurance effects in more detail in Section 1.6.
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tion is available. This concern is mitigated by the fact that radiology procedure codes are
quite specific, and are standardized across providers. In addition, in Section 1.5, I show
that the website did not change the quantity of procedures in general.
The out-of-pocket price may be zero if the insurer pays the full cost due to full in-
surance. Similarly, the insurer price may be zero if the individual pays the full cost be-
cause the individual is under the deductible. Due to this issue, the dependent variable
is transformed using log(1+ y). Alternative transformation have been proposed that are
arguably less arbitrary (MacKinnon and Magee 1990). In the final column of Appendix
Table A2, I show the results are robust to this alternative transformation.
In Appendix Table A3 I conduct a falsification exercise in which I test whether there
was an effect on prices in the one year period before the website actually existed. Consis-
tent with the assumption that results are not driven by differential price trends, none of
the eight estimates are statistically significant.
1.4.4 Heterogenous Effects
The website may benefit some individuals more than others. In this section I explore
how the effect on out-of-pocket prices varies across insurance organization types and
individual characteristics by estimating separate models for subpopulations.
Table 1.6 presents results for each of the five insurance organization types. Across
all plan types, individual patients have some scope to choose a provider, but the extent
to which individuals can choose a provider varies by plan. HMO, POS, and EPO plans
have specific rules that seek to guide patients to in-network providers.30 PPO plans and
Indemnity plans (also known as fee-for-service) are more flexible.31
30In general, individuals with an HMO plan must receive care from a provider within the HMO network,
usually with the approval of a primary care physician. EPO plans also require care within a pre-specified
network, although without the need for primary care approval. A POS plan is similar, but individuals may
be able to go to a provider outside the network with the referral of a primary care physician.
31PPO plans allow individuals to go to a provider out of network, but the price may be higher. Indemnity
plans do not have a pre-specified network.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit
Out-of-Pocket Price
By Insurer Organization Type
Restrictive Plans Non-Restrictive Plans
HMO POS EPO PPO Indemnity
OnWebm × Postt −0.071∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗−0.059∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.040)
Full Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.377 0.288 0.364 0.337
Observations 1,380,702 532,512 259,318 1,125,478 105,635
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(1+Patient Out-of-Pocket Cost). OLS regression standard
errors clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
There is a significant reduction in out-of-pocket prices across all of the insurance orga-
nization types, but the effects are larger for non-restrictive plans. Comparing the effect
for all restrictive plans (HMO, POS, and EPO) with all non-restrictive plans (PPO and
indemnity), the difference is significant.32 This is evidence that the website is most bene-
ficial for those with the most discretion regarding their choice of provider. One criticism
of unrestrictive plans, such as indemnity plans, is that uninformed individuals may make
poor choices regarding where to receive care, potentially driving up health care costs. The
results presented here suggest this can be mitigated by reducing information frictions in
the market.
I examine results by demographic characteristics to examine which groups benefits
most from the price information. These results are presented in Table 1.7. First, I examine
individuals who received a radiology procedure immediately after having an emergency.
Note these are relatively minor emergency visits since I exclude inpatient admissions. I
find no statistically significant effect suggesting that this subpopulation was less likely
to use the website compare to individuals having non-emergency procedures that could
potentially be scheduled further in advance.
32A Wald test yields an F-statistics of 4.57.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Out-of-Pocket Price
By Patient Characteristics
Emergency Previous Healthcare Charlson
Visit Experience Comorbidity Index
Yes No ≤Median > Median = 0 ≥ 1
OnWebm × Postt −0.021 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
F statistic of diff. 8.608∗∗∗ 9.746∗∗∗ 7.268∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.362 0.461 0.283 0.419 0.319
Observations 212,310 3,191,335 908,425 888,974 1,856,019 1,547,626
Age Education Income
≤ 40 > 40 ≤ 1st Quartile > 4th Quartile ≤ 1st Quartile > 4th Quartile
OnWebm × Postt −0.090∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
F statistic of diff. 3.432∗ 4.223∗∗ 1.160
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.367 0.361 0.382 0.360 0.379
Observations 1,237,595 2,166,050 854,013 799,104 858,653 843,406
Full Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(1+Patient Out-of-Pocket Price). OLS regression standard errors clustered at the month-year level in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
There is a literature that suggests that individuals with knowledge of the health care
system are able to make more informed decisions about care.33 Individuals with expe-
rience in the health care system may be able to choose low cost providers even without
the website. I find evidence that individuals with less previous healthcare experience,
defined as those with less than the median number of claims in the previous year, benefit
significantly more from the website. While both groups gain, individuals with less expe-
rience save 6.8 percentage points more, a statistically significant difference. Individuals
without comorbidities also benefit significantly more.34 This may be because they tend to
have less experience with the health care system or because, due to better health, they are
better able to shop-around.
In the year the website started, individuals age 18 to 29 were 23 percentage points more
33See review by Berkman et al. (2011).
34The results of a Wald test are presented in Table 1.7. The null hypothesis is that the two coefficients are
equal.
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likely to have broadband internet then those age 50 to 64.35 Consistent with this fact,
younger individuals, defined as those age 40 and younger, benefit more from the website,
saving 3.2 percentage points more than older individuals (see second panel in Table 1.7).
This difference is significant at the 10 percent level. Broadband adoption is also positively
correlated with education and income.36 Estimates imply larger effects for those in the
highest education quartile and highest income quartile, although the difference is only
significant for education.
Taken together, these results imply that price transparency provides benefits across a
range of demographic groups. However, the benefits accrue most to those groups that
had access to the internet and had the ability to shop-around, potentially exacerbating
health inequality.
Finally, I explore the effect of the website by price quantile. The website has an affect
across a large range of prices but is particularly effective for procedures in the medium-
high range. I discuss the empirical strategy and results in Appendix Section 3.6.
1.4.5 Demand-Side Effects
The primary motivation for the website was to allow individuals to shop-around for
medical care. In Table 1.8 I directly examine provider choice outcomes using the same
difference-in-difference specification to provide evidence that price effects are mediated
by changes in demand.
When individuals have a radiology procedure, they often go to the same provider as
their last radiology visit. Over the period, 34 percent of individuals with repeat visits
went to the same provider as their prior visit. Using a difference-in-difference linear
probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the chosen
35Pew Internet and American Life Project, Home Broadband Adoption, July 2007.
36In 2007, college graduates were 49 percentage points more likely to have broadband than those with
less than a high school education. Those with income over $75,000 were 46 percentage points more likely
than those with an income under $30,000. See Pew Internet and American Life Project, Home Broadband
Adoption, July 2007.
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Table 1.8: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Search
Behavior and Provider Type
Dependent Variable:
Same Provider Low Provider Provider in
as Last Cost Type is New
Radiology Visit Provider Hospital Hampshire
OnWebm × Postt −0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0059) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Full Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.34 0.40 0.12 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.149 0.134 0.451
Observations 1,571,869 2,882,093 3,404,442 3,404,442
Notes: Results from linear probability model. The unit of observation is a patient visit, which
may contain multiple medical claims. The sample consists of all commercial claims related to
outpatient radiology procedures in the state of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011.
Low cost provider is defined as a provider with an average out-of-pocket cost in the lowest
decile in each county conditional on procedure, insurer, and year. OLS regression standard
errors clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
provider is the same as the prior visit, I examine whether the website made individuals
more likely to switch providers. Column 1 in Table 1.8 presents the results. The website
significantly reduced the probability of going to the same provider as the previous visit.
In particular, individuals with access to the website were 9.6 percent less likely to go to
the same provider (3.3 percentage point reduction from the mean of 34 percent).
Over the period, 12 percent of individuals visit hospitals while the rest go to non-
hospital providers such as imaging centers or clinics. On average, the out-of-pocket price
at hospitals is 31 percent higher for the same procedures.37 The third column of Table
1.8 shows results for a specification in which an indicator for whether the provider is a
hospital is the dependent variable. The website led to a 2.5 percent reduction in the prob-
ability of having a radiology procedure at a hospital rather than a non-hospital provider
37I regress log out-of-pocket price on an indicator for whether the provider is a hospital and procedure
fixed effects. Note that the facility and equipment for outpatient radiology procedures at hospitals is often
the same as those used for inpatient procedures.
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(0.3 percentage point reduction from the mean). This effect is statistically significant.
New Hampshire is a relatively small state and many resident work in surrounding
states, particularly in Massachusetts.38 Almost a third of the individuals in the sample go
to radiology providers outside the state, however the website only provides information
about the price of providers within the state. The fourth column of Table 1.8 shows that
the website significantly increased the probability that individuals went to a provider
within New Hampshire.
1.4.6 Supply-Side Effects
Given that individuals switch to lower-cost providers, did this put downward pressure
on prices? I examine supply-side effects by estimating a model with controls for demand-
side factors, namely provider-procedure-insurer fixed effects. Rather than examining out-
of-pocket prices and insurer price separately, I now consider the total price (i.e. allowed
amount).
The main results can be seen in Figure 1.3. Panel a shows the baseline total effect on
visit prices which includes both demand-side and supply-side effects. Consistent with
the results in previous sections, there is no significant effect prior to the introduction of
the website, and then a significant effect afterwards. Panel b shows the results after con-
trolling for demand-side factors. The point estimates are smaller in magnitude, especially
in the period right after the introduction of the website. However, the estimates are still
highly significant, especially in the later period, implying a reduction in provider prices.
Recall that the visit price is determined by the prices of a bundle of procedures. The
primary way that the provider can change the price of the bundle is by changing the price
of the principal radiology procedure, which makes up more than half of the cost of the
bundle on average. In Panel c and d of Figure 1.3 I examine the effect on the principal
38About 17 percent of workers living in the New Hampshire work in a different state, one of the highest
rates in the nation. See Out-of-State and Long Commutes, Census 2011.
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procedure price. Panel c presents the baseline specification while Panel d presents the
supply-side effect. Panel d shows a very small effect in the two years after the introduc-
tion of the website. However, there is a larger supply-side effect three to five years after
the website. I interpret this as evidence that the website reduced negotiated prices in the
long-run.
Table 1.9 formalizes these results. There is both a short-run and long-run reduction in
transaction prices, where short-run is defined as the two-years after the website started.
However, after isolating the supply-side, the short-run effect is quite small. Visit prices
declined by 1.7 percent while principal procedure price declined by 1.9 percent. The
long-run effects are larger—there is a 2.2 percent reduction in visit prices and 4.7 percent
reduction in principle procedure price. These results are all statistically significant.
Table 1.9: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Supply-Side
Baseline Provider-Procedure-Insurer FE
Total Visit Principal Procedure Total Visit Principal Procedure
Price Price Price Price
OnWebm × PostShortRunt −0.034∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
OnWebm × PostLongRunt −0.038∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer FE Yes Yes No No
Procedure FE Yes Yes No No
Provider*Procedure
*Insurer FE No No Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean level 788.64 413.60 791.08 412.24
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.625 0.515 0.790
Observations 3,414,053 3,414,050 3,377,271 3,377,268
Notes: The dependent variable is log(1+ y), where y is either the visit price or principal procedure price. This price includes
both patient and insurer payments (i.e. allowed amount). For visit price, the unit of observation is a patient visit, which may
contain multiple medical claims. For principal procedure price, the unit of observation is the primary radiology procedure
within each visit. The sample consists of all commercial claims related to outpatient radiology procedures in the state of New
Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Overall, this is evidence that there was a significant reduction in negotiated prices. The
fact that the principal procedure price is most affected in the long-run is consistent with
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the fact that prices are renegotiated infrequently.
One caveat is that the changes in demand caused providers to reduce the price of
supplemental procedures in addition to principal procedure prices. Since supplemental
procedures, such as contrast agents and examinations related to radiology procedures,
are common across procedures on the website and procedures not on the website, these
reductions in prices would be “differenced-out”. This would lead to an underestimate of
the supply-side effects of price transparency. Thus, Table 1.9 are conservative estimates.
Providers operating in concentrated markets may be able to negotiate higher prices
with insurers (e.g. Dranove, Shanley and White 1993; Town and Vistnes 2001; Gowrisankaran,
Nevo and Town 2015). I define the Herfindahl index by county and procedure category
in the period prior to the introduction of the website. There is significant variation in
competition—some counties have a single provider in the market for certain procedure
categories while others are relatively unconcentrated.39
Table 1.10 presents the principal procedure effect by market concentration. Column
1 and 2 show the results for transaction prices. In there short-run, there is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the effect in low concentration markets (those with
Herfindahl index at or below the median) and high concentration markets (those with
above median Herfindahl index). However, in the long run, the reduction in prices is 1.5
percentage points larger in high concentration markets. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant. Results are similar after isolating the supply-side (column 3 and 4 in Table 1.10).
While there is no significant difference in the short-run, providers reduce their prices by
1.9 percentage points more in concentrated markets in the long-run. This is evidence that
price transparency put the most downward pressure on prices in markets where price
cost margins were likely the highest.
One important concern is that the supply-side effects reflect cross-subsidization. In
other words, price transparency puts downward pressure on the prices of procedures on
39The distribution of Herfindahl index in the sample is shown in Figure A1.
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≤Median HHI > Median HHI ≤Median HHI > Median HHI
OnWebm × PostShortRunt −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
OnWebm × PostLongRunt −0.047∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
F statistic of diff. (SR) 0.130 1.031
F statistic of diff. (LR) 4.570∗∗ 4.253∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.628 0.623 0.790 0.791
Observations 1,667,383 1,685,266 1,650,459 1,666,555
Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer FE Yes Yes No No
Procedure FE Yes Yes No No
Provider*Procedure
*Insurer FE No No Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is log(1 + y), where y is the principal procedure price. This price includes both patient and
insurer payments (i.e. allowed amount). HHI is calculated for individual’s county in each year. OLS regression standard errors
clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
the website, but providers compensate by increasing prices for procedures that are not
on the website or cutting care elsewhere. There is little theoretical justification for why
profit-maximizing providers would cross-subsidize (Frakt 2011). However, this may not
be the case if hospitals have an objective function other than profit-maximization. For
instance, there is evidence that hospitals use profits from procedures with high margins
to fund unprofitable services such as psychiatric, substance-abuse, or trauma-care (David
et al. 2014). In the sample used for this paper, 80 percent of providers are imaging centers
or other non-hospital facilities which do not provide services thought to be unprofitable. I
argue that cross-subsidization is unlikely for these providers, although it may be an issue
for providers such as Dartmouth-Hitchcock, New Hampshire’s only academic hospital.
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1.4.7 Price Dispersion
Information frictions can give rise to price dispersion in equilibrium (e.g. Salop and
Stiglitz 1977; Burdett and Judd 1983). In this section, I examine whether a reduction in
information frictions can reduce price dispersion, as measures by the interquartile range
of prices. I find evidence that the website reduced the range of transaction prices as well
as the range of negotiated provider prices.
Table 1.11: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Price Dispersion
Interquartile Range Interquartile Range
of Transaction Prices of Provider Prices
Total Visit Principal Procedure Total Visit Principal Procedure
Price Price Price Price
OnWebm × Postt −141.24∗∗∗ −62.64∗∗∗ −79.02 −47.40∗∗
(45.36) (20.23) (49.63) (17.99)
Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean IQR 1034.1 581.6 844.9 471.3
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.466 0.292 0.484
Observations 20,458 20,458 20,458 20,458
Notes: The unit of observation is a visit-month for columns 1 and 3 and procedure-month for columns 2 and
4. The sample consists of all commercial claims related to outpatient radiology procedures in the state of New
Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the month-year level in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 and 2 in Table 1.11 presents the results for transaction prices. There is a
$141 reduction in the interquartile range of visit prices on the website relative to those
not on the website (a 13.6 percent reduction from the mean of $1,043). There is also a $63
reduction in the interquartile range of principal procedure prices. Both these results are
significant.
More importantly, I examine the effect on the interquartile range of negotiated provider
prices (see column 3 and 4 in Table 1.11). The interquartile range of visit prices declines by
$79, but is not statistically significant. Focusing on the principal procedure price, which
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was likely most affected by the website, I find a significant reduction in price dispersion.
In particular, the interquartile range of provider prices declined by $47, or 10.1 percent of
the mean.
Together with the previous results, these results imply that website decreased both the
mean and variance of the distribution of transaction prices. This was due in part to a
similar shift in the distribution of negotiated prices.
1.5 EFFECT ON QUANTITY
In this section I examine whether the website changed the quantity of radiology visits.
In most cases, individuals choose whether to get a radiology procedure after a primary
care physicians recommends that they receive a specific procedure. To the extent that
individuals believe a procedure is optional, they may be more likely to get a procedure
if information about price is available and they know they can choose an inexpensive
provider. Conversely, the price may be more than the individual expected, leading to
lower quantity when price information is available.
1.5.1 Empirical Strategy
I use the similar difference-in-difference specification to examine whether the intro-
duction of the website changed the quantity of procedures on the website relative to pro-
cedures not on the website. In particular, the specification is
yiwt = β(OnWebw × Postt) + γOnWebw + αXit + λk + λt + εiwt (1.4)
where the outcome, yiwt, is either the number of procedures or an indicator for whether
the individual ever had the procedure during the year. In the latter case, it becomes a
linear probability model. I also include individual covariates, insurer fixed effects, and
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year fixed effects.40
Unlike previous specifications, I use the universe of privately-insured individuals in
the state, including those that never had a radiology procedure over the period. The unit
of observation is an individual in a year for procedures on the website and not on the
website (i.e. procedures are aggregated by whether they are on the website, which is
indexed by w).
1.5.2 Results
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.12 show the results for the whole sample. Relative to
the probability of having a procedure not on the website, the probability of having a
procedure on the website increased by 1.2 percentage points. The average number of
radiology visits on the website also increased. In particular, individuals had 0.04 more
visits after the introduction of the website. Both these results are significant.
Mammogram screening exams are often at the discretion of individuals, whereas other
radiology procedures are often needed at a specific point in time to diagnose symptoms
or treat an acute illness. Over the period of analysis, the annual probability of having a
mammogram in New Hampshire increased from 9.5 percent to 11.8 percent.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.12 I exclude mammograms from the analysis. Using the
same difference-in-difference specification I find no effect on the quantity of procedures
due to the website. Both point estimates for the probability of having a procedures and
the number of procedures are small and not statistically significant. In particular, I reject
the hypothesis that the website increased the probability of having a radiology procedure
by more than a percentage point.
I interpret these results as evidence that the quantity of radiology procedures, exclud-
ing mammography, was not affected by the introduction of the website. It is important
40Individual covariates includes age, gender, charlson comorbidity index, income, education, and rural
classification.
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Table 1.12: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Quantity
Dependent Variable:
Excluding Mammograms
Any Radiology Number of Any Radiology Number of
Visit Radiology Visits Visit Radiology Visits
OnWebm × Postt 0.0122∗∗ 0.0380∗∗ 0.0004 0.0166
(0.0045) (0.0111) (0.0044) (0.0087)
Full Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
On Website FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. var. 0.21 0.36 0.21 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.193 0.217 0.138
Observations 8,948,638 8,948,638 8,948,638 8,948,638
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual-year. The sample consists of all individuals privately insured in New
Hampshire or residing in New Hampshire between 2005 and 2011. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the
year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
to note that these results do not necessarily imply that the website caused an increase
in mammograms. Many confounding factors, such as changes in unobservable charac-
teristics of the population or changes in physician recommendations regarding mammo-
grams, could explain the increase in mammography.
Past work has stressed the importance of the extensive margin when considering health
care costs (e.g. Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015). However, it is important to note that my def-
inition of quantity differs from much of the literature. Often quantity or utilization is
quantified in terms of the number of medical claims. However, some providers may be
expensive because they bill for superfluous supplementary procedures that do not change
the overall quality of care. For instance, two individuals may receive the exact same ra-
diology procedure, but providers submit a different number of medical claims. I argue
that if an individual switches to a provider that is lower cost due to fewer claims it is a
reduction in price, not a reduction in the quantity of care.
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1.6 INSURANCE CHOICE AND INSURANCE PLAN
CHARACTERISTICS
The website allows users to compare the price of common procedures under different
insurance plans. Therefore, the website could be used by individuals or employers when
deciding on which insurance plan to purchase. In particular, if individuals can anticipate
the health insurance procedures they will need over the coming year, they may be able to
use the website to choose a plan that provides low prices for these procedures, magnifying
selection effects. However, I do not find evidence that changes in demand for insurance
are driving the reduction in radiology prices. 41
In order to examine whether selection into insurance plans is a factor for radiology
prices, I examine whether the difference-in-difference specifications are robust to the in-
clusion of insurance plan fixed effects. In the baseline specifications, I include fixed effects
that control for changes in the composition of insurance plans (see Table 1.5). I also exam-
ine a specification without insurance plan fixed effects (see Appendix Table A2, column
2). The difference in the estimated effect between these specifications is not statistically
significant implying that the composition of insurance enrollment is not driving the re-
duction in radiology prices due to the website. I also test whether individuals who switch
insurers are different than those that do not switch after the introduction of the website.
Table A5 shows that both groups benefit from the website, and there is no significant
difference. These results are consistent with the fact that radiology procedures over the
coming year are often difficult to predict, and are unlikely to be the primary reason that
individuals choose a given insurance plan.
It is still possible that the website affected insurance choice, even though the composi-
tion of insurance plans is not responsible for the reduction in radiology prices. The com-
41After my period of analysis, the website added separate features for comparing insurance plans. Future
research can examine the effect of this information.
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position of insurance plans, both insurance firm and plan type, is presented in Appendix
Figure A2. There does not appear to be a large shift in the composition of insurance
plans after the website launched in March 2007. In order to test this within a regression
framework, I use the following specification to examine whether there was a shift in the
composition of insurance plans.
ykt = βPostt + αXt + γt+ εimjkt (1.5)
where ykt is the number of enrollees in each plan type or company in each month.
I control for characteristics of individuals in each month, Xt, as well as a linear time
trend.42 This specification required stronger identifying assumptions than the difference-
in-difference method, namely constant trends in the absence of the website. I use the
period consisting of two years before and after the introduction website in order to avoid
confounding factors that influence insurance enrollment.
I examine enrollment for each of the major insurance companies in the state as well
as each of the insurance types. Of the ten estimates, one one is statistically significant
(see Appendix Table A6). I interpret this as evidence that the website did not have an
immediate effect on insurance choice.
A related mechanism of interest is endogenous plan response to price transparency.
For instance, plans may change cost-sharing rules in response to the website, further in-
centivizing individuals to use the website. I modify the baseline regression specification
by interacting insurance fixed effects with an indicator for whether the website is avail-
able.43 The estimates from this specification are not statistically different from the baseline
specification (see Appendix Table A2, column 3). I interpret this as evidence that changes
to plan characteristics after the start of the website that affected all procedures are not
42Individual controls include age, gender, income, and education.
43In particular, I estimate log(1 + pimjkt) = β(OnWebm × Postt) + αXit + λm + λk × Postt + λk × Pret +
λt + εimjkt where Pret = (1− Postt).
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driving the reduction in prices.44
1.7 CONCLUSION
The health care system can be very complicated to navigate, and information frictions
are thought to be pervasive (Reinhardt 2012). In this paper, I examine how a publicly
available website providing price information to consumers affected the market for ra-
diology procedures. While previous research has focused on the demand-side effect of
information supplied by specific employers, I examine the equilibrium effects using the
universe of private medical claims in the state.
Overall, I estimate that the HealthCost website reduced the cost for individuals by 6.9
percent and for insurers by 3.8 percent. A simple calculation implies that individuals
saved around $20.9 million and insurers saved $86.7 million on radiology visits over the
5 year period.45 I argue that while demand-side effects are important, there are significant
supply-side effects in the long-run when information is available to all consumers in the
market. In other words, this is evidence that price opacity softens provider competition.
This effect is particularly important given that the average price of radiology procedures
in the U.S. is roughly double that of other OECD countries.46
Given that website traffic logs reveal that only a small fraction of individuals receiving
radiology procedures in New Hampshire use the website, the supply-side effects may
be quite large if all consumers were informed about prices. In the following chapters,
I examine these counterfactuals using an empirical model of the market for radiology
procedures.
44Note that after my period of analysis, insurers in the state began offering additional incentives for
individuals to choose low-cost providers. These incentives may be due to the presence of the website and
could potentially lead to larger long-term effects of the website.
45All figures in 2010 dollars.
46The average price of an MRI scan is $1,200 in the US but only $569 in other OECD countries with
available data. The average price of CT scan is $228 in the US but only $98 in other OECD countries with
available data. See Squires (2011).
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Figure 1.3: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Supply-Side
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c. Principal procedure price, baseline d. Principal procedure price, with provider-procedure-insurer FE
Notes: Chart shows point estimates for each year using the difference-in-difference specifications in Table 1.9. The de-
pendent variable is log(1 + p), where p is either the principal procedure price or visit price. This price includes both
patient and insurer payments (i.e. allowed amount). Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval using standard
errors clustered at the month-year level.
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Model of Price




In certain markets, consumers do not know exact prices until they have committed
to a purchase. This is often the case for automotive repair, building construction, and
financial services, as well as other products with complicated bundling, discounts, or add-
ons.1 Ex-ante uncertainty about prices is particularly common in the U.S. private health
care market. Health care prices are determined in private negotiations between insurers
and medical providers, and firms are often contractually forbidden from disclosing these
negotiated rates. As a result, the vast majority of consumers say they do not compare
prices before receiving medical care.2 In addition to making it difficult to shop around for
medical services, the lack of price transparency may increase hospital prices. In response,
some policy makers have called for more “price transparency” in health care.3
While an influential literature, starting with Stigler (1961) and Diamond (1971), has
examined search frictions, there has been little emphasis on markets in which it is not
possible to acquire price information. Like search costs, the lack of price transparency
may increase prices and lead to price dispersion. Understanding how price transparency
affects prices is particularly important for privately-provided health care in the U.S. since
the market comprises about 6 percent of GDP.
This paper empirically evaluates how price transparency affects spending in the U.S.
health care market, focusing on the demand-side. I combine a model of demand that in-
corporates price uncertainty with a model of bargaining between providers and insurers.
Although a relatively small fraction of consumers currently try to obtain price informa-
tion when price transparency tools are made available, the model allows for an analysis of
1See, for example, Ellison (2005).
2See, for instance, “How Much Will it Cost? How Americans Use Prices in Health Care,” Public Agenda,
March 2015.
3More than half of U.S. states have proposed health care price transparency laws in recent years. Price
transparency legislation has also been proposed at the federal level. See “2015 Price Transparency Initiative
State Survey,” The Source on Healthcare Price & Competition, UC Hastings College of the Law, October 21,
2015.
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out-of-sample counterfactual scenarios. In Chapter 3, I combine with demand model with
model of the supply-side in order to examine how price transparency affects negotiated
prices.
I introduce a discrete-choice model in which consumers choose where to receive med-
ical care with potentially limited information about prices. In the model, consumers with
rational expectations receive noisy signals about prices, and, consequently, are less able
to discern which are the low price options. Consumers may choose options they believe
to be the best value but are often surprised by the bill. Accounting for the difference
between expected prices and actual prices is important for recovering underlying con-
sumer preferences, including price sensitivity, and evaluating the welfare effects of price
information.
The estimation strategy makes use of plausibly exogenous variation in consumers’
information set stemming from a price transparency website introduced by the New
Hampshire state government. In contrast to other price transparency efforts, the web-
site allowed any privately-insured consumer in the state to enter insurance information
and easily compare out-of-pocket prices across hospitals and other providers. I exploit
difference-in-differences variation based on the fact that the website was introduced in
March 2007, and could only be used to obtain price information for a subset of medical
imaging procedures. If consumers use the price transparency website when it is available,
I assume that they have perfect information about prices.
In the demand model, individuals’ beliefs about prices are treated as unknown param-
eters to be estimated.4 These high dimensional latent variables complicate the estimation
strategy. To address this issue, I take advantage of recent Bayesian techniques and em-
ploy a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator. This approach allows for a feasible
estimation strategy that recovers parameter estimates summarizing individuals’ beliefs
about prices in addition to underlying taste parameters.
4Specifically, individuals are assumed to receive a price signal that is the true price plus a mean-zero
error. The error is unobserved by the researcher.
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The model is estimated using detailed administrative data on private health care claims
and price transparency website usage in New Hampshire. The claims data contain infor-
mation on the actual out-of-pocket price that consumers pay as well as the price paid by
insurers.5 I focus on relatively simple outpatient medical imaging procedures—X-Rays,
CT scans, and MRI scans.6 The negotiated price of these procedures ranges from a few
hundred dollars for X-rays to a few thousand for MRI scans. Despite the fact that spe-
cific medical imaging procedures are relatively standardized, I find that the price of each
procedure varies widely across providers in the state.7 In addition to individual-level in-
formation on the choice of medical provider, I also utilize disaggregated information on
usage of the price transparency tool obtained from website traffic logs.
Estimates from the demand model imply that, in the absence of the price transparency
website, consumers have significant uncertainty about prices. In particular, individual
beliefs are wrong by 37 percent on average.8 When individuals use the website and learn
true prices, they make different decisions about where to receive care, especially if they
are under their deductible and are exposed to the full price. This in turn affects the so-
lution to the bargaining problem between insurers and providers, which is the focus of
Chapter 3. The estimates also show that the individuals who use the HealthCost website
tend to be those that benefit most from the information, such as those with higher price
sensitivity or those in insurance plans with greater cost sharing.
5These are the same data used to calculate prices for New Hampshire’s price transparency website.
6The claims data cover all privately-insured individuals in the state, over 1 million covered lives. There
are 177,995 individuals with medical imaging procedures over the period.
7This is consistent with previous research documenting the large degree of price dispersion for these
procedures nationally (Cooper et al. 2015). Also note that medical imaging procedures in the U.S. are
roughly double the price of the same procedures in other OECD countries with available data. See “The US
health system in perspective: a comparison of twelve industrialized nations,” Commonwealth Fund Issue
Brief, 2011.




This paper is related to the large literature on search costs and competition, starting
with Stigler (1961). Even with homogenous goods and many sellers, search costs can
lead to higher prices (e.g. Diamond 1971; Stahl 1989). Search costs have been shown
to be empirically important in a large variety of markets.9 A common assumption in
this literature is that individuals make a purchase decision after learning the price of at
least some of the options (i.e. the consideration set).10 In contrast, this paper studies
a context in which individuals make decisions under uncertainty. Although there are
similarities to search frictions, the welfare consequences of price uncertainty are distinct
since individuals may be surprised by their bill. The model presented in this paper has
implications for other situations in which it is not possible to observe actual prices when
making a purchase decision, such as markets where consumers receive price quotes.
This paper is also related to the literature examining markets with shrouded add-on
pricing. The price of add-ons may be shrouded in equilibrium due to consumer lack of
self-control (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004), selection issues (Ellison 2005), bounded
rationality (Spiegler 2006), or myopia (Gabaix and Laibson 2006).11 Empirical work has
found that obfuscation of shipping charges affects consumer behavior (Ellison and Elli-
son 2009; Brown, Hossain and Morgan 2010). Related work on bill-shock has examined
situations in which consumers are inattentive about the price of the next unit of consump-
tion, such as for cellular phone contracts (Grubb 2014; Grubb and Osborne 2015). Pricing
in the market for medical services can be seen as the limit-case of add-on pricing—in the
9Empirical work has studied search frictions in a variety of markets including prescription drugs, mu-
tual funds, textbooks, online bookstores, grocery stores, auto insurance, electricity, online hotel booking,
cars, and trade-waste (Sorensen 2000; Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004; Hong and Shum 2006; De Los San-
tos, Hortaçsu and Wildenbeest 2012; Seiler 2013; Honka 2014; Giulietti, Waterson and Wildenbeest 2014;
Koulayev 2014; Moraga-González, Sándor and Wildenbeest 2015; Salz 2015). There has also been related
work on technology that reduces search costs (e.g. Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Jensen 2007; Jang 2015; Luco
2015).
10This is true for models of sequential as well as non-sequential search.
11Also see Grubb (2015) for related review.
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absence of price transparency tools the full price is partially shrouded. Therefore, the
model developed in this paper can be seen as a new approach to add-on pricing in which
consumers have noisy beliefs about shrouded attributes and maximize expected utility.
Previous work has also examined the case in which consumers lack information about
product attributes other than price.12 For experience goods, consumers may initially lack
information about product quality or other non-price attributes (e.g. Erdem and Keane
1996; Ackerberg 2003; Erdem, Keane and Sun 2008; Allcott 2013). Building on Allcott
(2013), as well as theoretical work by Schmeiser (2014), Train (2015) formalizes the cal-
culation of consumer surplus in discrete-choice models when anticipated attributes are
different from experienced attributes. I use this approach to calculate welfare when price
is different than expected.
While this paper argues that information frictions are important for understanding
consumers’ choice of medical providers, a broader literature has emphasized frictions in
other parts of the health care system. For instance, Handel and Kolstad (2015) find ev-
idence that a variety of frictions affect health insurance choice. Prior literature has also
found that consumer inattention or inertia has implications for Medicare Part D (e.g. Er-
icson 2014; Decarolis 2015; Ho, Hogan and Morton 2016). In addition, there is evidence
that uncertainty about the effectiveness of different drugs is relevant for pharmaceuti-
cal demand (Crawford and Shum 2005; Ching 2010; Dickstein 2014). In a similar vein,
a literature has examined uncertainty about quality of medical services and medical de-
vices (e.g. Cutler, Huckman and Landrum 2004; Kolstad 2013; Grennan and Town 2015).
Finally, Grennan and Swanson (2016) find that information affects hospital-supplier bar-
gaining. Despite this growing literature, to my knowledge, there is no evidence on the
welfare effects of frictions that affect consumers’ choice of hospital.
Finally, this paper seeks to integrate quasi-experimental and structural approaches.13
12This is also related to the literature on quality disclosure. For an overview, see Dranove and Jin (2010).
13For a related discussion see Angrist and Pischke (2010) and response by Einav and Levin (2010) and
Nevo and Whinston (2010).
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There is a small but growing literature that directly compare results from quasi-experimental
reduced-form methods with estimates from a structural model (e.g. ). I contribute to this
literature by demonstrating that an empirical model can exploit a natural experiment to
perform out-of-sample counterfactual simulations. I compare these methods in greater
detail in Chapter 3.
2.1.2 Roadmap
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and
provides additional background on the price transparency website not provided in Chap-
ter 1. Section 2.3 presents the model of website usage and choice of medical provider. I
also discuss the estimation and robustness. Section 2.4 presents the results from the de-
mand model. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 DATA AND BACKGROUND
I utilize an all-payer claims database from New Hampshire that provides detailed in-
formation on negotiated prices along with information about how much is paid by the
individual versus the insurer. I use these data to construct the individual-specific out-of-
pocket price for each option in individuals’ choice sets. In Section 2.2.2 I provide back-
ground on the price transparency website in New Hampshire and describe the variation
that is used to estimate the model. I also describe the website traffic data which is used to
construct information about the fraction of consumers with price information when the
website is available.
2.2.1 New Hampshire Medical Claims
The main dataset contains enrollment and claims for the universe of individuals with
private health insurance in New Hampshire for the period January 2005 to November
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2010.14 These data were collected as part of the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health
Care Information System (NHCHIS), which assembled data from all commercial insurers
in the state. The data were collected by the state in order to analyze health spending and
construct prices for the price transparency website.
This paper analyzes the market for outpatient medical imaging services. This includes
X-rays, computerized tomography (CT) scans, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scans, all of which are diagnostic procedures that provide internal images of the body.
Note that in Chapter 1, I use a broader definition of radiology procedures that includes
procedures such as bone density scans and PET scans. In this paper I focus on X-rays, CT
scans, and MRI scans because these procedures are relatively common, allowing me to
construct accurate prices within individuals’ choice sets.15
I limit the sample to individuals covered by managed care plans under the three main
insurers in the state, Anthem, Cigna, and Harvard-Pilgrim. These insurance compa-
nies offer a variety of managed care plans, including Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) plans, Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans, Point-of-Service (POS) plans,
and Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) plans.16 In all of these plans, the insurers
negotiate lower prices with a selected network of providers, however the plans differ
according to the level of cost sharing and the rules for seeing specialists or going to an
out-of-network provider. Although all individuals in the NHCHIS dataset are insured by
plans in New Hampshire, some live outside the state. I remove these individuals as well
as individuals that go to providers in states other than New Hampshire and surrounding
states (Massachusetts, New York, Maine, and Vermont).
Each medical claim is associated with an individual procedure, however a medical
14Although the data include information about claims in later years, I focus on the period prior to De-
cember 2010 since this is when website traffic data is available.
15In Chapter 1, I find evidence that the price transparency website may have affected the quantity of
mammograms (but not other procedures). I also exclude mammograms from the analysis, allowing me to
assume that all individuals choose an inside-option.
16Less than 2 percent of enrollees are in indemnity (fee-for-service) plans. I remove these individuals.
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imaging visit may contain multiple procedures.17 Since the price of the bundle of proce-
dures is the relevant amount for consumers, the price transparency website displays price
aggregated to the visit level. I follow a similar procedure as the website (using the same
dataset) in order to calculate visit prices at each provider. In particular, I aggregate to the
visit level by summing all procedures on the day of the visit. I exclude visits in which
there was a more expensive primary procedure performed on the same day. This ensures
that the sample contains only medical imaging visits that are self-contained. The method
used to define visits and associated prices is described in greater detail in Chapter 1.
Each visit is categorized by the imaging procedure, defined by a CPT/HCPCS code.18
These codes are quite specific and refer to relatively standardized procedures. The full list
of medical imaging procedures is given in Table A7. For each visit, I am able to calculate
the out-of-pocket price paid by consumers, the price paid by insurers, as well as the list
price.19 The list price is not relevant for individuals in the sample since insurers negoti-
ate prices that are lower than the list prices. This negotiated price is obtained by simply
summing the amount paid by consumers and insurers. The ratio of the out-of-pocket
price to the negotiated price determines the individual-specific level of cost sharing (e.g.
if the individual is under the deductible, then the cost sharing is equal to 1). Prices are
inflation-adjusted to 2010 dollars using the Medical Care Services CPI from the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics.
For each visit, an identifier allows me to link information about the medical provider
that performed the procedure, which includes both hospital and non-hospital facilities.
While hospitals offer outpatient medical imaging services, freestanding outpatient facili-
ties (e.g. imaging centers) are significantly less expensive. In New Hampshire, the aver-
17For instance, a CT scan may contain a charge for the scan itself as well as supplemental charges for oral
contrast agent which help highlight specific parts of the body.
18The American Medical Association developed and maintains Current Procedural Terminology (CPT)
codes. Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes are an extension of CPT codes that
include additional procedures and services.
19The data also contain information on capitation payments to providers. Over the relevant period in
New Hampshire, these payments were very small.
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age total cost of imaging procedures is $1,004 at hospitals but only $797 at non-hospital
providers. In addition to observing provider type, I also observe the provider zip code.20
The location of these providers is shown in Figure 2.1.
For individuals, I observe age, sex, zip code, insurance enrollment, and whether they
are subject to a deductible. I also observe a patient identifier. I define 5 different age
groups (0-18, 19-35, 36-50, 51-64) and omit individuals over age 65 since they are likely
eligible for Medicare. Average income and education using the 2007-2010 American Com-
munity Survey is linked to each individual using the zip code. In addition, patient zip
code is used to calculate the distance to each provider. Using observed International
20Note it is not possible to obtain the identity of each provider and link additional information.





Notes: Map shows the location of providers providing medical imaging ser-
vices that service privately-insured individuals in New Hampshire.
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Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes, I also construct a measure of chronic diseases or
conditions that may affect how difficult it is to treat patients. This measure is referred to
as the Charlson Comorbidity Index.21 Finally, I construct an indicator for whether each
individual has the medical imaging procedure in the week following an emergency. Al-
though these are relatively minor emergency visits since I exclude inpatient admissions,
this may affect demand since it may be more time sensitive (e.g. demand for medical
imaging procedures after a bone fracture may be different than for routine preventative
care).
Table 2.1: Summary of Privately Insured Individuals with
Medical Imaging Claims
Mean SD Min Max
Male 0.46 0.50 0 1
Age 0-18 0.20 0.40 0 1
Age 19-35 0.19 0.39 0 1
Age 36-50 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age 51-64 0.30 0.46 0 1
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.6 0.8 0.0 2.0
Zip income ($1,000s) 83.5 24.6 22.0 309.7
Zip BA Degree (%) 33.9 13.8 0.0 100.0
Insurance Type:
PPO 0.29 0.45 0 1
POS 0.15 0.36 0 1
HMO 0.50 0.50 0 1
EPO 0.06 0.24 0 1
Insurance Company:
Anthem 0.60 0.49 0 1
Cigna 0.23 0.42 0 1
Harvard Pilgrim 0.17 0.37 0 1
Plan Characteristics:
Plan has Deductible 0.44 0.50 0 1
Unique Individuals 177,995
Notes: Includes all unique privately insured individuals in
the state of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2010
with at least one outpatient medical imaging visit. If an in-
dividual switches insurance plans, summary statistics are
calculated using only their first plan.
21In particular, the Charlson Comorbidity Index is an integer score that is often used to predict mortality.
See Charlson et al. (1987) and Stagg (2006).
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Table 2.1 provides a summary of individuals in the sample. There are 177,995 unique
individuals with outpatient imaging visits over the period. Half of the individuals are in
HMO plans, and most of the remainder are in PPO or POS plans. About 44 percent of
individuals have a plan with a deductible. New Hampshire is a relatively high-income
state, and privately insured individuals have even higher income than the general popu-
lation.
When an individual needs a specific procedure, the choice set is defined as the providers
that are available through the individual’s insurance plan that can perform the proce-
dure in the given year. Although I do not observe each insurer’s network directly, I
construct a proxy by examining the providers chosen by individuals in each insurance
company-product pair (e.g. Anthem HMO). In some cases, individuals may have plans,
such as PPO plans, that allow them to choose providers out-of-network. To the extent
that individuals actually choose these providers, they are included in the choice set (but
have higher prices).22 For each option in the choice set, I construct procedure prices that
vary by insurance company-product pair and year. In addition, out-of-pocket prices vary
across individuals with the same insurance product since some individuals are under the
deductible and some are not. Within each individual’s choice set, I remove providers
that cannot perform the procedure as well as those that are more than 75 miles from the
individual.
In general, patients are told they need a diagnostic test by their primary care physician
or other specialist. They may receive a referral, however consumers are generally free to
schedule an appointment for a medical imaging procedure at any provider within their
insurer’s network.23 Although the NHCHIS dataset does not have information on refer-
rals, I construct a measure of likely referrals. To do this, I find each individual’s primary
22For the purposes of the model, I refer to the set of providers that individuals can access given their
insurance as the “network” even though this could potentially include providers that are technically out-
of-network.
23Note I do not include inpatient medical imaging procedures since patients are unlikely to choose their
provider when they are already admitted to a hospital.
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care physician in each year, defined as the most frequently visited primary care physi-
cian. I then find the most common medical imaging provider chosen by the primary care
physician’s patients. Using this, I construct an indicator for likely referrals.
Table 2.2: Summary of Medical Imaging Visits by Insurer
Anthem Cigna Harvard Pilgrim
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Observations 2, 142, 583 442, 836 457, 294
Number of choice situations 200, 231 48, 938 52, 760
Number of unique patients 115, 370 32, 259 30, 366
Number of unique non-hospital providers 177 110 88
Number of unique hospital providers 38 14 0
Providers in choice set 13.7 5.3 13.1 6.2 11.2 4.5
Total Negotiated Price 924.2 1060.5 680.9 815.5 677.0 761.2
Insurance price 827.3 1015.0 639.8 785.2 601.7 719.5
Out-of-pocket price 96.9 216.2 41.0 91.4 75.3 185.5
Distance to provider 38.2 18.0 35.0 19.0 33.2 17.9
Choose hospital 0.34 0.47 0.21 0.40 0.00 0.02
Choose referral 0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.46
Notes: Includes all outpatient medical imaging visits for privately insured individuals in the state of
New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011. All prices in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars.
The full dataset is summarized for each of the three insurers in Table 2.2. Anthem
is by far the largest insurer, with over 200,000 medical imaging visits over the period.
On average, the out-of-pocket price is 12 percent of the total negotiated price. However,
there is large variation—individuals under the deductible pay the full price. In particular,
there is greater cost sharing in the beginning of the year, when individuals have not hit
their deductible, then at the end of the year (see Figure A4). Individuals choose between
13 different providers on average, although, again, there is significant variation. This is
partially due to the fact that there are more providers that are capable of performing X-
rays than MRI scans. Given large number of observations, I use a 2 percent sample of
visits for the main analysis.
Within individual’s choice sets there is a large degree of price dispersion, and conse-
quently, significant potential savings if individuals switch to low cost options. Figure 2.2a
52
shows the distribution of demeaned negotiated prices within individuals’ choice sets. The
distribution is approximately normal, with standard deviation of $639 (and coefficient of
variation of 44.5 percent). If a consumer is under the deductible for the year, the individ-
ual is fully exposed to the variation in prices. However, since most patients share cost
with an insurer, out-of-pocket price dispersion is smaller, with a standard deviation of
$127 (see Figure 2.2b).24 Finally, Figure 2.2c shows the distribution of prices paid by the
insurer.
Given the variation in prices, there are large potential savings if consumers switched to
cheaper providers in their network. The potential savings for consumers and insurers are
summarized in Table A8. Overall, I find that there would be savings of over 40 percent
if consumers switched to providers in the first quartile of the price distribution.25 The
savings are even greater for X-rays and CT scans. Consumers subject to a deductible
have large private gains from switching, but much of the potential savings for consumers
without a deductible go to insurers. This suggests that, although there are large potential
savings for the health care system, these consumers may have little incentive to switch to
less expensive providers even if they have price information.
2.2.2 HealthCost Website
In an effort to increase health care price transparency, the New Hampshire Insurance
Department launched the HealthCost website in March 2007.26 Although other states
have implemented health care price transparency initiatives, many only provide infor-
mation on the hospital list price of each procedure (i.e. charge amount), which has little
24The coefficient of variation is 49.6 percent.
25These are the potential consumers and insurer savings if all consumers choosing a provider ranked
above the first quartile in their choice set were to switch to the provider in the first quartile of their choice
set.
26The website can be found at nhhealthcost.nh.gov. Originally the website was nhhealthcost.org. Note
that in 2016, after the period of analysis, the website added additional information for consumers, including
information provider quality.
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bearing on the out-of-pocket prices that insured individuals actually pay.27 New Hamp-
shire’s HealthCost website was unique because it provided information about insurer-
specific out-of-pocket prices. Although other states, such as Maine and Colorado, have
since created tools with similar information, New Hampshire’s price transparency efforts
remain the most comprehensive.28 Individuals with private insurance in the state can
select one of about 35, mostly outpatient, procedures (see Figure A5a). In addition to
providing information for insured individuals, the website also has a separate tool for
uninsured individuals in the state. Since the claims data cover the population of insured
individuals, I focus only on the former. In recent years, the website added information
27Information about list prices may affect uninsured individuals. See Christensen, Floyd and Maffett
(2015), who examine the effect of information about list prices.
28New Hampshire was the only state to receive an “A” grade from Catalyst for Payment Reform’s 2015
Report Card on State Price Transparency Laws.
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about provider quality and a guide to health insurance. This occurred after my period of
analysis. It is also important to note that there have been other price transparency efforts
by individual insurers, notably Aetna which started its Member Payment Estimator tool
in 2010. However, Aetna had a very small presence in New Hampshire and is excluded
from the analysis.
To use the website, consumers enter their insurance information, deductible, zip code,
and search radius and the website returns a list of median bundled out-of-pocket prices
at each provider calculated using the NHCHIS dataset. Figure A5b shows an example
of prices returned by the website. The table of prices is automatically sorted by out-of-
pocket price, making it easy for consumers to schedule an appointment with the lowest
cost provider. In addition to the out-of-pocket price, the website also returns the amount
paid by insurers and the total negotiated price. For the purposes of analysis, I assume
that individuals who use the website are fully informed about prices. I discuss this as-
sumption in greater detail in Section 2.3.2.29
According to discussions with state employees, the website was promoted by encour-
aging insurers and primary care doctors to inform patients about the website. In addition,
there were at least 40 news articles mentioning the website over the period. On average,
there were 41,506 searches for price information per year according to website traffic logs,
about a third of which were for medical imaging procedures. Furthermore, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the website not only let consumers shop around, but may have
allowed insurers to negotiate lower rates. One report noted that after the introduction of
the website “the balance of plan-provider negotiating power began shifting significantly
in New Hampshire.”30 In particular, Anthem, the largest insurer in New Hampshire, had
a public battle with an expensive hospital in the state. Local news sources suggest that
29The website also provides information on precision of the cost estimate and typical patient complexity.
I argue these are less relevant for medical imaging procedures since the procedures are relatively com-
mon (making estimates fairly precise) and relatively standardized (meaning price depends little on patient
complexity).
30See “Moving Markets: Moving Markets: Lessons from New Hampshire’s Health Care Price Trans-
parency Experiment,” April 2014. California HealthCare Foundation.
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the price transparency website allowed the insurer to negotiate lower prices.31
In order to examine the effect of price transparency, this paper exploits two sources of
variation generated by the HealthCost website. First, there is variation due to the timing
of the website introduction. In this way, I can examine procedures on the website and
compare observed choices from 2005 to February 2007, prior to the introduction of the
website, to observed choices in the period starting March 2007. Second, there is variation
due to the fact that only a subset of medical imaging procedures were available on the
website.32 The X-ray, CT scan, and MRI scan procedures with and without information
available on the website are listed in Table A7. I argue that imaging procedures on the
website tend to be quite similar to procedures not on the website. For example, the price
of a knee X-ray is available on the website while the price of a knee/leg CT scan is not.
Note that the website also had price information for a few simple surgical procedures
(e.g. kidney stone removal), physician office visits, as well as newborn delivery. I do not
consider these procedures in the analysis because they tend to be less standardized and
involves a different set of providers.
In Chapter 1, I use these two sources of variation in a difference-in-differences frame-
work. In that paper, the key identifying assumption is that the price of procedures on
the website would follow a common trend relative to procedures not on the website if
the website were never available. I argued that this assumption was plausible given the
price trends that exist prior to the introduction of the website. In this paper, I develop
an empirical model that relies on an alternative, but related, set of assumptions. One
of the key assumptions is that individuals’ utility parameters are orthogonal to whether
procedures are available on the website. I compare the approach taken in this paper with
the reduced-form identification strategy and discuss the structural assumptions in more
31See “Higher costs of services snags Exeter Hospital’s new deal with Anthem,” Portsmouth Herald,
November 7, 2010 and “Exeter Hospital says costs being used as negotiating tactic,” Portsmouth Herald,
November 14, 2010.
32According to discussions with state employees, only a subset of procedures were chosen because clean-
ing the data and constructing prices was time consuming and the department had limited resources. Note
that after the period of analysis, the website added additional information.
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Notes: Chart shows cumulative searches by procedure group. Includes all searches
using “Health Costs for Insured Patients” wizard on either nhhealthcost.nh.gov or
nhhealthcost.org. Note the website began in March 2007.
detail in Section 3.4.1.
I use website traffic logs obtained from the New Hampshire Insurance Department to
calculate the number of website price searches in each month for each procedure listed on
the website. Website traffic data is available from March 2007 through November 2010,
at which point the website switched hosting companies. Figure 2.3 shows cumulative
monthly price searches for X-rays, CT scans, and MRI scans. When the website was first
introduced in 2007 there were about 750 to 1,000 searches per month for the price of
medical imaging procedures, however this grew to over 1,500 searches per month by late
2009.
In order to estimate the fraction of informed consumers I divide the number of price
searches per procedure by the total number of visits in New Hampshire from the claims
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Table 2.3: Monthly Percent of Consumers with Price
Information
By Procedure Listed on Price Transparency
Website
Mean % SD % Min % Max %
X-Ray (Ankle) 6.2 3.5 1.5 17.5
X-Ray (Chest) 1.5 0.8 0.6 4.2
X-Ray (Foot) 2.9 1.3 1.4 7.9
X-Ray (Knee) 3.3 1.5 1.7 9.6
X-Ray (Shoulder) 5.2 2.7 2.9 17.3
X-Ray (Spine) 2.4 1.3 0.9 7.9
X-Ray (Wrist) 2.3 1.1 1.0 7.2
CT (Abdomen) 5.3 2.9 2.6 15.2
CT (Chest) 13.4 6.5 6.3 33.1
CT (Pelvis) 15.9 8.6 5.7 50.3
MRI (Back) 9.3 5.0 3.9 29.3
MRI (Brain) 12.0 6.6 5.6 38.0
MRI (Knee) 11.8 5.9 6.1 34.2
MRI (Pelvis) 19.7 11.5 6.2 67.7
Notes: Percent of consumers with price information in each month
for each procedure is calculated as website usage (from website traf-
fic logs) divided by visits aggregated across all related CPT codes
(from claims data). Period of analysis is March 2007 to November
2010, the period in which website traffic data is available.
data.33 In other words, I assume that each use of the website is a unique individual.34
Table 2.3 shows the estimated percent of consumers with price information for each
medical imaging procedure listed on the website. The percent of informed consumers is
between 2 and 6 percent on average for X-ray procedures. There is a larger fraction of
consumers that use the website for CT scans and MRI scans—between 5 and 19 percent
on average. CT scans and MRI scans also tend to be more expensive, making the web-
site potentially more valuable for consumers receiving these procedures. There is also
temporal variation, potentially due to the fact that there is random variation in the type
33Note that the website procedures (e.g. knee X-ray) are more broad than the procedures as defined by
CPT codes (e.g. knee X-ray with 1 or 2 views). Therefore, I aggregate across all CPT procedure codes related
to the website procedure to obtain the total number of visits related to the website procedure in each month.
34If the same individual uses the website multiple times prior to a medical visit, the fraction of informed
consumers would be lower. This would imply that the estimated savings conditional on using the website
are actually larger. For this reason, the assumption that the number of website hits is equivalent to the
number of informed consumers results in a conservative estimate of website savings.
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of individuals that need a procedure in a given month. In addition, more individuals
may be learning about the website over time, as seen in Figure 2.3. This variation is used
to help estimate the demand model and recover information about the choice to use the
website if it is available.
2.3 DEMAND FOR PROVIDERS AND WEBSITE USAGE
This section presents a model of demand in which individuals have uncertainty about
prices unless they use the price transparency website. The model has two parts. First,
consumers may choose to use the price transparency website if it is available, in which
case they learn actual out-of-pocket prices. I derive an expression for the expected benefit
of price information given individuals’ beliefs about prices and assume that individu-
als use the website if this benefit is greater than the cost. Second, consumers choose a
medical provider. If individuals do not use the website or it is not available, they choose
a provider with uncertainty about prices. However, if individuals use the price trans-
parency website, they choose a provider with knowledge of all prices.
I start backwards and begin by discussing the choice of provider with and without
price information in Section 2.3.2. In Section 2.3.3 I discuss the model of website usage
using results derived from Section 2.3.2. The two parts of the model are estimated jointly.
I present an estimation strategy that relies on revealed preferences in terms of both web-
site usage and provider choices. The high dimensionality of the unobservables makes
maximum likelihood estimation computationally infeasible. In Section 2.3.4, I present a
Bayesian estimation strategy that addresses the estimation challenges by utilizing recent
advances in MCMC methods. Finally, I discuss identification.
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2.3.1 Model Setup and Timing
There are a set of providers that sell medical imaging services J indexed by j. The set
of providers includes hospitals as well as non-hospital providers (i.e. freestanding out-
patient facilities such as imaging centers and clinics). Each year, insurer k ∈ K contracts
with a subset of providers, Nkmt ⊆ J , that can perform procedure m ∈ M, whereM is
the set of medical imaging procedures.35 Finally, let i ∈ I denote an individual enrolled
in an insurance plan who needs a medical imaging procedure.
Each provider has a schedule of negotiated prices that is insurer-specific. In particular,
the total price of procedure m at provider j for enrollees in insurer k at time t is given by
pjkmt ∈ pkmt, where pkmt denotes the vector of prices across all providers. In Section 3.2, I
model the bargaining process that determines these prices in each year. In contrast to the
previous literature, it is important to note that I define prices at the visit level (i.e. prices
include the cost of supplemental procedures as on the price transparency website).36
Individual i pays fraction cikmt of the negotiated price, which is observed in the claims
data. The degree of cost sharing is determined by both the coinsurance rate applied to
procedure m when enrolled in insurance plan k as well whether the individual is past
the deductible for the year. In particular, if the individual is subject to a deductible then
cikmt = 1. Therefore, for a given individual, cost sharing can vary over time t. The out-of-
pocket price paid by the individual is
pOOPijkmt = cikmtpjkmt
I assume that this is the price internalized by the individual.37 The remainder is paid by
35Given that insurers contract with a network of providers, their role extends beyond providing insur-
ance. For this reason, they are often referred to as managed care organizations.
36Focusing only on the main procedure would likely understate price differences across providers since
consumers are in fact purchasing a bundle of procedures. Note that much of the literature focuses on
inpatient hospital spending where prices are often defined by diagnosis.
37It has been suggested that individuals respond to dynamic incentives that arise due to annual de-
ductibles, however the evidence is mixed (e.g Aron-Dine et al. 2015; Sacks et al. 2016; Brot-Goldberg et al.
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the insurer
pInsurijkmt = (1− cikmt)pjkmt
After prices are determined via bargaining in each year, individuals that need a med-
ical imaging procedure must choose a provider. I assume that each time an individual
needs a medical imaging procedure there is the following timing:
1. The individual forms a prior about prices (i.e. they know the distribution from
which prices are drawn)
2. The individual receives a vector of price signals and updates beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion
3. The individual evaluates the expected gain from price information and chooses
whether to use the website if it is available
4. The individual learns taste shocks and chooses the provider that maximizes ex-
pected utility
Previous to potentially using the price transparency website, the individual’s taste
shocks are unknown. This assumption is required to calculate the expected gain in con-
sumer surplus from price information and tractably model the decision to use the website
in the subsequent section. Learning the taste shock after choosing to use the website is
consistent with the fact that consumers may evaluate providers based on observable char-
acteristics, choose to use the website if it is available, and only then learn when providers
have open appointment times. Under this interpretation, the taste shocks can be inter-
preted as individuals’ idiosyncratic scheduling preferences.
After choosing a provider and receiving the procedure, the individual receives a bill
and learns the true price. Welfare calculations must take into account the fact that realized
price may differ from ex-ante beliefs about prices.
2015). I assume that individuals do not anticipate whether they will surpass their annual deductible and
respond only to the spot price.
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2.3.2 Choice of Provider
In this section I present a discrete choice model of provider demand in which con-
sumers receive noisy signals about prices. If consumers do not become informed about
prices, they choose a provider with uncertainty about prices. However, if consumers
use the price transparency website, they know true prices. Previous models of hospital
demand either assume that individuals do not account for hospital prices at all or have
perfect information about prices.38 In contrast, I assume that individuals may have some
information about prices even if they do not use the website. In this way, the model nests
both the full information case as well as the case in which individuals completely ignore
prices. In addition to price, the choice of provider is also assumed to depend on the dis-
tance from each individual to each provider, referrals, provider quality or amenities, as
well as factors that vary with observed differences across individuals.
Individuals may only visit a provider in their network, j ∈ Nkmt. There is no out-
side option since individuals are assumed to receive a medical imaging procedure if their
doctor recommends it. One concern is that price transparency affects the choice to have
a procedure at all. In Chapter 1, I use the entire sample of privately-insured individu-
als and examine the effect of the price transparency website on the probability of having
medical imaging procedures and do not find a statistically significant effect.39 This find-
ing suggests that conditioning on individuals that had a medical imaging procedure and
assuming they all choose an inside option is unlikely to bias counterfactual estimates.
38For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000), Tay (2003), Ho (2006), and Ho and Lee (2017) assume that
price does not influence patient choice while Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003), Gaynor and Vogt
(2003), Ho and Pakes (2014) and Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) include price in individual utility
and assume individuals have perfect information.
39In particular, I do not find an effect on quantity when mammograms are excluded. This is one reason
why this paper focuses only on X-rays, CT scans, and MRI scans.
62
Provider Choice When Prices are Known
I start by defining utility for the standard case in which prices are known. This ex-
pression is also the ex-post realized utility for the case in which individuals have ex-
ante uncertainty.40 For individual i with insurance k receiving procedure m from medical
provider j, indirect utility is assumed to take the additively separable form
uijkmt = −γipOOPijkmt + α1dij + α2d2ij + α3rijt + ξ jM + βxikmthj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijkmt
+εijkmt (2.1)
I allow for individual-specific heterogeneity in out-of-pocket price sensitivity, γi, which
is distributed with density f (γi). This approach has the benefit of not exhibiting the in-
dependence from irrelevant alternatives property and allowing for more flexible substi-
tution patterns. It is also important since individuals that are more price sensitive may be
more likely to use the price transparency website, which I explicitly account for in Section
2.3.3. I estimate the mean and variance of the distribution and allow the price coefficient
to be correlated with the individual’s average cost sharing, cik, since individuals with
greater price sensitivity may differentially select into more generous plans.41 Accounting
for the adverse selection into insurance is important for understanding which individu-
als benefit from the price transparency website. In particular, I assume that the random
coefficient is distributed normally:
γi ∼ N(γ¯+ ρcik, (σγ)2) (2.2)
Since the same individual may have multiple medical imaging visits over the period, it
is important to account for correlation in unobserved utility. Therefore, I assume that the
40Train (2015) refers to this as “experienced” utility and refers to ex-ante utility as “anticipated” utility.
41This approach is related to Limbrock (2011), who models selection into HMO plans and pharmaceutical
demand. Note that cik is defined as the individual’s average cost sharing for medical imaging procedures
over the period of analysis.
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random-coefficient is individual-specific (Revelt and Train 1998).
In addition to price, utility depends on observable non-price attributes, δijkmt. This
term includes distance from each individual to each provider, dij, distance-squared, d2ij, as
well as an indicator for whether individual i was likely referred to provider j, rijt. Demand
for hospitals may also differ depending on individual characteristics. Utility includes
xikmthj, the interaction between observable individual characteristics and an indicator for
whether the provider is a hospital. The vector of individual characteristics, x, includes
age categories, sex, income, education, outpatient emergency indicator, and the Charlson
Comorbidity Index. The last two are important for accounting for the fact that sicker
patients or those in more urgent need of care may have distinct preferences. Utility is
also a function of unobserved perceived quality or amenities at each provider, ξ jM. This
is allowed to vary according to the three procedure groups, X-rays, CT scans, or MRI
scans, which are indexed by M. This accounts for the fact that providers may specialize
in certain types of procedures.
Finally, εijkmt is an idiosyncratic error distributed i.i.d. type 1 extreme value that is
known by the individuals at the time the choice of provider is made. The observed choice
probability of individual i enrolled in insurer k receiving procedure m at time t conditional
on price information is




∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γipOOPij′ kmt + δij′ kmt)
f (γi)dγi (2.3)
where ϑikmt is an indicator for whether the individual used the website and was informed
about prices.
The expected consumer surplus, conditional on having price information, for a patient
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needing a medical imaging procedure is then:42







Provider Choice with Price Uncertainty
Next, I model the case in which individuals have uncertainty about prices. Individuals
form noisy beliefs using Bayes’ rule and then make a decision based on those beliefs. This
information structure is related to the empirical work on consumer learning (e.g. Erdem
and Keane 1996; Ackerberg 2003; Erdem, Keane and Sun 2008; Crawford and Shum 2005;
Ching 2010; Dickstein 2014; Grennan and Town 2015). I assume that individuals know the
distribution from which prices are drawn, which is assumed to be normal.43 In particular,
their prior is determined by the true mean and variance of prices their choice set, p¯OOPkmt
and s¯2kmt respectively:
pOOPijkmt
iid∼ N( p¯OOPkmt , s¯2kmt) (2.5)
The prior provides no information about relative prices in the choice set, and therefore
is not useful for choosing a provider on its own. However, individuals may be able to
obtain additional information about individual prices. For instance, they may be able to
look up list prices or receive potentially noisy price information from other individuals
that had similar procedures. When asked, providers and insurers sometimes provide a
price range if they provide any price information at all.44 I model this by assuming that
individuals receive a vector of unbiased signals, where each signal is given by
pOOPijkmt + eijkmt (2.6)
42This is the consumer surplus before the idiosyncratic error is known. All expressions for expected
consumer surplus are up to a constant. See Small and Rosen (1981).
43The true distribution of prices is approximately normal. See Figure 2.2b.
44See, for instance, “How to Research Health Care Prices,” Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2009.
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where pOOPijkmt is the true price and eijkmt is signal noise with density f (eijkmt). In particular,
I assume the distribution of signal noise is normal:
eijkmt
iid∼ N(0, σ2h) (2.7)
The key parameter is σ2h , which can be thought of as a measure of price transparency (or
opacity). The precision of price signals may be different for hospital versus non-hospital
providers, therefore σ2h is indexed by h, an indicator for whether the provider j is a hospi-
tal.
Using Bayes’ rule, individuals’ posterior beliefs about price, p˜OOPijkmt, are also normally






= wikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + (1− wikmt) p¯OOPkmt (2.8)







If σ2h = 0 then wikmt = 1 and individuals know true prices. Conversely, if σ
2
h → ∞ then
wikmt → 0, implying that individuals place no weight on the price signals. In this way, the
prior is important because it disciplines individual’s beliefs about price—if individuals
receive very noisy signals than they effectively ignore prices.45 In Section ??, I present
an alternative model in which individuals have an uninformative prior and take price
signals as given.
Using the assumption that the prior and signal are normally distributed, the variance



















When individuals do not use the price transparency website, I assume they form be-
liefs about utility, u˜ijkmt, and choose the provider that maximizes expected utility. In par-









+ α1dij + α2d2ij + α3rijt + ξ jM + βxikmthj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijkmt
+εijkmt
= −γiwikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + δijkmt + εijkmt
(2.11)
The second line follows from the fact that (1−wikmt) p¯OOPkmt is a constant that is the same
across choices, and thus can be differenced out.
Focusing on the component of utility that is due to price, it is useful to clarify what
is known by the individual and what is known by the researcher. The individual knows
her price sensitivity, γi, and signal, pOOPijkmt + eijkmt, but not the true price. However, the
researcher observes the true price, pOOPijkmt, but not the signal noise, eijkmt, or the individ-
ual’s price sensitivity. The prior distribution is known by both the researcher and the
individual.
Therefore, the observed choice probabilities from the researcher’s perspective is given
by




exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + δijkmt)
∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPij′ kmt + eij′ kmt) + δij′ kmt)
f (eikmt) f (γi)dJeikmtdγi (2.12)
where ϑikmt = 0 indicates that the individual did not use the website and is uninformed
about prices. It is worth noting that the vector of signal noise, eikmt, has the same num-
ber of elements as Nkmt. Therefore, computing the expectation over individual beliefs
requires evaluating a potentially high dimensional integral, complicating the estimation
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strategy. I address this issue in Section 2.3.4.
The calculation of expected consumer surplus must take into account that, from the
perspective of the individual, the expected price, E[ p˜OOPijkmt], may differ from true price,
pOOPijkmt. Train (2015) formalizes the calculation of consumer surplus when individuals mis-
perceive product attributes. In particular, individual’s expected ex-post consumer sur-
plus includes a standard term (Small and Rosen 1981) as well as a term that captures the
loss from incorrect beliefs:




exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + δijkmt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸










sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS gain/loss from incorrect beliefs
(2.13)
The second term is the average difference between expected price and true price,





− pOOPijkmt = wikmteijkmt + (1− wikmt)( p¯OOPkmt − pOOPijkmt) (2.14)
In general, individuals are more likely to choose a provider they falsely believe to be
inexpensive, creating a situation similar to a “winner’s curse”. This can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.4 which presents two situations, one in which expected price is greater than actual
price and one in which expected price is less than actual price. Believing an option to be
inexpensive (i.e. receiving a low eijkmt) results in a higher choice probability, increasing
the expected loss from incorrect beliefs.
2.3.3 Website Usage
In this section I develop a model in which individuals choose to use the price trans-
parency website if it is available. The model seeks to recover information about which
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Notes: Blue shaded region shows the gain in consumer surplus relative to expected
consumer surplus due to price being less than expected. Red region shows the loss
in consumer surplus from price being more than expected. Note that there is a
“winner’s curse” and the expected loss is larger.
individuals use the price transparency website. In Section 3.5, the estimates from this se-
lection model are used to simulate website usage under counterfactual scenarios such as
increased cost sharing.
Although I argue that that the availability of the website is plausibly exogenous, it is
not random which consumer use the website conditional on it being available. There may
be search moral hazard—consumers with the least to gain from using the website choose
not to use it. I assume that individuals evaluate the expected gain in consumer surplus
from using the website and compare this to the cost. They then use the website if the net
benefit is positive.





wikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + (1− wikmt) p¯OOPkmt , σ2hwikmt
)
(2.15)
With price uncertainty, the ex-ante consumer surplus from the individual’s perspec-
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tive is determined by evaluating Equation 2.13 at all possible prices.46 Therefore, given
































) is the joint distribution of beliefs determined by the individual’s prior
and signals following Equation 2.15.
In order to evaluate the expected gain from using the website, the individual must
compare Equation 2.16 with the expected consumer surplus after using the website. If
individuals use the website, they can re-optimize. In addition, they will no longer be
surprised by the bill. Therefore, given individual’s beliefs, expected consumer surplus













The difference between Equation 2.17 and Equation 2.16 is the benefit from using the
website. Since there does not exist a closed form expression, I derive an approximation
using a second-order multivariate Taylor series around the expectation. This approach is
necessary since it is computationally infeasible to use simulation-based methods.47 See
Appendix 3.6 for derivation and discussion about the accuracy of this approach. Using
46I assume individuals evaluate the benefit of using the website prior to knowing idiosyncratic shocks.
47Numerically integrating the expression by simulating draws for each price and then averaging over
the draws is computationally expensive given the high dimensionality of p˜OOPikmt . In addition, p˜
OOP
ikmt is itself
a function of latent variables (i.e. eikmt). For these reasons, a closed form expression for bikmt is necessary in
practice.
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where Φijkmt ≡ ∑j′∈Nkmt\j exp(−γiE[ p˜OOPij′ kmt] + δij′ kmt).
Unlike Equation 2.17, the interpretation of the closed-form expression above is rela-
tively straightforward. Holding beliefs about prices fixed, an increase in price uncertainty,
as measured by σ2h , increases the value of using the website. Similarly, an increase in price
dispersion affects wikmt, also increasing the value of using the website. Note that the ben-
efit of using the website is increasing in the absolute value of the individual-specific price
sensitivity parameter, γi.
Now I turn to the cost of using the website. In practice, the website is free to use and
only takes a few minutes. However, there may be large non-pecuniary costs. In 2007,
when the website started, only 58 percent of New Hampshire households had high speed
internet.48 In addition, many individuals were likely unaware of the website and had to
be motivated enough to discover the website on their own.
I assume cost has both an observable component, which is a function of individual
characteristics xikmt, as well as an unobservable component, νikmt. Observable character-
istics include age categories, sex, income, eduction, Charlson Comorbidity Index, emer-
gency indicator, and year indicators in order to account for the fact that more individuals
may hear about the website over time, reducing the implicit cost.49 I also include a con-
stant.
48See “State of New Hampshire Broadband Action Plan,” New Hampshire Department of Resources and
Economic Development & Telecommunications Advisory Board, June 30, 2008.
49This also accounts for the fact that more consumers have broadband internet over time.
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Individuals use the website if the net benefit is positive
θbikmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Website Benefit
− φxikmt + νikmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Website Cost
> 0 (2.19)
I assume that the distribution of νikmt is distributed i.i.d. type 1 extreme value (with
normalized variance). Therefore, the observed probability that individual i uses the web-
site for the price of procedure m at time t takes the logistic form:
ϑikmt =
exp(θbikmt − φxikmt)
1+ exp(θbikmt − φxikmt) (2.20)
where θ and φ are parameters to be estimated. Note that θ can be interpreted as the
marginal utility of income.
I have access to website traffic logs that provide an estimate of the number of individu-
als that decide to use the website for each procedure in each month. Since it is not possible
to link website usage to individual claims, it is necessary to connect the model’s predicted
individual website usage to overall website usage in each month for each procedure. Con-








where nmt is the number of individuals receiving procedure m in month t.
2.3.4 Joint Estimation of Demand
Next, I describe the procedure used to estimate the parameters of the demand model.
There are two pieces of the demand model, provider choice and website usage, which
are estimated jointly. I begin by discussing the likelihood function and the Bayesian
estimation procedure. I make use of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to
address the estimation challenges that arise due to the fact that beliefs about prices are
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unobserved. I then sketch the identification argument and discuss how the model takes
advantage of quasi-experimental variation to separately identify uncertainty about prices
and underlying consumer preferences.
Likelihood Function
The likelihood function is directly based on the structural equations describing indi-
vidual provider choices and website usage. The first component of the likelihood func-
tion is the probability of choosing the provider that was actually chosen. Equation 2.3 and
Equation 2.12 are the conditional choice probabilities with and without price information.
Therefore, the unconditional choice probability is:
sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt) =

sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt = 0) if website is not available
ϑikmt · sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt = 1) if website is available
+(1− ϑikmt) · sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt = 0)
(2.22)
If the website is not available for procedure m at time t, either because it is prior to
March 2007 or because the procedure is never on the website, then the consumer has un-
certainty about prices and choice probabilities are given by Equation 2.12. If the website is
available for procedure m at time t, the consumer is informed about prices if the website
is actually used. Therefore, choice probabilities are given by a mixture between Equa-
tion 2.3 and Equation 2.12, where the mixture weights are determined by the predicted
probability of using the website, given by Equation 2.20.
The second component of the likelihood function is the probability of actual website
traffic for each procedure-month given predicted website usage. The likelihood of website
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usage for procedure m in month t takes the following binomial form50
nmt!
Vmt!(nmt − Vmt)! (ϑmt)
Vmt (1− ϑmt)nmt−Vmt (2.23)
where nmt is the number of individuals receiving procedures and Vmt is the observed
search traffic for a given procedure-month.





















Vmt!(nmt − Vmt)! (ϑmt)
Vmt (1− ϑmt)nmt−Vmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Likelihood of Observed Search Traffic
(2.24)
where yijkmt is an indicator for the observed choice.
MCMC Estimation
To estimate the model, I use a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator to sim-
ulate the posterior distribution of Θ. This approach helps circumvent the computational
curse of dimensionality caused by the fact that beliefs, specifically the signal noise draws,
are a high-dimensional nuisance parameter.51 Rather than compute high dimensional in-
tegrals in order to find the expectation over eikmt and calculate the likelihood, the MCMC
estimator samples the parameter space conditional on the data.
50This is an approximation. The predicted probability of website usage within a procedure-month is
not identically distributed across individuals, therefore the sum of these Bernoulli distributed variables
takes a poisson binomial distribution. Since calculating the density of the poisson binomial distribution is
computationally expensive, I approximate this distribution with a binomial distribution. For an analysis of
the accuracy of this approximation see Ehm (1991).
51The standard estimation strategy is to use simulation methods and draw from f (eikmt) and f (γi), calcu-
late the log-likelihood for each draw, and average over the results to obtain the simulated log-likelihood for
a given value of the parameters. This simulated maximum likelihood approach is computationally infeasi-
ble due to the high dimensionality of eikmt. A very large number of draws from a multivariate distribution
would be required in order to accurately approximate the log-likelihood at each iteration.
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I take advantage of recent advances in Bayesian estimation and use a variant of MCMC
known as Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS).52 This approach,
developed by Hoffman and Gelman (2014), uses the gradient of the log posterior density
to more efficiently sample the posterior distribution.53 Relative to standard MCMC al-
gorithms such as Metropolis-Hastings and Gibbs sampling, this approach is known to
converge significantly faster for high-dimensional problems, making it well suited for a
situation with alternative-specific unobservables. In addition, it does not necessitate the
use of conjugate priors, allowing for more flexible modeling assumptions.
For the purposes of estimation, I reformulate the model in terms of a simplified like-
lihood that is augmented with a set of priors. The likelihood uses the choice probability
conditional on unobservables while the priors describe the distribution of website traffic
and the distribution of the unobservables. This version of the model is described in more
detail in Appendix 3.6.
It is important to note that using this Bayesian hierarchical model for estimation does
not impose additional assumptions since I use uninformative priors for all of the struc-
tural parameters. In supplemental material, I examine a simplified version of the model
with a small choice set and show that the results obtained via simulated maximum like-
lihood are very similar to those obtained via MCMC estimation.54 The use of MCMC is
primarily motivated by the fact that it is computationally attractive.
In order to estimate the posterior distribution of Θ, the algorithm uses the following
approach. At iteration n, the MCMC algorithm returns parameter estimates Θ(n). As
starting values, I use parameter estimates from a standard multinomial logit (see Section
2.4.1).55 However, to ensure that initial values do not influence the resulting posterior
52This algorithm is implemented in the Stan programming language, which I use to automatically com-
pute gradients and estimate the model. See Carpenter et al. (2016).
53In particular, HMC uses gradient information to avoid random walk behavior and sensitivity to cor-
related sampling. However, this approach suffers from the fact that it must be manual tuned for a given
problem and can double back on the parameter space, decreasing efficiency. Hoffman and Gelman (2014)
introduce NUTS to address these issues.
54Code and Monte Carlo results are available on my website.
55For parameters that are not included in the multinomial logit, I use random starting values.
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distribution, samples drawn during a warm-up period are discarded. The remaining
collection of samples, (Θ(1), ...,Θ(N)), approximately converge to the distribution of the
posterior. I report the mean and standard deviation of these samples in the results.
Identification Intuition
Without variation in consumers’ information set, it is difficult or impossible to sep-
arately identify price sensitivity and the degree of price uncertainty, i.e. the observed
choices from a population with low price sensitivity are potentially observationally equiv-
alent to the observed choices from a population with high price sensitivity but limited
information about prices. An alternative way to see this is to note that price uncertainty
is closely related to classical measurement error, except rather than the researcher having
noisy information it is the individual decision-maker. It is widely known that classical
measurement error can cause biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is also
true in non-linear models, and, in general, the variance of measurement error and the un-
derlying parameters are not separately identified (e.g. Chen, Hong and Nekipelov 2011).
I overcome this issue due to the fact that some consumers—those that use the price trans-
parency website—do not observe prices with error.
To describe the source of identification, I begin by focusing on individuals with price
information. Assuming the researcher can identify a subset of consumers that have price
information, identification of demand parameters (σγ, γ¯, ρ, α, ξ, β) follows the same argu-
ment as for the standard mixed logit model. Identification relies on variation in observed
provider choices when the characteristics of the providers or the choice set differ. In par-
ticular, price sensitivity is identified from the fact that the price of a given provider varies
depending on an individual’s insurer, whether the individual is under the deductible,
and year. In addition, the choice set of consumers varies over insurers, locations, and
years. Substitution patterns help identify the variance of the random coefficient on price.
In order to illustrate how underlying tastes and the degree of price uncertainty are
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separately identified, it is useful to start by describing the ideal experiment. Consider a
population that is randomly divided into a treatment group and control group. Although
both groups have the same distribution of consumer preferences, the treatment group is
given information about prices. If the treatment group appears more price sensitive than
the control group, it must be due to the fact that the control group had noisy beliefs about
prices. The extent to which individuals in the control group are less price sensitive pro-
vides information about the variance of signal noise. However, the mean bias of beliefs
is not identified in the case in which all individuals choose an inside option. This is be-
cause if individuals underestimate or overestimate the price of all options in the choice
set, observed choices do not change.
In this paper, I take advantage of a natural experiment in which a price transparency
website was available for a subset of consumers. In contrast to the ideal experiment
described above, individuals often did not use the website even when it was available.
However, conditional on θ and φ, the parameters that predict website usage, the observed
choices of individuals who used the website when it is available can be compared to the
observed choices of similar individuals who would have used the website if it were avail-
able. For this population, the identification argument is the same as in the ideal experi-
ment.
Finally, I turn to identification of the website usage parameters (i.e. θ and φ). In princi-
ple, these parameters can be identified by observing which individuals appear to be more
price sensitive when the website is available relative to when the website is not available.
In practice, identification is facilitated by using the website traffic data and exploiting
variation in website traffic across months and across procedures. In particular, correla-
tion between consumers’ benefit of using the website and website usage helps identify θ,




I now turn to the results. Section 2.4.1 motivates the full demand model by presenting
results from a standard multinomial logit model. Section 2.4.2 then discuss the results
from the full demand model (both provider choice and website usage). In Section 2.4.3, I
also discuss results from an alternative demand model in which consumers do not have
an informative prior about the distributions of prices.
2.4.1 Estimates from Multinomial Logit Model
In order to examine the effect of the price transparency website, I start by estimating
a naive demand model in which I interact the availability of the website and the price
coefficient. I assume choice probabilities take the form
sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt) =
exp(−γ1qmtpOOPijkmt − γ2(1− qmt)pOOPijkmt + δijkmt)
∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γ1qmtpOOPij′ kmt − γ2(1− qmt)pOOPijkmt + δij′ kmt)
(2.25)
where qmt is an indicator for whether procedure m is available on the website at time
t. Therefore, γ1 is the price coefficient when the website is available and γ2 is the price
coefficient when the website is not available. I also include δijkmt, which contains the same
non-price characteristics as in Equation 2.1. Since this simple approach does not model
unobserved beliefs, estimation can be performed via maximum likelihood.
Table A9 presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors from the simple logit
model. The magnitude of the price coefficient is larger when consumers have access to
the price transparency website, indicating that the website increases the effective demand
elasticity of the population. The difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.56 Complimenting the results in Chapter 1, this provides further evidence that the
56I present results for a small sample for comparison with the results from the full specification. The
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for a larger sample. In addition, although the
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website had a meaningful impact on consumer behavior.
Consistent with the prior literature on hospital demand, the travel distance is impor-
tant for understanding consumer demand. I find evidence of non-linearities in travel
preferences. The indicator for likely referrals is highly significant, indicating that physi-
cian can influence consumer behavior.57 Finally, there is evidence that income and educa-
tion affect whether consumers choose a hospital. The results suggest that higher income
consumers are more likely to prefer hospitals, which tend to be expensive, rather than
medical imaging centers.
It is important to note that the estimates from this model lack a straightforward inter-
pretation and do not allow for the calculation of welfare. When consumers have perfect
information, the price coefficient is often interpreted as the marginal utility of income.
Since many individuals lack information about price, even when the website is available,
γ1 and γ2 cannot be interpreted in this way. Given that there are still many uninformed
consumers when the website is available, γ1 is an underestimate of the true price sensi-
tivity (and marginal utility of income). The full model is needed to recover individuals’
underlying taste parameters, including price sensitivity, in order to evaluate counterfac-
tuals and conduct welfare analysis.
2.4.2 Provider Choice and Website Usage Estimates from Baseline
Model
Table 2.4 presents estimates for parameters of the full demand model. I focus on spec-
ification 1, which reflects the baseline model presented in Section 2.3. The first column
reports the mean of the estimated posterior distribution of each parameter implied by the
coefficient on price is not statisically significant when the website is not available in Table A9, it becomes
significant with a larger sample.
57Since the likely referral indicator is a constructed explanatory variable and is highly significant, there
is worry it could bias other coefficients. As a robustness check, I also estimate the model without the
likely referral indicator. In both the simple multinomial logit model and the full specification, the other
coefficients are qualitatively consistent when the likely referral indicator is not included.
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Table 2.4: MCMC Estimates for Demand Model
Specification 1 Specification 2
Estimate SD Estimate SD
Provider Choice Parameters
OOP Price Mean (−γ¯) −0.0099 (0.0003) −0.0094 (0.0002)
OOP Price SD (σγ) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
OOP Price × Cost Sharing (ρ) −0.0092 (0.0004) −0.0090 (0.0001)
Distance (α1) −0.0320 (0.0028) −0.0345 (0.0027)
Distance squared (α2) 0.0024 (0.0003) 0.0025 (0.0003)
Referral Indicator 2.053 (0.032) 2.268 (0.039)
Hospital×Age ≤18 −0.006 (0.161) −0.021 (0.179)
Hospital×Age 19-35 0.060 (0.161) 0.058 (0.174)
Hospital×Age 36-50 −0.099 (0.155) −0.113 (0.165)
Hospital×Age 51-64 −0.132 (0.161) −0.150 (0.171)
Hospital×Male −0.098 (0.065) −0.114 (0.072)
Hospital×Income 0.013 (0.002) 0.014 (0.002)
Hospital×BA −0.036 (0.004) −0.039 (0.004)
Hospital×Charlson 0.055 (0.043) 0.070 (0.046)
Hospital×Emergency 0.550 (0.085) 0.620 (0.090)
Website Choice Parameters
Benefit (θ) 0.026 (0.011) 0.003 (0.003)
Cost (φ )
Constant 6.058 (6.441) 6.769 (5.957)
Age 19-35 −5.698 (6.466) −6.224 (5.956)
Age 36-50 −5.248 (6.432) −5.765 (5.935)
Age 51-64 −5.261 (6.426) −5.737 (5.930)
Male −0.163 (0.187) −0.175 (0.186)
Income 0.015 (0.007) 0.013 (0.006)
BA −0.013 (0.010) −0.014 (0.010)
Charlson Comorbidity 0.001 (0.105) −0.024 (0.106)
Outpatient Emergency 2.854 (1.158) 2.129 (0.933)
Year: 2007 0.326 (0.126) 0.323 (0.125)
Year: 2008 0.235 (0.108) 0.235 (0.107)
Year: 2009 0.267 (0.119) 0.284 (0.121)
Price Signal: Hospital (σh=1) 97.6 (6.3) 83.1 (5.9)
Price Signal: Non-Hospital (σh=0) 105.8 (5.6) 82.2 (5.7)
Observations 59,240 59,240
Notes: Table shows the mean and standard deviation of the posterior distribution estimated via MCMC. Specification
1 refers to model in which consumers know the mean and variance of the price distribution and use this information
to form a prior about prices. Specification 2 assumes consumers have an uninformative prior about prices. The
provider-choice equation also includes provider-procedure group fixed effects (not shown). For the website choice
model, the omitted year is 2010 and the omitted age group is ≤18.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Provider
Actual Out-of-Pocket Price 95% CI of Consumer Beliefs
Notes: Chart shows an example choice situation selected from the data in which an
individual is choosing between 6 providers. Confidence interval shows the distri-
bution of beliefs given the estimated price uncertainty from specification 1 in Table
2.4.
MCMC estimation procedure. The second column reports the standard deviation of the
posterior distribution.58
The magnitude of mean price sensitivity, γ¯, is much larger than the price coefficient in
the simple logit model presented in the previous section. This reflects the fact that γi can
now be interpreted as consumer’s underlying price sensitivity when prices are known
(i.e. underlying marginal utility of income). There is significant heterogeneity in the price
sensitivity parameter, which is negatively correlated with consumer cost sharing. This
implies that consumers with high price sensitivity select into generous insurance plans
(i.e. those with lower cost sharing). The effect of other explanatory variables, including
distance, the likely referral indicator, and hospital interactions, is largely consistent with
the results from the logit model presented in Table A9.
The estimated standard deviation of signal noise, σh, is shown at the bottom of Table
58Note that for explanatory variables that overlap with the simple logit model, the standard deviation of
the parameter posterior distributions are very similar to the standard errors reported in Table A9.
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2.4. The estimates imply that, in the absence of price information, individuals have a
large degree of uncertainty about prices. The standard deviation of signal noise is larger
for non-hospital providers, suggesting that individuals have greater uncertainty about
the price of medical imaging centers and other non-hospital providers.59
Given that the interpretation of σh is complex, it is useful to consider an example from
the data. Figure 2.5 shows a sample individual choosing between six providers that range
in price from about $200 to $650. Using the estimate of σh, the individual’s beliefs about
the price of each option can be simulated given different potential draws from the distri-
bution of signal noise. The 95 percent confidence interval for these beliefs is shown for
each option in the choice set. Beliefs range by over $200, implying that there is a non-
trivial chance that the individual will believe the expensive options (such as option 5), are
actually the least expensive. Also note that mean beliefs are not equal to the true price.
This is due to the fact that each individual’s prior causes shrinkage towards the mean.
I compare uninformed consumers beliefs about prices with the true price. On aver-
age, there is a 37 percent absolute difference between beliefs and true prices. The gap is
even larger for individuals under the deductible—48 percent. Noisy beliefs about price
effectively make residual demand more inelastic. The implied price elasticity of demand
evaluated at mean prices when consumers are uninformed is only -0.08, however it would
be -0.47 if they were fully informed.60
Turning to the website choice parameters, the coefficient on the monetary benefit of
using the website, θ, is positive. Furthermore, zero lies outside the 95 percent credible
interval. This implies that consumers are more likely to use the website if the potential
benefit is large, either because of the potential savings or individual-specific price sensi-
tive. The coefficients on explanatory variables that make up the observable part of the
cost of using the website tend to be imprecisely estimated. There is suggestive evidence
59However, note that zero lies within the 95 percent credible interval of the difference.
60For each procedure at each provider, residual demand elasticity for the general case in which consumers
are uninformed is calculated as (pOOPjm /sjm)
1
N ∑i,k,t γiwikmtsijkmt(1− sijkmt), where all expressions are eval-
uated at the mean price. The residual demand for each procedure at each provider is than averaged.
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that higher income consumers have a larger cost, reflecting the higher opportunity cost of
time. At the same time, more educated individuals have a lower cost of using the website,
perhaps because they are more likely to be proficient internet users. Patients receiving a
procedure after an emergency episode have a higher cost. Furthermore, there is lower
estimated cost of using the website in 2010, the omitted year. This may reflect the fact
that the website became better known over time. Overall, the cost of using the website is
estimated to be $63 on average (see Figure A6). Note that the magnitude of θ is relatively
small, indicating that that νikmt is important for understanding website usage. In other
words, there are unobserved factors, such as word-of-mouth or internet proficiency, that
determine website usage.
2.4.3 Estimates under Alternative Demand Assumptions
This section considers an alternative assumption regarding consumer beliefs in the ab-
sence of price information. Rather than assume individuals know the mean and variance
of the distribution from which prices are drawn, I assume that individuals have an unin-
















= −γi(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + δijkmt + εijkmt (2.27)
This is equivalent to setting wikmt = 1 in the baseline specification.
Specification 2 in Table 2.4 presents the results from this alternative model. The esti-
mates that characterize provider choices are broadly consistent with estimates from speci-
fication 1. The estimated standard deviation of the price signal is smaller for both hospital
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and non-hospital providers. This is due to the fact that noisy price signals generate more
extreme beliefs than in the baseline model since beliefs are not disciplined by a prior.
The estimates that characterize the cost of using the website are also broadly consistent
with the previous estimates. However, the coefficient on the benefit of the website, θ, is
very small compared to specification 1. The alternative assumption implies that, in the
absence of information, individuals ignore non-price characteristics and choose providers
they believe to be inexpensive. Therefore, the expected benefit of using the website is
larger than in the baseline model.
I argue that this alternative model is less realistic. Consumers who lack information
about prices are likely to ignore prices rather than choose a provider solely because they
guess that it is inexpensive. Formally, consumers likely have a prior that disciplines be-
liefs.
2.5 DEMAND-SIDE OUT-OF-SAMPLE COUNTERFACTUALS
I now use the estimates from the demand model to examine counterfactual policy sim-
ulations. In particular, I simulate the demand-side impact when more consumers are
informed about prices holding insurance plan attributes fixed. The results imply decreas-
ing returns as more consumers are informed about prices. However, a full examination
of the relevant counterfactuals must take into equilibrium effects. This supply-side effect
is the focus of Chapter 3.
Only about 8 percent of consumers used the price transparency tool when it was avail-
able, implying that there is a large cost of using the website. Much of this cost is likely
non-pecuniary, i.e. individuals may not have even known that the website existed. Inter-
ventions that reduce this implicit cost, such as advertising the website or even subsidizing
usage, would increase the fraction of informed consumers.61
61Other policies that would further increase price information include requiring posted prices or guaran-
teed price quotes.
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Figure 2.6: Demand-Side Effect of Price Transparency on Spending
By Fraction on Individuals with Price Information




















5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 55% 65% 75% 85% 95%
Percent of Consumers Choosing to Become Informed about Prices
Notes: Demand-side effect holds prices fixed at distribution simulated with no price
transparency. All figures in 2010 dollars.
Figure 2.6 shows the effect of reducing the implicit cost of becoming informed about
prices, increasing the fraction of consumers with price information. I begin by simulat-
ing prices for the case in which no individuals have price information, then simulating
demand for various cases holding the distribution of prices fixed. As more individuals
choose to use the price transparency effort, average savings increases. However there
are decreasing returns due to the fact that website usage is endogenous—the benefit for
the marginal consumers is smaller when the cost of using the website is low. There are
savings of less than $50 per visit if all consumers are informed.
The evidence that consumer decisions are significantly affected by price transparency
motivates a model examining the firm-response to increasing consumer price transparency.
This is the focus of the last chapter.
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2.6 CONCLUSION
I develop a demand model for health care services that separates underlying consumer
price sensitivity and the degree of uncertainty about prices in order to explore how con-
sumer choices would change if more consumers were informed about prices. I also show
how to examine the welfare implications of information in this context.
This model of demand and price transparency has implications for other markets in
which it is not possible to search for prices, such as markets in which consumers receive
potentially noisy price quotes (e.g. automotive repair, building contractors, and law ser-
vices). Even if these quotes are correct on average, the lack of price transparency makes
demand less elastic. A similar mechanism may be present in other markets with shrouded
add-on prices, surcharges, or delivery fees.
The fact that price transparency affects the elasticity of demand suggests that bar-
gaining between health insurers and providers may be affected by increased price trans-
parency. Indeed, this is one of the main results from Chapter 1. In Chapter 3, I use the
results from the empirical model of demand to estimate a model of the supply-side that








The relatively high level of spending on privately-provided health care in the U.S.
is often attributed to high prices.1 In addition, a recent literature has documented the
large degree of price dispersion in health care, even for relatively standardized proce-
dures (Cooper et al. 2015). This suggests that is important to understand the determinants
of health care prices, and interventions that can allow insurers to negotiate lower prices
with providers.
This paper empirically evaluates how price transparency affects markups and welfare
in the U.S. health care market. I combine the model of demand that incorporates price
uncertainty developed in Chapter 2 with a model of bargaining between providers and
insurers. The model allows for an equilibrium analysis of out-of-sample counterfactual
scenarios. I find that there would be a considerable reduction in health care prices if all
consumers were informed about prices. One way to increase the number of informed
consumers is to combine price transparency tools with high cost sharing health plans,
incentivizing consumers to become informed about prices. This combination of policies
would also lead to a large reduction in equilibrium prices.
In particular, I present a bargaining model to recover information about marginal cost
and examine how price transparency affects negotiated prices in equilibrium. Recent
empirical work has used models of bilateral bargaining between insurers and medical
providers to gain insight into the effects of hospital and insurer competition (Gowrisankaran,
Nevo and Town 2015; Ho and Lee 2017). While others have suggested that price trans-
parency can affect health care prices, I develop the first model of equilibrium behavior
that incorporates consumer price uncertainty.2 I use the first order condition of the bar-
1See, for example, Anderson et al. (2003), Koechlin, Lorenzoni and Schreyer (2010), and Cooper et al.
(2015).
2For a discussion about how price transparency could affect markups see “Health Care Price Trans-
parency: Can It Promote High-Value Care?”, Commonwealth Fund, April/May 2012. Also see Section
2.2.
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gaining equation to derive an expression for equilibrium prices and find that price trans-
parency leads to a trade-off. First, price transparency can make residual demand more
elastic, decreasing the incentive for providers to negotiate high prices. Second, price
transparency ensures that consumers do not choose high cost providers, implying that
insurers may be more willing to have high cost providers in their network. This can ac-
tually reduce the incentive of insurers to negotiate low prices. Therefore, the effect of
price transparency on negotiated prices is theoretically ambiguous. Using the bargaining
model, I derive a moment condition that allows me to recover marginal cost and investi-
gate the effect of price transparency empirically.
In my first empirical exercise, I use the estimates from both the demand and supply
model to evaluate the effect of New Hampshire’s price transparency website. I find that
the website resulted in overall savings of 3 percent.3 This intent-to-treat effect is consistent
with my reduced-form results in Chapter 1. In particular, I found that the website reduced
overall spending by about 4 percent using a difference-in-differences methodology. These
savings are primary due to increased price-shopping on the part of consumers, however
part of the decline is also due to a small reduction in the equilibrium prices.
Even though New Hampshire’s price transparency website was publicly available to
all individuals in the state, a relatively small fraction of consumers in the market actually
used it. Overall, I find that consumers used the website for about 8 percent of medical
imaging visits when the website was available.4 Unlike the reduced-form analysis, the
empirical model allows me to examine the effect conditional on using the price trans-
parency website.5 Estimates imply that the website primarily benefited individuals most
exposed to the full price, i.e. those subject to a deductible. Individuals with a deductible
that used the website saved $178 per visit on average, while individuals without a de-
3Overall savings refers to change in spending for both insurers and consumers.
4This is obtained by dividing website traffic for medical imaging procedures by the number of privately-
insurers individuals in New Hampshire receiving medical imaging procedures available on the website.
5The effect conditional on program take-up is sometimes referred to as the treatment-on-the-treated
effect. The presence of spillover effects hinders estimation of the treatment-on-the-treated using reduced-
form methods.
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ductible saved $16. It is important to note, however, that price information may cause
individuals to switch, for example, from nearby hospitals perceived as high quality to
distant imaging centers with lower perceived quality. Taking the change in non-price at-
tributes into account, I show that the gain in consumer surplus for these individuals is
$132 and $12, respectively.
Given modest website usage, the effect on equilibrium prices may be larger if more
consumers are informed about health care prices. There are two factors that make it dif-
ficult to extrapolate from reduced-form estimates. First, even though the availability of
the website is exogenous, use of the website when it is available is potentially endoge-
nous. If the individuals who find out about the website and choose to use it are those
that receive a larger benefit, there may be decreasing savings as more individuals be-
come informed about prices. Second, equilibrium prices are a function of the number
of consumers that have price information. By affecting negotiated prices, price trans-
parency generates spillover effects that benefit all consumers, including those that do not
have price information.6 By using the demand model from Chapter 2 and estimating
the individual-specific probability of using the website and deriving a bargaining equa-
tion, the empirical model presented in this paper allows me to address both issues when
examining out-of-sample counterfactual scenarios.
Counterfactual simulations imply that, while selection is present, the effect on equi-
librium prices dominates. As a result, there would be a considerable reduction in equi-
librium prices if a larger fraction of consumers had information. If all consumers were
informed, equilibrium prices would be 19 percent lower. Prices decline because demand
effectively becomes more elastic, allowing insurers to negotiate lower prices with most
providers in their network. In addition, consumers would choose lower cost providers in
their choice set, resulting in per visit savings of $44 for consumers and $166 for insurers
relative to no price transparency. Overall, spending would decline by 28 percent. Sav-
6This is similar to a search externality. See Salop and Stiglitz (1977).
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ings would come largely at the expense of provider profits, although some of the savings
would also be due to individuals switching to providers with lower marginal cost (e.g.
imaging centers and clinics rather than hospitals).
Finally, I shed light on policy by simulating the effect of combining price transparency
with high cost sharing insurance plans. One potential reason that current price trans-
parency tools are not widely used even when they are available is that many consumers,
especially those that pay a small coinsurance rate, have modest private gains from be-
coming informed and price shopping. High cost sharing plans reduce moral hazard due
to insurance, increasing consumers’ incentive to use the price transparency website. In
counterfactual simulations, I find that high cost sharing, which I define as a 50 percent
coinsurance rate, would lead to a 38 percent increase in the number of consumers using
the website. In addition, consumers would have more incentive to choose a low cost
provider once they had price information. For these reasons, equilibrium prices would
be almost as low as the full information case without high cost sharing. Although this
would result in higher out-of-pocket spending for consumers, overall health care spend-
ing on medical imaging procedures would decline by 18 percent.
3.1.1 Roadmap
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the bargaining
model, focusing on the role of consumer information. Section 3.3 presents the results from
the supply model. Section 3.4 uses the estimates to examine the effect of the website while
Section 3.5 presents out-of-sample counterfactual simulations. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 BARGAINING BETWEEN PROVIDERS AND INSURERS
In a variety of markets, prices are determined through bilateral bargaining. For in-
stance, wholesalers negotiate prices with retailers and unions negotiate wages with em-
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ployers. Although there is a growing empirical literature that seeks to shed light on how
outcomes are determined in these markets, there is little evidence about how information
frictions, in particular price transparency, affects equilibrium outcomes when prices are
negotiated.
In this section, I examine how price transparency affects bargaining between providers
and insurers. I use an approach that is similar to Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015),
who assume consumers are perfectly informed about prices. In contrast, I show how con-
sumer information frictions affect “gains-from-trade” for both the providers and insurers.
Prices are then determined as a Nash equilibrium of bilateral Nash bargaining problems
(Horn and Wolinsky 1988).
Using the estimates from the demand model given in the previous section, I use the
supply-side model to estimate the marginal cost of each procedure at each provider. These
estimates are then used in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 to simulate negotiated prices under
various counterfactual scenarios.
3.2.1 Bargaining Model
I now present the model of bilateral bargaining between medical providers and insur-
ers incorporating consumer price uncertainty. In each year, insurer k negotiates the price
of procedure m with each provider in the insurer’s network, j ∈ Nkmt.7 For the analysis,
I assume that each provider negotiates independently.8 I also take the set of providers J
and networks Nkmt as given.9
7While the previous literature has assumed that insurers negotiate over a price index, I allow insurers
to negotiate over the visit price of each procedure m ∈ M. For outpatient procedures, I believe this to be
a more realistic assumption. Note that negotiated prices for a visit may change due to lower individual
procedure prices or different supplemental procedures. I do not distinguish between these mechanism.
8In contrast, Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) and Ho and Lee (2017) allow hospitals that are
part of a system to jointly negotiate with insurers. I am unable to link anonymous provider identifiers to
ownership data, and therefore cannot examine hospital systems. To my knowledge, the medical imaging
providers in the sample tend to be independently owned.
9It is possible that a large increase in price transparency increases entry of low cost outpatient facilities,
leading to larger cost savings for consumers. I assume entry and exit are exogenously determined.
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I start by describing the gains from trade for provider j when contracting with insurer
k. The provider’s profit from individual i enrolled in insurer k receiving procedure m at
time t is given by
ΠJijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#ikmt) = sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt)[pjkmt −mcjkmt] (3.1)
where mcjkmt is the marginal cost of the procedure and sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt) is the choice
probability which depends on whether the individual is informed about prices, ϑikmt.
Without a contract with the insurer, the provider’s profit from a given individual is zero.
Therefore, the gains from trade are simply the provider profit summed over individuals
and procedures.
Next, I turn to the insurer’s gains from trade. For a given individual, the reimburse-
ment amount paid by the insurer across all providers is
TCikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt) = ∑
j∈Nkmt
pjkmt(1− cikmt)sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt) (3.2)
Following Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015), I also assume that insurers inter-
nalize the consumer surplus of their enrollees. When consumers are informed about
prices, consumer surplus takes the standard form (see Equation 2.4). However, insur-
ers are aware when consumers have uncertainty about prices, and consumer surplus in-
cludes a term that accounts for incorrect beliefs. In particular, consumer surplus is given
by Equation 2.13.
The insurer’s surplus generated by an individual visit is then the weighted sum of
consumer surplus and total cost
ΠKikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt) = ζCSikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt)− TCikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt)) (3.3)
where ζ is a parameter reflecting the relative weight on consumer surplus. The insurer
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gains from trade for an enrollee visit are the difference between the surplus generated
with and without provider j in the network:
∆jΠKikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt) = ΠKikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt)−ΠKikmt(Nkmt\j, pkmt|#kmt) (3.4)
Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4 can be thought of as a stylized approach to modeling
the insurer’s profit function. The consumer surplus of the insurer’s enrollees enters the
insurer’s surplus function since a larger consumer surplus implies that the insurer can
charge higher premiums to consumers, generating profit for the insurer. In contrast, Ho
and Lee (2017) explicitly model demand for insurance and insurer competition in order
to derive an expression for provider and insurer profits that accounts for the fact that
consumers may switch insurers to access their preferred providers. I lack data on insur-
ance premiums, and therefore, I cannot explicitly model insurer competition. Consistent
with reduced-form results in my previous work, I assume that price transparency does
not affect insurance choice.10
I now define the Nash bargaining problem that determines equilibrium prices. Im-
portantly, the equilibrium price at a given provider, pjkmt, also depends on the price of
the procedure at other providers. Following Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and the previ-
ous empirical bargaining literature, I assume that equilibrium prices are those that solve
the Nash bargaining solution given the equilibrium prices at other providers, p∗kmt\pjkmt.
In other words, a hypothetical disagreement is assumed to not affect other prices.11 Ex-
tending Rubinstein (1982), Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee (2014) rationalize this
model by showing conditions under which the Nash-in-Nash solution is equivalent to a
non-cooperative extensive form game with alternating offers.
Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution is the negotiated prices for each provider-
10In Chapter 1, I examine whether insurance enrollment changed after the introduction of the price trans-
parency website and do not find a statistically significant effect.
11This is similar to a contract equilibrium (Cremer and Riordan 1987).
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insurer-procedure triple in a given year, p∗jkmt, that satisfy



















where the gains from trade are summed over all individuals enrolled in insurer k receiv-
ing procedure m in year t, Ikmt. The Nash bargaining weight is τ ∈ [0, 1]. Since insurers
and providers do not know the price signals that consumers will receive, both take the
expectation over consumer beliefs.12
Empirical models of bilateral bargaining in vertical markets generally assume that the
negotiating parties do not have asymmetrical information about the relevant gains from
trade.13 I do not deviate from this assumption.14 In the model presented in this section,
price transparency indirectly affects equilibrium prices since changes in consumer behav-
ior affect the gains from trade. I assume that the price transparency website, which was
targeted towards consumers, did not directly affect the information set of the providers
or insurers. Further research is needed to understand whether price transparency affects
provider-insurer bargaining directly.15
12The providers and insurers know the variance of the price signals, σ2h . In practice, I simulate beliefs by
drawing from the distribution of eikmt, computing each term, and then averaging over the draws.
13To my knowledge, all empirical models of business-to-business bargaining assume perfect informa-
tion. Note that a sizable theoretical literature, starting with Samuelson (1984), examines bargaining with
asymmetric information.
14Insurers and providers have uncertainty about the draws that determine consumer beliefs about prices,
but have full information about the expected gains-from-trade for all participants.
15In the context of hospital-supplier bargaining, Grennan and Swanson (2016) find reduced-form evi-
dence that price transparency affects negotiated prices in a way that is consistent with a theoretical model of
bargaining under asymmetric information. It is possible that a similar mechanism is important for provider-
insurer bargaining.
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3.2.2 First Order Condition of the Bargaining Problem
I now turn to the equilibrium of the bargaining model. The first order condition of the
bargaining problem given by Equation 3.5 implies that equilibrium prices are determined




















I present further detail, including the derivation of ∂∂pjkmt [∑i∈Ikm EeΠ
K
ikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt)],
in Appendix 3.6. Given that there are many providers in each network, a single price
change has a minimal effect on individuals’ prior about the distribution of prices. For
tractability, I assume that providers and insurers do not take changes in the prior into
account, and therefore hold the prior fixed when solving for the first order condition.
The Nash-in-Nash bargaining model nests the standard Bertrand-Nash pricing as-
sumption when τ = 1. In this case, providers unilaterally set prices and an increase in
price transparency that makes demand more elastic leads to lower prices in equilibrium.
In the market for privately-provided health care, insurers negotiate their own rates
with each provider that are thought to be lower than what a Bertrand-Nash pricing as-
sumption would imply.17 This corresponds to the case in which τ < 1. Therefore, it is
important to also understand how price transparency affects insurers’ incentive to nego-
tiate lower prices.
There are multiple channels through which consumer price transparency can affect
equilibrium outcomes in the bargaining model. First, price transparency affects the in-
16For simplicity, I omit the ∗ used to indicate equilibrium outcomes.
17Under Bertrand-Nash pricing, providers would be able to set prices unilaterally. In the absence of
price information, the the effective demand elasticity is about -0.06 on average, implying extremely large
markups.
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centives of the provider. This can be seen by noting that the provider gains-from-trade
are a function of the choice probabilities, sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|ϑikmt), which depend on web-
site usage (ϑikmt). In general, demand is more elastic when more consumers are informed
about prices. Under a Bertrand-Nash pricing assumption, this implies that providers will
choose lower prices when more consumers are informed. Similarly, in the bargaining
framework, providers have less incentive to negotiate high prices.
The effect of price transparency on insurers’ incentives are more complicated. Price
transparency affects insurer cost since consumers tend to switch to lower cost providers.
This can be seen by noting that TCikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt) depends on the choice proba-
bilities. Price transparency also affects the consumer surplus of the insurer’s enrollees,
CSikmt(Nkmt, pkmt|#kmt), since individuals can switch to lower cost providers and are not
surprised by the bill (see Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.13).
It is important to note that price transparency does not always increase the incentive
for insurers to negotiate low prices with all providers in their network. This is because
insurers may be willing to have high priced providers in their network if they know that
consumers will not choose these options. In other words, when more consumers are in-
formed about prices, insurers find it easier to steer consumers to low-priced providers,
and they take this into account when negotiating prices. Therefore, when demand be-
comes more elastic due to increased price transparency, it is not always the case that all
prices decline.
3.2.3 Estimation and Identification of Bargaining Model
In this section, I describe the estimation strategy for the bargaining model. Following
the previous empirical bargaining literature, I parameterize marginal cost and use the
bargaining first-order condition to derive a moment condition which is than estimated
using GMM.
The marginal cost of a visit is assumed to vary by procedure, provider, and year and is
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additively separable taking the form
mcjkmt = η j + ηm + ηt + εMCjkmt (3.7)
where η j are provider fixed effects and ηm are procedure fixed effects. Health care prices
increased significantly over the six year period, therefore it is important to include year
fixed effects, ηt. The unobservable component of marginal cost is εMCjkmt. I assume providers
have constant returns to scale.
Using the parameterized marginal cost above along with the first-order condition given
by Equation 3.6, the marginal cost error is given by




∂pjkmt ∑i∈Ikm [ζCSikmt − TCikmt]








This is used to form the following moment condition:
E[εMCjkmt|Zjkmt] = 0 (3.9)
where Zjkmt is a vector of variables assumed to be exogenous. The model assumes that
the bargaining participants know mcjkmt, including εMCjkmt, implying that prices are poten-
tially endogenous. Following the previous literature, I address this issue by including
two instruments: predicted willingness-to-pay for each provider at mean price and pre-
dicted total provider quantity at mean price.18 Although these instruments are correlated
with price, it is assumed that they are uncorrelated with εMCjkmt. The instrument set, Zjkmt,
also includes all marginal cost fixed effects.
Identification of parameters η, τ, and ζ follows from a similar argument as that pre-
sented in Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015). The provider choice and website usage
18These are a similar set of instruments as those used by Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015). They
also include willingness-to-pay for the hospital system and willingness-to-pay per enrollee for each insurer.
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parameters from the demand model allow me to construct CSikmt, TCikmt, and sijkmt, as
well as their derivatives with respect to price (these are given in Appendix 3.6). In the
bargaining model, these are treated like data. Variation in provider incentives (deter-
mined by sijkmt and ∂sijkmt/∂pjkmt) and insurer incentives (determined by CSikmt, TCikmt,
∂CSikmt/∂pjkmt, and ∂TCikmt/∂pjkmt) that can explain variation in prices identifies ζ and
τ. This variation comes in part from the introduction of the price transparency web-
site. The remaining price variation identifies the marginal cost fixed effects, η. Unlike
Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015), I take advantage of price variation across indi-
vidual procedures. This provides an additional source of variation to identify ζ and τ.
3.3 ESTIMATES FROM SUPPLY MODEL
Table 3.1 provides results from the bilateral bargaining model. The estimated bargain-
ing weight is 0.37, implying that insurer incentives are important for equilibrium prices.
This estimate of the bargaining weights is lower than some other estimates in the litera-
ture.19
Table 3.1: Bargaining Model Estimates
Estimate SE
Bargaining Weight (τ) 0.368 (0.024)





Notes: GMM estimates using results from the baseline de-
mand model. Standard errors in parentheses.
The estimated weight on consumer surplus in the insurer’s surplus function is 1.76,
implying that insurers put more weight on consumer surplus than on cost. This finding
19For comparison, Ho and Lee (2017) estimate provider bargaining weights between 0.50 and 0.88. How-
ever, Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) estimate provider bargaining weights that average 0.24.
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is consistent with Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015), who also estimate a weight
greater than 1. One potential explanation for this result is that enrollees dislike when
their usual provider is dropped from the insurer’s network. These switching costs may
lead to larger estimates of the weight on consumer surplus.
The estimates from the bargaining model can be used to construct the marginal cost of
each procedure at each provider in each year. The marginal cost estimates are summa-
rized by procedure group in Table 3.2. MRI scans have the highest marginal cost, followed
by CT scans and X-rays. The marginal cost estimates are consistent with the fact that MRI
machines are the most expensive, while CT and X-ray machines are less expensive and
require less staff.
In order to examine whether marginal cost estimates are plausible, I compare the es-
timates from the model to Medicare reimbursement rates. I find that the marginal cost
estimates are generally comparable to the Medicare fee schedule. While I estimate the
average marginal cost for medical imaging procedures is $465, the average Medicare non-
facility reimbursement for the same procedures is $526.20
I recompute baseline prices using the estimates of marginal cost as well as the other
estimates from the demand and supply model. Given the estimates and an initial price
schedule, I calculate the solution to each bargaining problem conditional on other prices.
I iterate until all solutions of the bargaining problem reflect the best response to all other
prices. This procedure is outlined in more detail in Appendix 3.6. The mean and stan-
dard deviation of recomputed baseline prices by procedure group are shown in Table 3.2.
Markups are largest for x-ray procedures. The Lerner index, (p − mc)/p, is 0.65 for X-
rays, but only 0.19 and 0.10 for CT scans and MRI scans respectively. Since the majority
of procedures are X-rays, the average Lerner index across all procedures is 0.47.
20Note that Medicare reimbursement rates tend to be higher than marginal cost estimates for X-rays but
lower for CT and MRI scans. In order to calculate comparable Medicare reimbursement rates, I use the
non-facility fee for each procedure in the visit and then average over the population to find the average
visit reimbursement rate for each procedure, insurer, year. The Medicare non-facility fee schedule is used
as it applies to non-hospital providers (the facility fee schedule is lower since separate hospital fees are not
included). Medicare reimbursement rates are also inflation adjusted to 2010 dollars.
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Table 3.2: Marginal Cost Estimates
Estimated
Baseline Price Marginal Cost
Mean SD Mean SD
CT Scans 1, 869.4 1, 006.2 1, 512.6 1, 458.9
MRI Scans 2, 123.5 956.2 1, 902.3 1, 340.4
X-Rays 674.9 548.4 234.2 912.0
Notes: Prices are simulated using the algorithm described in Ap-
pendix 3.6. The unit of observation is a provider, procedure, in-
surer, year. All prices in 2010 dollars.
3.4 EFFECT OF THE PRICE TRANSPARENCY WEBSITE
In this section I use the estimates from both the demand and supply models to perform
a policy evaluation and examine the effect of New Hampshire’s price transparency web-
site. First, I calculate the overall equilibrium effect of the website for all individuals who
potentially used the price transparency website. This estimate can be compared to the
intent-to-treat effect estimated using the difference-in-differences approach in Chapter 1.
I show that results from the two methods are qualitatively consistent, providing support
for the main counterfactuals presented in Section 3.5. I also discuss the conceptual dif-
ferences between the structural approach in this paper and the difference-in-differences
approach.
Next, I use the model to examine the effect of the price transparency website in more
detail than is possible with the reduced-form approach alone. In particular, I find the
effect of the website conditional on using the price transparency website, often referred
to as the treatment-on-the-treated effect. Estimating the treatment-on-the-treated using
reduced-form methods is hampered by the fact that there are spillovers that effect all
consumers.21 The estimates from the empirical model imply that consumers subject to a
deductible benefit the most from the price transparency website. In addition, the empiri-
21Without spillover effects, it is possible to use the “Bloom result” to obtain the treatment-on-the-treated
effect via an instrumental variable approach (Bloom 1984). However, it is important to account for the fact
that consumers who do not use the website still benefit from lower prices.
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cal model allows me to recover the change in consumer surplus, which I find is less than
consumer cost savings.
3.4.1 Comparison with Difference-in-Differences Estimates
In Chapter 1, I analyzed the effect of New Hampshire’s price transparency website us-
ing quasi-experimental reduced-form methods. By comparing the price of medical imag-
ing procedures on the website before and after the website started with the change in price
for similar medical imaging procedures that were never on the website, the approach re-
covers the average effect of access to the website.22
For comparison purposes, I construct the average treatment effect using the estimates
from the structural model. This is done by using both the demand and supply estimates
to simulate prices with and without the price transparency website. The iterative algo-
rithm used to simulate prices is described in Appendix 3.6. These prices are then used to
calculate the average percent change in spending due to the website.
Table 3.3 presents the estimated effect of access to the price transparency website along
with the difference-in-differences estimates from Chapter 1. The estimates from the em-
pirical model are similar to the estimates obtained from the difference-in-differences spec-
ification. While the estimates from the former imply that the website reduced overall
spending by 2.9 percent, the latter implies that there was a 3.8 percent reduction in spend-
ing. Focusing on the reduction in cost for consumers and insurer, I also find similar es-
timates from the two models. In both cases, the estimates from the empirical model are
smaller than the difference-in-differences estimates.
While these estimates are qualitatively consistent, there are a number of potential rea-
sons why the estimates from the two approaches are not identical. First, this paper uses
22In the policy evaluation literature, this is often referred to as the intent-to-treat effect. The baseline
difference-in-differences specification is LogPriceimjkt = β(OnWebm × Postt) + αXit + λm + λk + λt + εimjkt
where OnWebm is an indicator for whether procedure m is on the website and Postt is an indicator for
whether the website is available at time t.
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Table 3.3: Intent-to-Treat Effect of Price Transparency Website
Comparison with Reduced Form Results
%∆ Patient %∆ %∆
Out-of-Pocket Insurer Total
Cost Cost Cost
Difference-in-Difference Estimates −6.9 −3.8 −3.8
Empirical Model Estimates −5.5 −2.6 −2.9
Notes: Figures show the percent change in transaction prices for all individuals who could have used
the website. Difference-in-differences estimates, which are from Chapter 1, are converted from log-
points to percent change. The total effect is not necessarily strictly between the out-of-pocket cost effect
and insurer cost effect due to heterogenous quantile treatment effects and heterogenous cost sharing.
a slightly smaller sample of medical imagining procedures than my previous paper (see
discussion in Section 2.2). In addition, 2011 is excluded when estimating the empirical
model since website traffic data is not available. Second, the two approaches require
different assumptions to identify the causal effect of the website. The main assumption
of the difference-in-differences approach is that the price of procedures on the website
would follow a common trend relative to procedures that were not on the website in
the absence of treatment. In my previous work, I examine trends in the period prior to
the introduction of the website to provide evidence consistent with this assumption. In
contrast, the empirical model requires functional form assumptions and distributional as-
sumptions, as well as an assumption about the form of imperfect competition. While the
reduced form approach assumes that spending is not affected by unobserved covariates
that are correlated with the availability of the website, the structural approach implicitly
assumes that primitives, such as the distribution of demand parameters, are orthogonal
to the availability of the website.
There is a small literature that directly compares quasi-experimental reduced-form es-
timates and estimates from a structural model.23 While the reduced-form analysis is use-
ful for policy evaluation and relies on relatively clear assumptions, the remainder of this
paper focuses on results that can only be obtained from an empirical model based on
23One example is Hausman and Leonard (2002), who compare the effect of a product introduction esti-
mated with a difference-in-differences approach with estimates from an empirical model based on theory.
Einav et al. (2013) also uses difference-in-differences estimates in conjunction with an empirical model of
selection on moral hazard. Also see Peters (2006), Fu and Gregory (2016), and Salz and Vespa (2016).
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economic theory. In particular, the empirical model allows for an analysis of wider-scale
adoption of health care price transparency.24 I argue that the difference-in-differences es-
timates help validate the policy-invariant parameter estimates from the empirical model,
lending credence to the counterfactual simulations in the remainder of the paper.
3.4.2 Effect Conditional on using the Price Transparency Website
The first panel of Table 3.4 summarizes the effect of using the website holding prices
fixed.25 First, I examine individuals that are not subject to a deductible, either because
they have surpassed their annual deductible amount or because they have a plan that
does not have a deductible.26 These individuals pay a relatively small portion of the
total negotiated prices (cost sharing is about 6 percent on average), therefore the savings
from using the website are only $15 per visit on average. Although consumers only take
into account the out-of-pocket price, there is correlation between the provider out-of-
pocket price and the insurer price. Therefore, insurers also benefit from the increased
price shopping (insurers save $12 on average).
Consumers subject to a deductible benefit most from the price transparency website.
Individuals who used the website and have a deductible saved $127 per visit, a savings of
26 percent compare to prices they would have paid in the absence of the website. Given
that these individuals paid the full negotiated price, there are no insurer savings.
I compute the change in consumer surplus for individuals who use the website using
Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.13. The gain is smaller than the cost savings—$90 for indi-
viduals subject to a deductible. This is due to the fact that, without price information,
24Although there has been significant policy interest in health care price transparency, it is only recently
that price transparency tools have become available to consumers. While these tools are available from
private companies, insurers, as well as state governments, these efforts generally affect only a small fraction
of consumers.
25Demand-side results hold prices fixed using simulated prices for the case in which the website does not
exist.
26Individuals with a deductible that does not apply to a given medical imaging procedures are also
included in this group.
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Table 3.4: Effect for Individuals Predicted to have Used the Transparency Website
Patient Insurer
OOP Price OOP Price Insurer Price Insurer Price
wo/ Website w/ Website ∆ Price ∆ CS wo/ Website w/ Website ∆ Price
(a) Demand-Side Effects Only
Over/No Deductible 68.1 53.1 −15.0 11.1 829.8 818.0 −11.8
Under Deductible 486.9 360.2 −126.7 89.5
(b) Demand- and Supply-Side Effects
Over/No Deductible 68.1 51.9 −16.1 12.0 829.8 814.6 −15.2
Under Deductible 486.9 309.2 −177.7 131.8
Notes: Weighted prices calculated using estimated probability of using website. Demand-side effects are
calculated holding observed prices fixed. When analyzing supply-side effects, prices are recomputed for
the baseline case (with the website) and the counterfactual scenario in which the website did not exist. All
prices in 2010 dollars.
individuals place less weight on price (since wikmt is low) and choose providers based
on non-price characteristics, such as distance and perceived quality, that are known.
With price information, individuals tend to choose less expensive providers, however
these providers tend to have worse non-price attributes. Although individuals with a de-
ductible save $127 when they have price information, the providers they choose are $37
worse on non-price characteristics.
In the second panel of Table 3.4, I account for the fact that the website changed nego-
tiated prices in addition to consumer choices. Rather than hold prices fixed, I re-simulate
prices for the case in which some individuals used the price transparency website.
Accounting for the equilibrium effects, the savings from the website were slightly
larger. Consumers without a deductible saved $16 while individuals subject to a de-
ductible saved $178. In contrast, the insurers saved only $15 per visit. Overall, the supply-
side effects are modest, consistent with my previous reduced-form results. This is due to
the fact that a relatively small fraction of consumers use the price transparency website.




I now use the estimates from the demand and supply model to examine counterfactual
policy simulations and explore the broader implications of price uncertainty.
First, I simulate the impact when more consumers are informed about prices holding
insurance plan attributes fixed. The results imply a significant supply-side effect when
a large fraction of consumers are informed about prices. If all consumers were informed
about prices, equilibrium prices would be 20 percent lower. I also find that price trans-
parency leads to less price dispersion.
Next, I examine the effect of a price transparency website that is combined with high
cost sharing plans, defined as a 50 percent coinsurance rate. Since out-of-pocket prices are
higher on average, individuals have more incentive to use the website and find low cost
providers. Although high cost sharing increases patient out-of-pocket spending, overall
health care spending declines more than with the price transparency website alone.
3.5.1 Effect of Increased Price Transparency
Effect on Overall Savings
Figure 3.1 shows the effect of reducing the implicit cost of becoming informed about
prices, increasing the fraction of consumers with price information. As more consumers
become informed about prices, the demand curve facing providers effectively becomes
more elastic. The change in demand affects equilibrium prices, as determined by the bar-
gaining first order condition, potentially generating a positive externality for consumers
even if they do not use the price transparency website. I examine the equilibrium ef-
fect by simulating prices at each point in Figure 3.1. I then use these prices to compute
consumers choices and overall spending.
The equilibrium effect of increased price transparency is shown by the solid line in
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Figure 3.1: Effect of Price Transparency on Medical Imaging Spending
By Fraction on Individuals with Price Information




















5% 15% 25% 35% 45% 55% 65% 75% 85% 95%
Percent of Consumers Choosing to Become Informed about Prices
Equilibrium Effect DiD Equilibrium Website Effect
Demand-Side Effect
Notes: Demand-side effect holds prices fixed at distribution simulated with no price
transparency. Equilibrium effect re-simulates equilibrium prices for each level of
price transparency. Difference-in-differences estimates from Chapter 1. All figures
in 2010 dollars.
Figure 3.1. As more individuals are informed, the amount saved per visit is highly non-
linear. Initially, the supply-side effects are modest—when only a few consumers are in-
formed about prices, equilibrium prices remain relatively constant. When a larger fraction
of consumers are informed, there is a meaningful effect on overall demand, changing the
incentives of both providers and insurers when negotiating prices. This leads to lower
equilibrium prices, generating large savings. As price-cost margins decline, insurers be-
come limited in their ability to negotiate ever lower prices. Once about half of consumers
are informed about prices, the supply-side effects become less relevant. For reference, the
demand-side effect from Chapter 2 is given by the dashed line in Figure 3.1.
Effect on Consumers, Insurers, and Providers & Welfare Analysis
I examine increased price transparency in greater detail by examining the effect for
consumers, insurers, and providers. I focus on two counterfactuals: the equilibrium effect
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Table 3.5: Counterfactual Negotiated Provider Prices
Mean %∆ Mean %∆
Price Price Price Dispersion Price Dispersion
(a) Holding Cost Sharing Fixed
No Transparency (base) 1, 014 735
Transparency Website 988 −2.5% 669 −9.0%
Full Transparency 822 −18.9% 621 −15.5%
(b) With High Cost Sharing
No Transparency 908 −10.4% 548 −25.5%
Transparency Website 856 −15.6% 562 −23.5%
Full Transparency 829 −18.2% 619 −15.7%
Notes: Chart shows unweighted prices across all providers/procedures. For the baseline case, prices are computed
assuming all individuals have uncertainty about prices. For the price transparency website case, I analyze the case
in which the website is available for all procedures in all years. Website usage probabilities are recomputed and
then prices are simulated. Full price transparency refers to the case in which all individuals know prices. Price
dispersion refers to the interquartile range of prices. High cost sharing refers to 50% coinsurance rate. All prices in
2010 dollars.
of the price transparency website if it was available for all procedures in all years and the
equilibrium effect of full price transparency.
Panel (a) of Table 3.5 shows the impact on negotiated provider prices relative to no
price transparency. When no individuals have price information, the average price of the
medical imaging procedures in $1,014. If a price transparency website is available for
all medical imagining procedures in all years, the average price declines 2.5 percent to
$988.27 Finally, I examine the counterfactual scenario in which all individuals are fully
informed about prices. This would be the case if, for instance, primary care providers
were required to provide a price schedule after recommending a medical imaging test. In
this case, prices would be 18.9 percent lower than the baseline case. The distribution of
prices under various counterfactual scenarios is shown in Figure A7.
In the second and third column of Table 3.5, I examine the effect on price dispersion, as
measured by the interquartile range of prices. An increase in price information reduces
27This is broadly consistent with difference-in-differences estimates that isolate the supply side. How-
ever, note that since this counterfactual examines the effect of the website for all procedures in all years, it
is not directly comparable to the estimates from the difference-in-differences model or the results in Section
3.4.
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the degree of price dispersion. Although the mechanism is different, these results are
broadly consistent with the literature stressing that price dispersion can result from search
frictions.28
Panel (a) of Table 3.6 presents the overall effect on spending taking into account both
supply and demand-side effects. If the website were available for all procedures in all
years, consumers would save $6 and insurers would save $21 on average, generating $2.1
million in total savings per year on X-ray, CT scans, and MRI scans in New Hampshire.
Full price transparency leads to $16.3 million in savings, of which 21 percent accrues to
consumers.
The effect for providers is shown in Panel (a) of Table A10. The savings that accrue to
individuals and insurers are, in large part, a result of smaller markups for the provider.
However, the change in provider markups is smaller than the savings for consumers and
insurers. This is due to the fact that individuals with price information switch to providers
that have lower estimated marginal cost, e.g. from hospitals to medical imaging centers.29
The overall welfare impact for consumers, insurers, and providers is shown in Panel (a)
of Table 3.7. Full price transparency would result in an overall welfare gain of $2.5 million
annually.
3.5.2 Effect of Price Transparency Combined with High Cost Sharing
Health insurance plans with high cost sharing, such as high-deductible plans, poten-
tially give consumers more “skin in the game”, increasing the incentive to make cost-
effective decisions.30 Partially for this reason, policies such as tax-advantaged Health
Savings Accounts have encouraged high cost sharing plans. However, if consumers can-
not observe prices, high cost sharing alone may not lead consumers to switch to less
28See, for instance, Stigler (1961), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), and Burdett and Judd (1983).
29It is also important to note that, on average, providers still have positive markups even with full price
transparency. The fact that there are positive margins helps mitigate concerns about exit from the market.
30See, for instance, discussion in Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015).
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Table 3.6: Counterfactual Cost, Welfare, and Expenditure
Patient Insurer Total
Per Visit Annual Per Visit Annual Annual
OOP ∆ OOP ∆ ∆ Spending ∆ CS Insurer ∆ Insurer ∆ Spending ∆ Spending
Cost Cost CS (millions) (millions) Cost Cost (millions) (millions)
(a) Holding Cost Sharing Fixed
No Transparency (base) 95.2 871.7
Website 89.2 −6.1 5.3 −0.5 0.4 850.8 −20.9 −1.6 −2.1
Full Transparency 51.4 −43.9 38.1 −3.4 3.0 705.4 −166.3 −12.9 −16.3
(b) With High Cost Sharing
No Transparency 418.5 323.3 −325.9 25.1 −25.3 418.5 −453.1 −35.2 −10.1
Website 396.7 301.4 −310.8 23.4 −24.2 396.7 −475.0 −36.9 −13.5
Full Transparency 249.7 154.4 −208.1 12.0 −16.2 249.7 −622.0 −48.4 −36.3
Notes: Transaction prices are calculated using recomputed prices for each counterfactual. Counterfactual with price
transparency website assumes website is available for all imaging procedures in all years. High cost sharing refers to
50% cost sharing. All figures in 2010 dollars.
expensive options. For instance, Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) do not find evidence that
high deductible plans increase price shopping.31 Instead, deductibles may simply lead to
larger bill shock. In this section, I examine the effect of combining high cost sharing with
the New Hampshire price transparency website. I find that the interaction of these two
policies generates larger savings than the price transparency alone.
In Table 3.5 panel (b), I consider that case in which individuals all have plans with a 50
percent coinsurance rate. In this case, individuals have more incentive to use the website
since the potential savings are larger. Simulations imply that website usage increases 38
percent under the high cost sharing scenario. This puts additional downward pressure on
prices, resulting in mean prices that are 16 percent lower than with the price transparency
website alone. Under high cost sharing, the market is relatively efficient when individu-
als have access to the price transparency website. Comparing this with full price trans-
parency combined with high cost sharing, the additional supply-side effects are small. In
fact, the prices estimates with full price transparency and high cost sharing are slightly
higher than those estimates with full transparency alone. The effect on prices is due in
part to the fact that insurers have less incentive to negotiate lower prices if they incur a
31Although the sample of consumers examined by Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) had access to a price trans-
parency tool, they note that only a small fraction of consumers knew about it.
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Table 3.7: Counterfactual Net Welfare Impact for Consumers,
Providers, and Insurers
Annual
Per Visit ∆ Welfare
∆ Welfare (millions)
(a) Holding Cost Sharing Fixed
No Transparency (baseline)
Website 1.9 0.1
Full Transparency 31.7 2.5
(b) With High Cost Sharing
No Transparency 32.4 2.5
Website 53.9 4.2
Full Transparency 231.8 18.0
Notes: Figures refer to overall welfare effects for consumers,
providers, and insurers due to the fact that consumers switch to
providers with lower marginal cost. High cost sharing refers to 50%
cost sharing. All figures in 2010 dollars.
smaller portion of the negotiated price.
High cost sharing leads to a large reduction in price dispersion. However, under high
cost sharing, price dispersion actually grows as more individuals are informed about
prices. When negotiating prices, the incentives of the insurer are multifaceted, result-
ing in a complex effect on the distribution of prices (see Figure A7). As discussed above,
high cost sharing means that insurers have less incentive to negotiate low prices in some
cases, especially if they know that consumers can shop around. Therefore, it is not always
the case that price dispersion declines with increased price transparency.
Table 3.6 reports the impact on transaction prices, welfare, and total annual spending
taking into account both the demand- and supply-side effects. When the website is com-
bined with high cost sharing, the annual savings total $13.5 million, over 6 times larger
than with the website alone. Full price transparency results in $36.3 million in savings.
Due to the high cost sharing, these savings accrue to the insurer, whereas the consumers
have higher out-of-pocket cost. However, it is possible that insurer savings are passed on
to consumers in the form of lower insurance premiums.32
32This would require an explicit model of insurer competition. See Ho and Lee (2017).
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Panel (b) of Table 3.7 shows the overall welfare impact of combining price transparency
with high cost sharing. Although much of the reduction in health care spending is due
to a transfer from providers to insurers, there are still significant net welfare gains. When
full price transparency is combined with high cost sharing, many consumers switch to
lower marginal cost providers, resulting in a welfare gain of $18.0 million annually.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I study how price transparency in the market for medical imaging pro-
cedures affects negotiated health care prices. I contribute to the literature by developing
an empirical model of competition in the market for medical procedures that separately
accounts for consumer preferences and consumer uncertainty about prices.
The results imply that price transparency, if used widely, leads to lower provider
markups, generating large savings for consumers and insurers. In particular, counter-
factual simulations imply that there are considerable spending reductions when roughly
half of consumers are informed about prices. The savings are due in large part to the
fact that demand effectively becomes more elastic when a large fraction of consumers
are informed, allowing insurers to negotiate lower prices with providers. Given that
price transparency leads to a positive externality for uninformed consumers by reduc-
ing prices, the website is underused relative to the social optimum. Overall, I find that
spending on medical imaging procedures would decline by $16.3 million per year if all
consumers were informed about prices.
I also find that price transparency tools would be more widely used if consumers were
more exposed to the full price of medical services. In addition, consumers would have
more incentive to choose the lowest cost provider once they had price information. This
in turn would allow insurers to negotiate prices that would be almost as low as the full
information case without high cost sharing. Overall, price transparency tools combined
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with high cost sharing, defined as 50 percent cost sharing, would result in a $13.5 million
annual reduction in medical imaging spending in the state.
Although the empirical analysis in this paper focuses on X-rays, CT scans, and MRI
scans, the lack of price transparency likely has implications for other medical procedures
that are “shoppable”. This includes other outpatient procedures and services such as
primary care office visits, simple elective surgeries, and diagnostic testing procedures, as
well as some inpatient procedures such as newborn delivery. Previous analysis of health
care expenditures has estimated that over 40 percent of health care spending is on services
that are potentially shoppable.33
Firms sometimes justify opaque pricing by noting that there is uncertainty about cost
that is only resolved once the service is provided. Although I argue this is not the case
for standardized medical imaging procedures, this may be an issue for other medical
services. For instance, hospitals may not know how complex a surgery will be until a
patient is on the operating room table. While research has examined the incentives to
increase search costs (e.g. Ellison and Ellison 2009; Ellison and Wolitzky 2012), there is
little evidence on the incentives of firms in this context. One possible direction for future
research would be to examine firm incentives for price transparency, especially when
marginal cost is individual-specific.
I conclude that information frictions are important for understanding the effect of com-
petition in the market for health care services. Similar information frictions may lead to
higher prices in other markets. From a policy perspective, I argue that health care price
transparency has substantial promise that has not yet been fully realized.
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Appendix
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON DATA
CONSTRUCTION
This section describes the construction of the data in further detail.
Sample Selection
In the main specification, I consider the universe of private-health insurance claims for
individuals under age 65. Individual age 65 and older may have Medicare in addition
to their private insurance, making them a very selected population. I also remove claims
that were denied or refunded.
I identify the universe of radiology procedure by linking procedure descriptions from
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) CPT/HCPCS Database to the procedure
codes in the claims database. Procedure codes that changed description are assigned
separate identifiers.
I also use the CMS CPT/HCPCS Database to identify the subset of radiology proce-
dures with price information available on the HealthCost website. A procedure on the
website may refer to multiple procedure codes (e.g. the website does not provide sepa-
rate price information for a knee X-ray with 2 views versus a knee X-ray with 3 views,
even though these have different procedure codes.34 The list of procedures on the website
34The HealthCost website often only used one CPT/HCPCS code to calculate prices, however prices are
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and associated CPT/HCPCS codes are given in Appendix Table A7.
Visit Price and Principal Procedure Price
Prices on the website are calculated by aggregating all health claims related to the
radiology procedure, which I call the visit price. I use a similar method as the website,
with some important differences. In this section, I describe how visit prices are calculated
and how my method differs from that of the website.35
Like the website, I sum the price of all medical claims on the day of the visit to get the
visit price. I exclude visits in which the individual had inpatient claims as well as visits
in which the most expensive procedure was not a radiology procedure.
The New Hampshire Insurance Commission removed claims when the total charge
was above the 95th percentile. They also remove visits in which the patient out-of-pocket
price was in the lowest one percentile or highest fifth percentile. Unlike the website, I
do not remove any visits based on price. Although outliers may be an issue for surgi-
cal procedures in which the complexity of a given surgery can vary widely, radiology
procedures are fairly homogenous.
The website generally calculates the prices using a single procedure code. For instance,
in order to calculate the price of a foot X-ray, the website consider the price of procedure
code 73620, defined as an X-ray exam of the foot with 2 views. However, individuals re-
ceiving an X-ray exam with 1 view may also use the website and are likely to be unaware
that the posted prices are for 2 views. Since price of these procedures is highly correlated
for a given provider, the individual may still benefit from the information. For this rea-
son, I consider all procedures with a description matching a procedure on the website to
be treated, even if it was not included when calculating prices for the website.
highly correlated.
35The detailed method used by the New Hampshire Insurance Department is described on the website.
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Additional Data Sources
Nominal prices of radiology procedures are generally trending upwards over the pe-
riod. All prices are inflation-adjusted to 2010 dollars using the Medical Care Services CPI
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even so, real prices are still generally increasing
over the period.
I use a number of additional sources to construct demographic covariates. In order to
construct the Charlson comorbidity index, I use Stagg (2006). The Charlson comorbid-
ity index is calculated for each individual for each year. I obtain information about the
urbanization/rurality of each zip code using the 2014 Rural-Urban Chartbook from the
Rural Health Research Center. Finally, I use the CMS CPT/HCPCS Database to identify
procedures that are likely a results of an emergency or urgent care episode.
APPENDIX B: EFFECT ON PRICE TRENDS
I find evidence that the effect of the website grows consistently over the five year pe-
riod after the website’s introduction. I argue that this is likely due in part to the delayed
supply-side response and the increase in website usage over time. An alternative expla-
nation is that the website affected health expenditure growth.
I estimate an alternative model that allows the effect of the website to vary linearly
over the period after the website began. This specification is:
log(1+ pimjkt) = β(OnWebm×YearsSinceWebsitet)+ αXit+λm+λk+λt+ εimjkt (3.10)
Rather than include dummy variable Postt as in the baseline specification, I now in-





(t− t0)/12 if t ≥ t0
0 if t < t0
(3.11)
where t0 is the month of the website introduction, March 2007.
In this specification, β is now interpreted as the annual effect of the website. Or more
precisely, it is the log-point change in transaction prices due to the website being available
for an additional year.
The results are presented in Appendix Table A4. Each year the website is available
decreases out-of-pocket prices by 3.8 log points. This is statistically significant at the 1
percent level. Therefore, if the trend continues, the website is predicted to lower out-of-
pocket prices by 32 percent in a decade. For the insurer paid amount, there is no evidence
of an increasing annual effect of the website. The coefficient is negative but insignificant.
Although I interpret the effect as a change in price levels in the main specifications,
future research is needed to examine whether price transparency can reduce health care
spending growth in the long run.
APPENDIX C: TREATMENT HETEROGENEITY BY PRICE
QUANTILE
Empirical Strategy
The price of radiology procedures varies widely. For instance, ultrasound examina-
tions can be relatively inexpensive while PET scans can be thousands of dollars. In this
section, I examine how the treatment effect of the website varies by price quantile. This
provides additional insight into the population affected by the introduction of the web-
site.
In particular, I am interested in the effect on the τth quantile
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Qτ(LogPriceimjkt|OnWebm, Postt, Xit) =β(τ)(OnWebm × Postt) + λ1(τ)OnWebm
+ λ2(τ)Postt + α(τ)Xit
(3.12)
In general, the quantile treatment effect implied by the difference-in-difference estima-
tor is asymptotically biased. This is because the quantile difference-in-difference estima-
tor assumes that the time effects and group affects are additive, a strong assumption in
a non-linear model. In order to recover the full distribution of counterfactual outcomes
when there is both panel variation and time variation, Athey and Imbens (2006) develop
the “changes-in-changes” model. Their approach has relatively mild assumption, namely
that the distribution of unobservables in the treated and untreated groups remains the
same across time. Another benefit of their approach is that it is invariant to the scale of
the dependent variable.
Note that the model is simplified in order to make it computationally tractable. Rather
than individual procedure fixed effects and month fixed effects, I use an indicator vari-
ables for whether procedures are on the website and an indicator variable for whether
the website has been introduced. I include covariates using the approach developed by
Melly and Santangelo (2015).
Results
The results from both the quantile difference-in-difference model and the changes-in-
changes model are presented in Figure A3. Both approaches yield similar conclusions,
but I focus on the results from the changes-in-changes model.
I estimate the effect of the website by price decile. All but the lowest price procedures
are significantly affected by the website. This is consistent with the intuition that individ-
uals having inexpensive procedures are less likely to use the website and shop around
since they have less to gain from switching to a low cost provider. Prices at the 6th decile
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are the most affected, and see a price decline of more than 10 percent.
There is a significant affect for the highest price procedures, but the point estimate is
relatively small. This may be due to the fact that expensive procedures can be highly-
specialized, and it may be more difficult to switch to a low price provider. Consequently,
the benefits from the website are smaller.
APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR REDUCED-FORM
ANALYSIS
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Notes: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Quantile difference-in-difference (DID) model
estimated using full sample. Changes-in-changes (CIC) model estimated using quarter sample.
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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR REDUCED-FORM
ANALYSIS
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Table A1: Radiology Procedures with Price Information Available on HealthCost Website
Website Procedure CPT/HCPCS Detailed
Name Code Description
Ankle X-Ray 73610 X-ray ankle
Bone Density Scan 76075 Dual X-ray absorptiometry, axial skeleton
77080 Dual X-ray absorptiometry, axial skeleton
77082 Dual X-ray absorptiometry, vertebral fracture
76076 Dual X-ray absorptiometry, appendicular skeleton
76071 CT bone density, peripheral
Chest X-Ray 71020 Chest x-ray, two views, frontal and lateral
71035 Chest x-ray, special views
71022 Chest x-ray, two views, frontal and lateral (with oblique)
71010 Chest x-ray, single view frontal
71101 Chest/ribs X-ray exam, three views
CT - Abdomen 74160 CT abdomen w/dye
74150 CT abdomen w/o dye
74170 CT abdomen w/o & w/dye
CT - Chest 71260 CT thorax w/dye
71250 CT thorax w/o dye
71270 CT thorax w/o & w/dye
CT - Pelvis 74177 CT Pelvis and Abdomen w/dye
72193 CT pelvis w/dye
72192 CT pelvis w/o dye
72194 CT pelvis w/o & w/dye
74178 CT Pelvis and Abdomen w/o & w/dye
74176 CT Pelvis and Abdomen w/o dye
Foot X-Ray 73630 Foot X-ray, ≥ three views
73650 Foot/heel X-ray
73620 Foot X-ray, two views
Knee X-Ray 73562 X-ray exam of knee, 3
73564 X-ray exam, knee, ≥ 4 views
73560 X-ray exam of knee, 1 or 2
73565 X-ray exam of knees
Mammogram 77057 Screening mammogram, bilateral
G0202 Screening mammogram, digital bilateral
77063 Screening mamogram, tomosynthesis bilateral
76090 Mammogram, unilateral
76091 Mammogram, bilateral
76092 Screening mammogram, film bilateral
MRI - Back 72148 MRI lumbar spine w/o dye
72158 MRI lumbar spine w/o & w/dye
72141 MRI neck spine w/o dye
72156 MRI neck spine w/o & w/dye
MRI - Brain 70553 MRI brain w/o & w/dye
70551 MRI brain w/o dye
MRI - Knee 73721 MRI knee w/o dye
73723 MRI knee w/o & w/dye
MRI - Pelvis 72197 MRI pelvis w/o & w/dye
72195 MRI pelvis w/o dye
74181 MRI abdomen w/o dye
74182 MRI abdomen w/dye
74183 MRI abdomen w/o & w/dye
72196 MRI pelvis w/dye
72198 MRI angiography pelvis w/o & w/dye
Myocardial Imaging 78465 Myocardial Imaging, multiple studies
78451 Myocardial Imaging, single studies
78452 Myocardial Imaging, single studies rest
78453 Myocardial Imaging, single studies planar
78454 Myocardial Imaging, multiple studies planar
78460 Myocardial Imaging, single studies planar quantification
78461 Myocardial Imaging, multiple studies planar quantification
78464 Myocardial Imaging, single studies
Shoulder X-Ray 73030 X-ray shoulder
73000 X-ray collar bone
73010 X-ray shoulder blade
73050 X-ray shoulder joints
Spine X-Ray 72100 X-ray lower spine, 2 or 3 views
72040 X-ray neck spine, 2 or 3 views
72050 X-ray neck spine, ≥ 4 views
72052 X-ray neck spine, complete
72110 X-ray lower spine, ≥ 4 views
72114 X-ray lower spine, complete
72120 X-ray lower spine, bending complete
72090 X-ray exam of trunk spine
72072 X-ray exam of thoracic spine
Ultrasound - Breast 76645 Ultrasound breast, real time
76641 Ultrasound breast, complete
76642 Ultrasound breast, limited
Ultrasound - Pelvic 76856 Ultrasound pelvic, complete
76700 Ultrasound abdomen, complete
76705 Ultrasound abdomen
76857 Ultrasound pelvic, limited
76830 Ultrasound transvaginal non-obstetrics
Ultrasound - Pregnancy 76805 Obstetrics ultrasound ≥ 14 wks, sngl fetus
76817 Obstetrics ultrasound, transvaginal
76816 Obstetrics ultrasound, follow-up, per fetus
76802 Obstetrics ultrasound < 14 wks, addl fetus
76801 Obstetrics ultrasound < 14 wks, single fetus
76811 Obstetrics ultrasound, detailed, sngl fetus
76810 Obstetrics ultrasound, ≥ 14 wks, addl fetus
76812 Obstetrics ultrasound, detailed, addl fetus
Wrist X-Ray 73110 X-ray exam of wrist, ≥ 3 views
73130 X-ray exam of wrist/hand
73090 X-ray exam of forearm
73100 X-ray exam of wrist, 2 views
Notes: Outdated procedure codes and codes not used during the sample period are not shown.
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Table A2: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price
Robustness Estimates
No Insurer FE Individual Inverse
No Insurer × Post With Fixed Hyperbolic
Controls Controls Interaction Trends Effects Sine
Dep Var: Patient Out-of-Pocket Price
OnWebm × Postt −0.069∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Mean level 86.62 86.64 86.50 86.50 86.50 86.50
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.358 0.376 0.376 0.406 0.367
Observations 3,592,076 3,579,071 3,404,442 3,403,645 3,415,266 3,404,442
Dep Var: Insurer Paid Amount
OnWebm × Postt −0.030∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Mean level 655.30 86.64 86.50 653.90 653.90 653.90
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.260 0.292 0.295 0.415 0.283
Observations 3,592,076 3,579,071 3,404,442 3,403,645 3,415,266 3,404,442
Dep Var Transformation log(1+ y) log(1+ y) log(1+ y) log(1+ y) log(1+ y) sinh−1 y
Indiv. Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Individual FE No No No No Yes No
Insurer FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Insurer FE × Post No No Yes No No No
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure Category Trend No No No Yes No No
Notes: The unit of observation is a patient visit, which may contain multiple medical claims. The sample consists of all commercial claims related
to outpatient radiology procedures in the state of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2011. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the
month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A3: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on Visit Price
Falsification Test
All No Deductible Deductible
Not Past Past
Dep Var: Log(1+Patient Out-of-Pocket Cost)
OnWebm × Postt 0.006 0.006 −0.007 −0.050
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.031)
Mean level 60.09 12.92 154.92 33.17
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.252 0.237 0.110
Observations 978,787 545,312 307,175 126,300
Dep Var: Log(1+Insurer Paid Amount)
OnWebm × Postt 0.007 0.014∗ 0.021 −0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013)
Mean level 549.57 532.51 517.16 702.04
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.366 0.255 0.415
Observations 978,787 545,312 307,175 126,300
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Charlson Comorbidity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance Org Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Procedure (CPT) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: In the above specification, post is defined as the period beginning March 2006, a year be-
fore the website actually launched. The unit of observation is a patient visit, which may contain
multiple medical claims. The sample consists of all commercial claims related to outpatient ra-
diology procedures in the state of New Hampshire over the period 2005 to 2007. OLS regression
standard errors clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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OnWebm × YearsSinceWebsitet −0.038∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Indiv. Controls Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean level 86.50 5.56
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.291
Observations 3,404,442 3,404,442
Notes: The sample is the same as the baseline specification. OLS regression
standard errors clustered at the month-year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A5: The Effect of Price Transparency Website on
Out-of-Pocket Price by Insurer Switching
Individual Individual Does
Switches Insurers Not Switch Insurers
Post-Website Post-Website
OnWebm × Postt −0.064∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018)
Full Controls Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Procedure FE Yes Yes
F statistic of diff. 1.102
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.346
Observations 2,844,724 559,718
Notes: The dependent variable is Log(1+Patient Out-of-Pocket Price). The
sample of individuals that switch insurers includes those that gain private in-
surance post-website. OLS regression standard errors clustered at the month-
year level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
APPENDIX F: DERIVATION OF WEBSITE USAGE BENEFIT
Here I derive the approximate benefit of using the price transparency website using a
second-order multivariate Taylor series around the expectation.36 The primary reason for
36In the context of standard errors, a similar approach is often referred to as the delta method.
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Table A6: The Price Transparency Website and Insurance Composition
by Insurance Type and Insurance Firm
Dependent Variable:
Harvard Matthew
Anthem Cigna Pilgrim Thornton Other
Postt 8, 569 −4, 624 3, 475 −6, 430 −987
(14, 916) (10, 769) (14, 996) (6, 701) (4, 173)
Mean level 163,215 102,042 69,845 100,457 50,582
Adjusted R2
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
PPO POS HMO EPO Indemnity
Postt 10, 782 −1, 572∗∗ −4, 233 −4, 551 −422
(2, 272) (53) (1, 907) (4, 266) (4, 602)
Mean level 116,592 66,921 229,916 41,063 31,650
Adjusted R2 0.987 0.911 0.868 0.938 0.809
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Outcome is number of individuals enrolled in each insurance type or insurance firm in each month. OLS
regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
using this approximation is that the expression must be computed in every iteration of
the estimation procedure. Therefore, simulating the high-dimensional integral is compu-
tationally infeasible.
If we wish to approximate the first moment of the function f (x1, x2, . . . , xN) given
mean values (µ1, µ2, . . . , µN), the second-order Taylor series is
E[ f (x1, x2, . . . , xN)] ≈













∂2 f (µ1, µ2, . . . , µN)
∂xn∂xk
E(xn−µn)(xk−µk)
In this case, I wish to approximate the expected value of consumer surplus if individuals








exp(−γi p˜OOPijkmt + δijkmt))
]
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Since price signals are independent
EpOOPikmt
[








if j = j
′
0 if j 6= j′
Furthermore, note that
∂2 log(∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γi p˜OOPij′ kmt + δijkmt))
∂ p˜OOPijkmt
2 =
γ2i exp(−γi p˜OOPij′ kmt + δijkmt)∑j′∈Nkmt\j exp(−γi p˜OOPij′ kmt + δijkmt)[
∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γi p˜OOPij′ kmt + δijkmt)
]2











































































since the expected bill shock from the individual’s perspective is zero.
The value of the website is the difference between expected consumer surplus with and
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I test this approximation by simulating draws from the distribution of beliefs, comput-
ing consumers surplus, and then averaging over the draws to compute the expectation.
I find that the simulated expectation is within 5 percent of the second-order approxima-
tion using reasonable parameter values. For a more detailed discussion of the validity
of a Taylor series approximation for calculating welfare in a macroeconomic context, see
Woodford (2001).
APPENDIX G: DETAILS ON BAYESIAN INTERPRETATION OF
THE DEMAND MODEL AND ESTIMATION
In this section, I present the model as it is estimated in a Bayesian framework. As
I describe in Section 2.3.4, reformulating the model in this way allows for a computa-
tionally feasible estimation strategy that takes advantage of recent advances in Bayesian
estimation but does not change the structural interpretation of parameters.
In general, the posterior is defined as
P(Θ|D) ∝ L˘(D|Θ)P(Θ)
where L˘(D|Θ) is the likelihood given data D and P(Θ) is the distribution of the parame-
ter prior.
Start by defining an individual’s choice probabilities conditional on unobservables, γi
and eikmt:
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sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|γi, eikmt) =
ϑikmt ·
exp(−γipOOPijkmt + δijkmt)
∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γipOOPij′ kmt + δij′ kmt)
+ (1− ϑikmt) ·
exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPijkmt + eijkmt) + δijkmt)
∑j′∈Nkmt exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPij′ kmt + eij′ kmt) + δij′ kmt)
The simplified likelihood, conditional on unobservables, is then
L˘(D|Θ) = [sijkmt(Nkmt, pkmt|γi, eikmt)]yijkmt
Note that, unlike Equation 2.24, this is a closed-form expression. This likelihood function





1+ exp(θbikmt − φxikmt)
)
(Website Usage)
γi ∼ N(γ¯+ ρcik, (σγ)2) (Price Sensitivity)
eijkmt ∼ N(0, σ2h) (Signal Noise)
The remaining parameters are given uninformative priors.
APPENDIX H: DETAILS ON BARGAINING FIRST ORDER
CONDITION















For brevity, I have simplified the notation and omitted the expectation over eikmt.
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(1− τ) (sijkmt[pjkmt −mcjkmt])τ (∆jΠKijkmt)−λ ∂ΠKikmt∂pjkmt = 0
Now solving for the markup:























for the case in which there is price uncertainty (#kmt = 0).
Given the derivations below, the case in which there is full information (#kmt = 1) is easily
derived by setting eijkmt = 0 and wikmt = 1.





−γiwikmtcikmtsijkmt(1− sijkmt) if j′ = j
γiwikmtcikmtsijkmtsij′ kmt if j
′ 6= j
Note that the above assumes that each individual’s prior, which is determined by p¯OOPkmt
and s¯2kmt, is a constant that is not affected by a price change (i.e.
∂wikmt
∂pjkmt
= 1). This is
justified by the fact that each provider likely has a negligible effect on consumer priors,
especially when the choice set is large. Therefore, I argue providers are unlikely to in-
ternalize this effect. For the same reason, I also use this assumption when deriving the
insurer’s problem.




















exp(−γiwikmt(pOOPij′ kmt + eij′ kmt) + δij′ kmt)]
+ ∑
j′∈Nkmt
[wikmteij′ kmt + (1− wikmt)( p¯OOPkmt − pOOPij′ kmt)]sij′ kmt
= −cikmtsijkmt−γiwikmtcikmtsijkmt[wikmt(1− ∑
j′∈Nkmt
eij′ kmtsij′ kmt)− cikmt(1−wikmt)(1− ∑
j′∈Nkmt
pj′ kmtsij′ kmt)]








pj′ kmt(1− cikmt)sij′ kmt]
= (1− cikmt)sijkmt(1− pjkmtγiwikmtcikmt) + ∑
j′∈Nkmt
[pj′ kmt(1− cikmt)γiwikmtcikmtsijkmtsij′ kmt]
APPENDIX I: DETAILS ON PROCEDURE FOR SIMULATING
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES
In order to find counterfactual equilibrium prices, I start by finding choice probabilities
as a function of the vector of prices, sijkmt(pkmt), which depend on whether consumers
know prices and the degree of cost sharing. This can then be used to find the consumer
surplus, CSikmt(pkmt), and insurer cost, TCikmt(pkmt) which are also depend on policy-
relevant parameters.
With estimates of the bargaining parameter, τˆ, weight on consumer surplus, ζˆ, and the





























The iterative algorithm proceeds as follows:





3. Iterate until all prices are optimal given all other prices (i.e. until prices converge
within a mean tolerance of $1).
This equilibrium vector of prices can them be used to simulate spending and welfare
given demand.
37In rare cases, it is possible for the model to predict negative prices. I bound prices to be positive.
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APPENDIX J: STRUCTURAL MODEL APPENDIX TABLES
Table A7: List of Medical Imaging Procedures
CPT Short On CPT Short On CPT Short On
Code Description Website Code Description Website Code Description Website
70100 X-ray exam of jaw 71100 X-ray exam of ribs 72126 CT neck spine w/dye
73610 X-ray exam of ankle × 71022 X-ray chest × 70491 CT soft tissue neck w/dye
73615 X-ray of ankle contrast 73130 X-ray exam of hand × 72191 CT angiograph pelv w/o&w/dye
70160 X-ray exam of nasal bones 75743 X-ray artery, lungs 74176 CT abd & pelvis w/o contrast ×
70030 X-ray eye for foreign body 75726 X-ray artery, abdomen 74160 CT abdomen w/dye ×
73050 X-ray exam of shoulders × 73600 X-ray exam of ankle 70470 CT head/brain w/o & w/dye
75680 X-rays artery, neck 73085 X-ray of elbow contrast 70496 CT angiography, head
74415 X-ray, urinary tract contrast 75803 X-ray lymph vessel,arms/legs 72132 CT lumbar spine w/dye
73520 X-ray exam of hips 73060 X-ray exam of humerus 72131 CT lumbar spine w/o dye
71035 X-ray chest × 73090 X-ray exam of forearm × 72158 MRI lumbar spine w/o & w/dye ×
71110 X-ray exam of ribs 71111 X-ray exam of ribs/chest 70544 MRI angiography head w/o dye
73630 X-ray exam of foot × 70150 X-ray exam of facial bones 70557 MRI brain w/o dye
73010 X-ray exam of shoulder blade × 75685 X-ray artery, spine 75559 MRI cardiac w/stress img
72110 X-ray exam of lower spine × 71030 X-ray chest 72157 MRI chest spine w/o & w/dye ×
71021 X-ray chest 73550 X-ray exam of thigh 72148 MRI lumbar spine w/o dye ×
75519 X-ray heart/catheterization 73564 X-ray exam, knee, 4 or more × 73222 MRI joint upr extrem w/dye
75731 X-rays artery, adrenal gland 70110 X-ray exam of jaw 70540 MRI orbit/face/neck w/o dye
70210 X-ray exam of sinuses 75733 X-ray artery, adrenals 72146 MRI chest spine w/o dye ×
75724 X-rays artery, kidneys 70250 X-ray exam of skull 72196 MRI pelvis w/dye ×
72220 X-ray exam of tailbone 72069 X-ray exam of trunk spine 72198 MRI angio pelvis w/o & w/dye ×
77072 X-rays for bone age 72050 X-ray exam of neck spine × 73225 MRI angio upr extr w/o&w/dye
73525 X-ray of hip with contrast 75801 X-raylymph vessel, arm/leg 75553 MRI heart for morph w/dye
70330 X-ray exam of jaw joints 73100 X-ray exam of wrist × 71550 MRI chest w/o dye
73080 X-ray exam of elbow 73592 X-ray exam of leg, infant 73721 MRI jnt of lwr extre w/o dye ×
71130 X-ray exam of breastbone 71101 X-ray exam of ribs/chest × 71552 MRI chest w/o & w/dye
73562 X-ray exam of knee, 3 × 75710 X-ray artery, arm/leg 70558 MRI brain w/dye
73660 X-ray exam of toe(s) 72052 X-ray exam of neck spine × 74183 MRI abdomen w/o & w/dye ×
72010 X-ray exam of spine 72072 X-ray exam of thoracic spine × 70552 MRI brain w/dye
74405 X-ray urinary tract contrast 73510 X-ray exam of hip 72149 MRI lumbar spine w/dye
74320 X-ray of bile ducts contrast 72114 X-ray exam of lower spine × 70545 MRI angiography head w/dye
73580 X-ray of knee joint contrast 75527 X-ray heart/catheterization 73718 MRI lower extremity w/o dye ×
72170 X-ray exam of pelvis 70332 X-ray exam of jaw joint 73720 MRI lwr extremity w/o&w/dye ×
75665 X-rays artery, head & neck 73620 X-ray exam of foot × 71551 MRI chest w/dye
72090 X-ray exam of trunk spine × 72200 X-ray exam sacroiliac joints 70551 MRI brain w/o dye ×
75716 X-ray artery, arms/legs 73590 X-ray exam of lower leg 70547 MRI angiography neck w/o dye
73040 X-ray of shoulder w/contrast 74020 X-ray exam of abdomen 70543 MRI orbt/fac/nck w/o & w/dye
72100 X-ray exam of lower spine × 75573 CT heart w/3d image congen 73719 MRI lower extremity w/dye
75805 X-ray lymph vessel, trunk 75572 CT heart w/3d image 73219 MRI upper extremity w/dye
74301 X-rays at surgery add-on 72128 CT chest spine w/o dye 73723 MRI joint lwr extr w/o&w/dye ×
74305 X-ray bile ducts/pancreas 75574 CT angio hrt w/3d image 70553 MRI brain w/o & w/dye ×
73000 X-ray exam of collar bone × 72130 CT chest spine w/o & w/dye 75562 MRI card flow/vel w/dye
72120 X-ray exam of lower spine × 72127 CT neck spine w/o & w/dye 72197 MRI pelvis w/o & w/dye ×
70200 X-ray exam of eye sockets 74150 CT abdomen w/o dye × 75556 MRI cardiac flow mapping
71120 X-ray exam of breastbone 70498 CT angiography, neck 75558 MRI cardiac flow/velocity
70130 X-ray exam of mastoids 73702 CT lwr extremity w/o&w/dye 70559 MRI brain w/o & w/dye
70260 X-ray exam of skull 72129 CT chest spine w/dye 76390 MRI spectroscopy
75774 X-ray artery, each vessel 72133 CT lumbar spine w/o & w/dye 75561 MRI cardiac for morph w/dye
71010 X-ray chest × 73701 CT lower extremity w/dye 75552 MRI heart for morph w/o dye
72080 X-ray exam of trunk spine 70490 CT soft tissue neck w/o dye 75555 MRI cardiac/limited study
74000 X-ray exam of abdomen 70480 CT orbit/ear/fossa w/o dye 74182 MRI abdomen w/dye ×
71020 X-ray chest × 72125 CT neck spine w/o dye 75557 MRI cardiac for morph
75671 X-ray artery, head & neck 74178 CT abd & pelv 1/> regns × 72147 MRI chest spine w/dye
73110 X-ray exam of wrist × 70482 CT orbit/ear/fossa w/o&w/dye 70546 MRI angiograph head w/o&w/dye
75660 X-ray artery, head & neck 73201 CT upper extremity w/dye 73218 MRI upper extremity w/o dye ×
75722 X-ray artery, kidney 73202 CT uppr extremity w/o&w/dye 72159 MRI angio spine w/o&w/dye
73030 X-ray exam of shoulder × 71260 CT thorax w/dye × 72141 MRI neck spine w/o dye ×
73092 X-ray exam of arm, infant 73206 CT angio upr extrm w/o&w/dye 73220 MRI uppr extremity w/o&w/dye ×
75500 X-ray cinema heart vessels 71270 CT thorax w/o & w/dye × 70549 MRI angiograph neck w/o&w/dye
75676 X-ray artery, neck 71275 CT angiography, chest 73725 MRI ang lwr ext w or w/o dye
72040 X-ray exam of neck spine × 73700 CT lower extremity w/o dye 73223 MRI joint upr extr w/o&w/dye
74400 X-ray urinary tract contrast 70486 CT maxillofacial w/o dye 73722 MRI joint of lwr extr w/dye
75741 X-ray artery, lung 70460 CT head/brain w/dye 74185 MRI angio, abdom w orw/o dye
75662 X-ray artery, head & neck 70488 CT maxillofacial w/o & w/dye 76400 MRI bone marrow
73542 X-ray exam, sacroiliac joint 70487 CT maxillofacial w/dye 72195 MRI pelvis w/o dye ×
75705 X-ray artery, spine 75571 CT hrt w/o dye w/ca test 76498 MRI procedure
73560 X-ray exam of knee, 1 or 2 × 72194 CT pelvis w/o & w/dye × 70542 MRI orbit/face/neck w/dye
75807 X-ray lymph vessel, trunk 72193 CT pelvis w/dye × 72156 MRI neck spine w/o & w/dye ×
73565 X-ray exam of knees × 73200 CT upper extremity w/o dye 75563 MRI cardiac w/stress img & dye
70220 X-ray exam of sinuses 72192 CT pelvis w/o dye × 70336 MRI, jaw joint
74300 X-ray bile ducts/pancreas 74175 CT angio abdom w/o & w/dye 70541 MRI, head (MRA)
75650 X-ray artery, head & neck 70450 CT head/brain w/o dye 72142 MRI neck spine w/dye
75523 X-ray heart /catheterization 76360 CT scan for needle biopsy 75565 MRI cardiac veloc flow mapping
73540 X-ray exam of pelvis & hips 75635 CT angio abdominal arteries 74181 MRI abdomen w/o dye ×
73650 X-ray exam of heel × 74177 CT abd & pelv w/contrast × 70548 MRI angiography neck w/dye
75756 X-ray artery, chest 74170 CT abdomen w/o & w/dye × 75560 MRI cardiac flow/vel/stress
75736 X-ray artery, pelvis 73706 CT angio lwr extr w/o&w/dye 73221 MRI joint upr extrem w/o dye
75658 X-ray artery, arm 76497 CT procedure 75564 MRI hrt w/flo/vel/strs & dye
73140 X-ray exam of finger(s) × 70481 CT orbit/ear/fossa w/dye 71555 MRI angio chest w or w/o dye
73115 X-ray of wrist contrast × 70492 CT sft tsue nck w/o & w/dye
77071 X-ray stress view 71250 CT thorax w/o dye ×
70360 X-ray exam of neck 74174 CT angio abd&pelv w/o&w/dye
Notes: Procedures listed on website are more broad than procedures as defined by CPT codes (i.e. a selected website procedure may refer to multiple CPT codes). CPT codes that had modified descriptions over
the period are assigned separate identifiers in the analysis.
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Table A8: Potential Savings from Switching Providers
Patient Insurer
Switch to Lowest Switch to Provider Switch to Lowest Switch to Provider
Price Provider in 1st Quartile Price Provider in 1st Quartile
∆ Cost %∆ Cost ∆ Cost %∆ Cost ∆ Cost %∆ Cost ∆ Cost %∆ Cost
CT Scans
Over/No Deductible 33 66.2% 30 57.8% 1, 281 50.7% 1, 015 37.0%
Under Deductible 1, 114 42.2% 914 33.1%
MR Scans
Over/No Deductible 33 68.1% 35 69.8% 927 37.0% 676 25.9%
Under Deductible 796 36.0% 590 26.6%
X-Rays
Over/No Deductible 16 46.1% 15 41.3% 375 46.8% 331 36.5%
Under Deductible 457 50.8% 396 38.6%
Notes: Chart shows potential savings from switching to providers with lower negotiated prices within
individual’s choice set relative to observed choices. See Section 2.2.1 for definition of choice set. If
provider in first quartile is more expensive then chosen provider, simulation assumes individuals do
not switch.
Table A9: Estimates from Multinomial Logit Demand Model
Estimate SE
Patient Out-of-Pocket price
×Website Available (−γ1) −0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0004)
×Website Not Available (−γ2) −0.0004 (0.0004)
Distance (α1) −0.0287∗∗∗ (0.0030)
Distance squared (α2) 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Referral Indicator (α3) 1.9939∗∗∗ (0.0313)
Hospital × Age ≤18 0.0769 (0.1667)
Hospital × Age 19-35 −0.0270 (0.1638)
Hospital × Age 36-50 −0.0141 (0.1568)
Hospital × Age 51-64 −0.1080 (0.1618)
Hospital ×Male −0.0863 (0.0671)
Hospital × Income 0.0112∗∗∗ (0.0022)
Hospital × BA −0.0313∗∗∗ (0.0040)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0361 (0.0444)
Hospital × Emergency 0.5407∗∗∗ (0.0861)




Notes: MLE estimates from a 2% sample of visits. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(a) Holding Cost Sharing Fixed
No Transparency (base) 309.3
Website 285.0 −24.3 −1.9
Full Transparency 136.7 −172.6 −13.4
(b) With High Cost Sharing
No Transparency 214.5 −94.8 −7.4
Website 199.0 −110.3 −8.6
Full Transparency 127.1 −182.1 −14.2
Notes: Transaction prices are calculated using recomputed prices for each counterfactual.
Counterfactual with price transparency website assumes website is available for all imag-
ing procedures in all years. High cost sharing refers to 50% cost sharing.
APPENDIX K: STRUCTURAL MODEL APPENDIX FIGURES
Figure A4: Cost Sharing and Deductible Status


















































Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month
Notes: Bars show the percent of medical imaging consumers that have not hit their
deductible conditional on having a plan with a deductible. Line shows the uncon-
ditional mean percent of total cost paid by the patient for each day of the year.
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Figure A5: Prices Variation within Individuals’ Choice Sets
Lead Provider 
Estimate of 















STILES	ROAD	IMAGING	 $148 $245 $394 MEDIUM MEDIUM
 603.898.3129
AMERICAN	MEDICAL	IMAGING $190 $371 $562 HIGH MEDIUM
 603.766.6736
DERRY	IMAGING	CENTER $275 $624 $898 HIGH MEDIUM
 603.537.1363
CHESHIRE	MEDICAL	CENTER $282 $647 $929 HIGH MEDIUM
 603.354.5400




$321 $762 $1,082 MEDIUM MEDIUM
 603.577.2000
CATHOLIC	MEDICAL	CENTER $369 $907 $1,276 MEDIUM HIGH
 603.668.3545




$375 $924 $1,299 MEDIUM MEDIUM
 603.524.3211
ELLIOT	HOSPITAL $394 $981 $1,375 MEDIUM HIGH
 603.669.5300
CONCORD	IMAGING	CENTER $457 $1,172 $1,630 HIGH MEDIUM
 603.225.0425
(a) Entering Procedure Information (b) List of Prices
Notes: Screenshots show the New Hampshire HealthCost website as it looked in 2015.
Over the period of analysis (2007 to 2010) the website had the same information.
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$0 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Total Negotiated Price





$0 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Total Negotiated Price
No Price Transparency (baseline)
Full Price Transparency




$0 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Total Negotiated Price
No Price Transparency + High Cost Sharing (baseline)




$0 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Total Negotiated Price
No Price Transparency + High Cost Sharing (baseline)
Full Price Transparency + High Cost Sharing
(c) Price Transparency Website + High Cost Sharing (d) Full Price Transparency + High Cost Sharing
Notes: Histograms show distribution of unweighted counterfactual prices across
providers, procedures, insurers, and years.
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